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Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure
In this thesis, the relationship between some aspects of industrial 
market structure and industry price-cost margins or profit-revenue ratios 
is investigated. This is done mainly by building mathematical models 
based upon the tenet of profit maximisation. Empirical tests of the 
hypotheses developed are carried out using regression analysis on recent 
UK data.
After an introductory chapter, the arguments are developed by 
successively taking structural features into account. Thus initially, 
problems involved in relating the structure of established firms in an 
industry to price-cost margins are considered. Then the possibilities 
and problems of potential entry into an industry are opened up. After 
that, the power of buyers from and sellers to the industry are brought 
into partial account. Additional potentially relevant structural 
factors receive a more cursory treatment before the analysis passes to 
empirical testing. At every stage, the relevant established literature 
is reviewed. It is found theoretically that the price-cost margin may 
be related to two main aspects of market structure, the "Herfindahl" 
index and a bilateral power index developed here. However, the commonly 
included "entry barrief variables need not, under reasonable assumptions, 
be considered relevant. The empirical results lend support to the 
theoretical conclusions regarding the Herfindahl and bilateral power 
indices.
The contribution to knowledge in the subject area achieved herein 
is (hopefully) mainly in the rigorous development and application of
models which have, in general, previously been rather vaguely based 
upon commonsense extensions of the fundamentals of economic theory.
In fact, the thesis consists to a large extent in the belief that 
industrial economic problems often considered as having theoretically 
indeterminate solutions may be profitably examined and "solved" 
rigorously, with the judicious use of restrictive assumptions.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
The General Area:
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate, in both theoretical 
and empirical terms, parts of the relationship between industrial 
structure and profit performance. This is by no means a novel aim.
The originality hopefully lies here in the amount of attention directed 
towards making more explicit the often inchoate theoretical basis of 
such structure-performance models.
In fact the estimation of structure-profit equations has quite 
a long history, at least in the US dating back to the 1950's. It lies 
at the heart of one side of empirical Industrial Economics, the cross­
industry estimation of relationships suggested by "economic theory",
(the other side being studies of individual industries). The basic 
premise behind this empirical work is that various factors characterised 
as structural features of an industry relate, via the conduct of those
in (and to some extent outside) the industry, to performance. These 
relationships, mainly flowing from the structural aspects to perform-
To give a very simple example, relevant to our purpose, consider 
the firm i with profits defined as:
(II is profit, p price, q quantity, c(q) variable costs and F fixed costs.) 
If that firm maximises profit by choosing optimal output then we may say 
that:
Footnotes are gathered at the end of each chapter, references at the end
.. I
ance, form what is known as the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm.
1
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Suppose the firm i is a monopolist, then from (1) we find its "price- 
cost margin" is equal to the reciprocal of the industry elasticity of 
demand for the good i sells. The relevant structural feature is the 
elasticity of demand facing i (st optimal output), and this feeds 
through, via the assumption that output and price are set to maximise 
profits (conduct) to the monopolist's price-cast margin, a measure of 
performance (also known as Lerner's measure of monopoly power). The 
theory, profit maximisation, has provided, via the paradigm, a hypo­
thesis which is in principle testable crass-sectionally (say) by 
comparing the price-cost margins of monopolists faced by differing 
industry elasticities of demand.
Now of course the sample of monopolists on which we could test 
such a hypothesis would be small. On the other hand if we are able 
to say something, for an industry of several firms, about the relation­
ship between the elasticity of demand facing a firm and that facing 
the industry then we could expand the potential sample greatly. This 
is one aspect of the task facing oligopoly theory, which is concerned 
with divining likely pricing and output outcomes when numbers in the 
industry are such that each firm has a perceptible influence on the 
fortunes of others. Almost by definition, because of the inter­
dependence, there is no unique solution, but there is a "general 
presumption" among economists that the greater the numbers in an 
industry, the more likely it is that prices and outputs approach the 
competitive level. In fact, as we show in the following chapter, 
despite the variety of solutions offered to the oligopoly problem, 
there are quite useful ways to characterise a wide range of these.
Wrapped up also with the concept of oligopoly theory is the 
problem of potential entry. For if firms look as if they are going 
to enter an industry, thereby lowering profits for those firms already
- 3 -
established, we might expect some reaction from established firms to
the potential threat. It is normally presumed that there exist partial
barriers to new entry into an industry, either pre-existing or erected
by established firms, but that nevertheless prices have to be set with
2some regard to the possibility of entry.
The two paragraphs above have outlined the main considerations 
which those who estimate structure-performance relationships wish to 
capture. Thus, a common activity in the UK is to attempt to explain 
the price-cost margin by means of the five-firm concentration ratio,
some measure of plant scale economies, the advertising-sales ratio and 
3so on. Perhaps (on a charitable interpretation) because of space 
pressures, empirical studies on these lines have tended to neglect 
any wide-ranging discussion of the theoretical underpinnings, and 
have often been content to refer back to previous work (which may be 
no more explicit), or to use as their justification a reference to 
the general corpus of economic theory. For example, Khalilzadeh- 
Shirazi (1974) considers that "the theoretical justification for the 
inclusion of the foregoing variables (seller concentration, measures 
of entry barriers, the rate of growth of demand) has been widely 
discussed in the literature (so) we will only briefly touch upon 
them." (p.67). Yet in a similar study Holterman (1973) is quite 
brazen:
"The hypotheses to be tested cannot be derived frcm economic 
theory without making many unacceptably restrictive assumptions ... 
economic theory is about an individual firm producing a single good .. 
Nevertheless they are all intuitively reasonable and there is nothing 
in economic theory to suggest that they are false." (p.121)
This is obviously an understatement of the status of economic 
modelling in the area. But the fact that the foundations for the
y
j
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hypotheses appear obscure makes progress by refutation of untrue 
postulates rather difficult.
There is a methodological point here. Suppose that existing 
largely ad hoc formulations work reasonably well. A Friedmanite 
would probably then argue that we are doing very little if we achieve 
a similar (or little better) degree of explanation based upon more
rigorous theorising. We question this argument by means of an example:
. . . 2 Assume a variable Y is m  truth related to X . Then for certain
numerical values of X (around unity), regressing Y on X will provide
a good fit to the data. But obviously if some new observations come
. . 2 up in which X is negative (say), the correspondence between X and X
will be much less close and our empirical relationship may appear even
to have broken down. We would not wish to take this example too far.
However, prediction would appear to be less hazardous if we decide to
introduce all variables ensuing from our theoretical discussion in as
"correct" a form as possible.^
Thus our thesis is almost diametrically opposed to that of
Holterman. We feel strongly that empirical work in the field should
start by being based fairly closely on a particular theory or theories.
For this reason we wish to develop mathematical models embodying
precise assumptions about firm behaviour following from the basic
tenet of profit maximisation. From these we derive formulae relating
structural variables to our performance measure. As will be clear
when we proceed in later chapters to a more detailed consideration of
the theoretical art in the various areas to be covered, this involves
substantial new work in extending existing models or even in developing
models more or less from first principles. In performing this exercise,
we do not of course believe that firms will act entirely accordingly to
our formulae, but we do consider that the development of such equations
will enable the empirical work to be much more soundly based.^
/
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A Plan of the Thesis
As we have said, we concentrate here on developing oligopoly 
theory (in directions most useful for subsequent empirical work) prior 
to empirical estimation of our model. Accordingly we allot the three 
chapters following this to a fairly extensive discussion and elaboration 
of the effects important structural variables might have on performance. 
The general basis, that entrepreneurs attempt (in some sense) to 
maximise profits, is relaxed, and then only briefly, in chapter 5.
We feel we have enough to cover without venturing too far from the 
traditional.
Chapter 2 is concerned with oligopoly theory proper, without 
the possibility of entry. As we note in that chapter, there are a 
number of traditional solutions to the problem, starting with that 
given by Cournot (1927).^ There is also a more modern type of approach 
through game theory. We attempt to review both types of work before 
going on to develop our particular synthesis which, while holding under 
fairly general conditions, still leads to interesting predictions.^ 
Basically we find that the price-cost margin can be expressed as a 
function of the Herfindahl index of industry concentration.
The area covered by chapter 2 is probably most developed in 
terms of previous mathematical modelling of the topics we cover. For 
we find when we move to consider the problem of potential competition 
in chapter 3 that work on the static limit pricing model has progressed 
very little since Modigliani's (1958) masterly analysis. We discuss 
this at length, together with a recent alternative, and build a 
synthesis of the two which we then extend to cover, among others, a 
case where there are many established non-collusive firms. We also 
attempt an assessment of the predictive content of the dynamic models 
concerned with entry retardation. However we finally reject the limit
V /
pricing model in favour of the capacity creation approach pioneered by 
Spence (1974) which will normally dominate in terms of profit available 
to established firms. This does not mean the earlier work is wasted, 
because the problem of the amount of excess capacity to create is 
conceptually the same as that of finding the limit price.
Chapter 4 extends our model into the rather neglected area of
the influence of bilateral power, that is the power of sellers to and
8buyers from the industry in question. We consider this to be one of 
the most novel and important parts of the thesis. As we see in that 
chapter, theoretical work in this direction has reached only as far as 
the indication of solutions to bilateral monopoly situations, though we 
are not alone in believing the concept of bilateral power to be 
potentially important. It is unfortunately a difficult topic to deal 
with comprehensively. Accordingly we develop a model (based on that 
given by Cournot) emanating from quite specific and fairly tractable 
assumptions. Having done so we consider its relationship to other 
possible formulations; given the paucity of previous work we do not 
feel able to do more. Again we derive a formula which can be used 
(approximately) for empirical purposes, moreover one which has slightly 
surprising implications. We find that under certain assumptions the 
"bilateral power" part may be separated from other effects. This 
finding is used (implicitly) to facilitate some of our exposition in 
chapter 5.
Chapter Sis more of a mixture than those listed above. The basic 
approach having been developed, we feel qualified to discuss previous 
empirical work. We first assess that work performed on UK datf^ then 
consider the question of an alternative performance measure widely 
used on US data. At the same time these studies throw up additional 
empirically used explanatory variables which we argue in the main are
- 6 -
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of rather doubtful relevance as used, within our framework. We do 
however consider that cyclical fluctuations have a place in our model 
and discuss a proxy for their effect. The final portions of the chapter 
very briefly extend our remit somewhat wider in thinking about utility 
maximisation and the question of lags and possible simultaneity 
problems.
The final chapter, apart from some isolated points of theory, is 
given over to detail on the data and sample and then estimation of the 
model. The data mainly emanates from two published sources, the Census 
of Production series and the series of Input-Output tables for the U.K. 
Our tests show, briefly, a reasonable measure of empirical support for 
our model, with both main structural variables achieving statistical 
significance, and indicate an apparent absence of serious econometric 
problems.
There are two appendices to the thesis. The first discusses two 
assumptions which will be fairly extensively used in developing the 
models of later chapters. These are that firms have constant marginal 
cost schedules (equal to average variable cost), and that they face 
demand curves of the constant elasticity form, within the relevant 
range. The former is necessary in order to relate the price-cost 
margin to the profit-revenue ratio and is used in developing the models 
of chapter 2. The latter is mainly used in chapters 3 and 4 but is also 
advantageous when we wish to discuss what happens to the margin as the 
number of firms in an industry changes. We provide brief justifications 
for the use of both these simplifying assumptions mainly by reference to 
empirical studies, where possible on UK data.
The second appendix contains some basic facts about the data we 
use, some of which are presupposed in later chapters (particularly chapter 
5). It also includes data on variables we generate which do not come
- 8 -
directly from published sources, namely the Herfindahl index and our 
bilateral power index. One point on the data which has widespread 
ramifications for our developed functional forms should however be 
mentioned here. We do this in the section below.
Ill The "Ratio" formulation
As we saw from our very simple model of the first section, one 
of the major determinants of price-cost margins in theory is the 
industry price elasticity of demand. This carries through to the 
more complex models of later chapters. Unfortunately, values for this 
have not been tabulated by anyone on any consistent basis. The most 
detailed work in recent years has been that performed by Deaton. He 
(1975 b) estimated the elasticity of demand for 37 commodities using 
various functional forms on post-war time-series data for Britain. Not 
unnaturally, he concentrated on consumer good industries which, again 
not unnaturally, are not a predominant feature of the Census. The 
upshot of this is that we estimate we could use only five of his values 
directly if we wanted to include figures for the elasticity of demand.
As we shall see in chapter 5, the approach followed by other 
9studies in this field has been to neglect this variable entirely. In 
doing so they implicitly assume that the elasticity of demand is the 
same for all industries. An alternative, followed here, is to take the 
basic theoretically generated structure-performance relationship at two 
time periods and form a ratio. If we then assume that the ratio of the 
demand elasticities in the two periods is a constant across industries, 
a postulate which seems intuitively more reasonable than the alternative, 
we may neglect that variable altogether. In fact, as we discuss in 
chapter 5, we modify this assumption by briefly considering possible 
determinants of differential effects on the elasticity of demand ratio
between industries.
- 9 -
Moreover, it turns out that by taking the ratio form of the basic 
equation we also hopefully cancel out some other elements of inter­
industry variation. For example, as we see in Chapter 2, we might 
expect individual industry's performance at a certain level of 
concentration to vary while in ratio form a change in concentration 
seems more likely to produce similar effects across industries. A 
similar argument might be made about barriers to entry. It is mainly 
for this reason that we decide to retain the ratio form despite making 
quite severe assumptions about constancy of elasticities when we come 
to use the bilateral power measure of chapter 4 empirically.
Despite saying that the ratio form of the basic equation should 
cancel out some sources of interindustry variance in performance, we do 
not believe that we are bound to obtain superior results by the use of 
that technique; perhaps the contrary. Our reasoning here would be that 
we might expect the profit-revenue ratio across industries not to exhibit 
proportionately as much variance as the ratio (at two time periods) of 
profit-revenue ratios across industries. This is fact turns out to be 
true for our sample. The coefficient of variation in the former case 
for 1968 is 0.232, while for the ratio of 1968 on 1963 values it is 2.247, 
nearly ten times as large.1® This being so, our method of estimation 
perhaps provides a stricter test of the model to be developed and, in 
that we are attempting to explain what happens as structure changes, it 
possibly also provides more policy-relevant conclusions.
10
FOOTNOTES
1. Though we cannot think of the phenomena as totally unidirectional, 
as we note briefly in chapter 5.
2. This should not be taken as a full summary of our arguments. See the 
following section.
3. We go into detail on these studies in chapter 5.
4. This does not imply we would be perfectly happy to indulge in prediction 
of course.
5. It could be that even after such theoretical work the empirical results 
would be poor. That at least should enable us to say something about 
behaviour though.
6. The book was of course written well before 1927, in fact in 1838, but 
we refer throughout the thesis to the 1927 edition.
7. That approach emanates partially from some work done jointly with 
Keith Cowling, as we mention where relevant.
8. It turns out in our particular model of the situation, sellers have no 
effect on the margin though.
9. An exception is Cowling and Waterson (1976), the ratio approach of 
which we utilise here.
10. The precise samples used will be discussed in Chapter 6. These figures 
are the ratio of sample standard deviation to mean of the logarithms 
of the relevant variables, over a sample of 50 industries. A similar 
pattern emerges for our alternative sample of 51 industries, and also 
if we use 1963 'level' figures instead of those for 1968.
Chapter 2; Oligopoly - A Basic Structure-Performance Model
Introduction:
There has been a tremendous volume of writing on the theory of 
oligopoly in the economics literature, which indicates that it has 
presented a sizeable problem to the economics profession. While the 
cases of perfect competition and monopoly have been solved to the 
satisfaction of the vast majority, oligopoly contains many features 
which make simple solutions unlikely.
A definition of what actually constitutes an oligopoly is hard 
to discern, but we shall consider that it is what is probably the 
general state of affairs prevailing in the economy, where the actions 
of some or all of the individual firms in an industry are not wholly 
unaffected by other firms in the industry. It is this interdependence 
which gives rise to many of the theoretical problems in modelling 
oligopoly behaviour.
Saying this of course begs the question of what an industry is. 
For most purposes it is not sensible to define an industry as a group 
of firms producing a perfectly homogenous product. Although some 
products appear almost perfectly homogenous (e.g. pure sulphur, cement, 
I" wire nails) and many are reasonably homogenous (e.g. tea, lavatory 
paper, motor oil), a great number of goods, while being of the same 
type, differ greatly in detail (e.g. shoes, paint and motor cars). It 
would seem reasonable to consider that even the last of the above sets 
of examples should constitute industries, since each one satisfies the 
same type of wants among consumers and is produced by similar processes 
that is there is a market for motor cars, for example. However, the 
presence of heterogeneity does cause problems in formulating theories
12 -
of oligopoly. Of course, those engaged in empirical work usually have 
to use statistics calculated on the basis of much wider categories 
than these, and this may also cause difficulty. Further, the fact 
that firms often provide a wide variety of products and that consump­
tion of certain goods may enhance or discourage consumption of related 
goods causes difficulties when using pure theory to explain actual 
observations.
Allied with the fact that many goods are of a heterogenous 
nature is the problem that firms may use different mixes of strategies 
in selling their products in the market. The pure strategy of price/ 
quantity setting is usually augmented by differing levels of advertising, 
salesmanship, service, and so forth.* Any theory attempting a close 
explanation of reality needs to take this into account, though of 
necessity those that do, incorporate such factors in a fairly simplistic 
manner.
Referring back to the concept of the industry, we should note that 
even if we can specify the exact number and size of firms solely prod­
ucing one undifferentiated product forconsumption we still have to 
consider the possibility that other firms may consider entry into the 
industry feasible at certain prices. Thus, the behaviour of the 
individual firms presently in the industry may be affected not only 
by their anticipations of how their rivals may react, but also by the 
possibility of the number of rivals increasing (or decreasing). Again, 
behaviour may be affected by the presence of powerful buyers from, or 
powerful sellers to, the industry. Such factors will have to be left 
to later chapters, for here we only intend to discuss the theory of 
oligopoly in pure form.
In dealing with solutions to the problem of oligopoly pricing, 
we shall first consider the classical theories using calculus methods
13
and then go on to enquire into the contribution of game theory. Of 
necessity neither of these sections pretend to be complete reviews of 
the extant literature, they merely provide a flavour of the type of 
models which have been used in attempting to describe oligopoly 
behaviour.
II The Classical Theories:
As stated earlier, interdependence among producers gives rise to
a multitude of possible solutions to the oligopoly problem. This is
2clearly seen if we consider a fairly conventional model, where there 
are N sellers of a standardised product with a single selling price in 
a market with no possibility of entry, inputs being purchased at given 
prices and outputs sold to price takers. Each firm will have a profit 
function.
ni = pqi “ ~ Fi i “ 1.2,...n.
where qi is the ith firm's output (Eqi = Q), p is market price, each 
firm has common variable cost function c(q^) and fixed costs F^. 
Equilibrium is reached by quantity variation, so that for maximum profits 
we require:
dn.i = 0
d zn.i < 0
d q £ d q 2
dn.
T h u s : d qi = P + q i S  • jf. - « ’ <’ i> ' 0 0 )
d 2 n. 
and —  
d qi
= 2 d £  d £  + d Q  ' dqi
dp d 2Q d 2p
< 3 ? /  ~ c "< q i> < 0
The second-order condition implies that the firm’s assumed marginal 
revenue function cuts its marginal cost function from above. Assuming 
that this holds, we can easily see that the firm's conjecture about
14 -
rfn d(q + q„ +
interdependence, that is the value of —  - -- + Vdqi dq.
is of crucial importance to the value of price and quantity at 
equilibrium. We may alternatively write the above term as:
dQ
dqi
= I +
d Z q. 
2 * 1  J 
dq. = 1 + X^, say.
therefore, summing (1) over N firms yields:
Np + S  Sqi{n?. " = °
Dividing by p and writing X = Zq. X./Q, |n
tl Cl + X)
N T i T  — ------ 0 ;
p - Zc'Cq^/N , + x
N h (2)
p. ¿q
Q * dp we have:
or
Cournot's (1927) theory of oligopoly assumes that each firm considers 
that the other firm's output will not change as a result of the firm 
in question changing his output. This means that X^ = 0 for all i, 
so X » 0; the "conjectural variations" term is zero. From (1) we have:
= 0 (3)
= — j— , where MC = c' (q.), all q. being equal. N|n| 1 1
(3) yields a set of "reaction functions" which should all intersect at 
positive outputs to give the equilibrium solution. They can be considered 
as defining a path to equilibrium.
These reaction functions are utilised by the leader in Stackleberg's 
theory of oligopoly. Consider the case where all but one firm act as 
"followers". For them we have that dQ/dq^ = 1. However the leader, 
knowing their reaction functions, uses them to obtain a more favourable 
position for himself. If he be the mC^ firm, then he has:
P + <Ji c,<9i>
and from (2): p - MC
P
15 -
are the followers'
"reduced form" reactions to m's output changes. This is obviously a 
special case of the general result given earlier, where not all the 
A^ are equal.
Other special cases which can be developed from the general model 
include the limiting case of collusion. Here, each firm knows that, if 
he raises or lowers output, the others will do likewise. Thus dQ/dq^=N 
and we have from (1):
A natural problem posed by all models involving conjectural 
variations is that of the stability of the solution. If for simplicity 
we choose to tike a Cournot duopoly then we may represent the reaction 
functions in a diagram as overleaf (Diagram 1). The idea of the approach 
to equilibrium may be stated thus:
Suppose A is initially a monopolist producing at point 3. B's 
initial reaction on entry is read off by tracing a vertical line upward 
to his reaction function, which gives a new output point at which A 
finds his position non-optimal. We trace a horizontal line to A's 
reaction function to obtain his preferred position and the process 
continues until, hopefully, point C is reached. This is then a stable 
equilibrium. Obviously, we may not reach a stable point for a number 
of reasons. In talking about the Cournot model, Fellner(1949) states that 
"the reaction functions will intersect, and at least one intersection 
will have to be stable, although there may be several intersections
p + Qdp/dQ - c'(q^) = 0
while from p - MC _ _1_
P
)
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DIAGRAM 2.1*
Cournot reaction functions
This figure is substantially a redrawing of Fellner's (1949) 
figure 1 p. 59.
*  i.e. diagram 1 of chapter 2. Where it does not cause ambiguity 
we reference diagrams in the text simply as'diagram 1" etc.
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including stable ones. Cournot, of course, actually implied that 
points 1, 2, 3 and 4 were arranged in this manner ... " (p.63). Again, 
when talking about conjectural variations on output more generally, he 
says: "It is generally realised, of course, that the F functions in 
this extended sense need not intersect for positive outputs, and that 
if they intersect, the point of intersection need not be stable even 
in the sense in which the Cournot intersection i£ stable" (p.73).
Further problems could be caused by increases in numbers and by the 
fact that the firms may realise that their assumptions are being proven 
wrong.
There are two general answers to such difficulties. The first 
is to assert that although the dynamic stability may be questionable,
the static equilibrium points may exist independent of this. This point 
. 3will be considered later. The other is of course slavishly to set up 
Cournot-type models under various assumptions and to consider their 
dynamic properties. Amongst those who have done this are Quandt (1967), 
Quandt and McManus (1961)» and Hadar (1966). For example, Quandt and 
McManus set up a Cournot model with (in one case) linear demand and 
cost functions. Lags are discrete and single-period so that a first- 
order difference equation results. Stability of this is then easily 
discerned in the general solution. Quandt summarises the conclusions 
on the Cournot model as depending heavily on whether the dynamic adjust­
ment is formulated as discrete or continuous: with discrete models, 
increasing marginal cost is stabilising, and for given demand and cost 
functions, an increase in the number of firms tends to be destabilising. 
In contrast, continuous dynamic adjustment processes are stable for all 
a priori admissable values of the parameter. Quandt and McManus say:
"As is usual in dynamics, a lot depends upon just what dynamic assump­
tions are made". We shall not pursue this particular aspect of stability
any further here.
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We might also consider that we can represent Sweezy's ( 1939) Kinked 
Demand Curve theory using the concept of conjectural variations on 
output. Although that theory was in fact set up in terms of price 
reactions, the main points of the model may be brought out by taking 
it that the firms assume:
dq./dq. = 0 for dq. < 0
J  l  l
and dq./dq. = 1 for dq. > 0
J  l
As is well known, the fact that the conjecture about price falls 
(or quantity increases) is different from that about price rises 
(quantity falls) gives rise to a kink in the imagined demand curve.
The upper section of the curve is very much more elastic than the 
lower portion, as others follow downwards, yet not upwards. This means 
of course that the marginal revenue curve is discontinuous over a 
certain range of prices at the going quantity. However, the supposed 
main advantage of the kinked demand curve theory, that is its explana­
tion of infrequent price changes as due to marginal cost changes within 
the discontinuous range not affecting price, is at the same time its 
major disadvantage. For the corollary of this is that the theory, can 
attempt little explanation of the extent to which price is above marginal 
cost. Obviously limits may be prescribed, and these will be affected by 
the industry elasticity of demand and the number of firms in the industry, 
but within these limits the theory is silent. There is also the question 
(considered by Efroymson (1943)) of whether the assumptions made are 
valid in boom conditions and, if so, when a switch is made.
H I  The Game Theoretic Approach:
So far, we have been considering conventional maximisation 
solutions to the oligopoly problem; we have encountered a number of
19 -
these yet there are many more. This plethora of models has lead other 
economists to look at the situation afresh. As Shubik (1959, p.viii) 
puts it " ... in an oligopoly ... no maximum problem exists; indeed 
the notion of a maximum has no meaning. It is necessary to erect a 
new conceptual and, by necessity, mathematical edifice. This is 
precisely what has been accomplished by the theory of games." It is 
our aim to take at least a cursory look at this alternative approach, 
and to consider its achievements both from a theoretical standpoint and 
as guides to the direction of empirical work. A full-scale review is 
not intended, nor will a comprehensive list of the terminology and 
concepts used be given. We shall be content to give a flavour of the 
usefulness of game theory by discussing in fair detail two of the major 
works in this area (Shubik 1959 and Telser 1972) and a closely allied 
work (that of Nicholson 1972) without wading into their mathematical 
complexities.
Shubik's book is in two parts. The first half is taken up with 
setting out most of the conventional models of oligopoly in a game 
theoretic' framework. In doing this some conceivable plays not covered 
by traditional analysis are exposed, for example the idea of a mixed 
strategy. There is much discussion of the difficulty of defining the 
appropriate firm's demand curve, given the industry demand curve, in 
cases where price is the policy variable; this difficulty also occurs 
where quantity is the policy variable in models with product differen­
tiation. The problem is solved, theoretically at least, by the intro­
duction and clarification of the concept of "contingent demand". In 
essence, the difficulty arises because while a firm on setting quantity 
is (implicitly) willing to accept market price, a price-setter must be 
able to produce the output required by the market which may vary widely. 
If, for example, the firm in question sets a price slightly higher than
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others, he may sell very little or nothing, while a price slightly 
lower would oblige him to supply virtually the whole of the market.
If he is unable or unwilling to do the latter then others may be able 
to sell at higher prices, giving rise to the concept of contingent 
demand, which helps to explain the difference between Bertrand's 
and Edgeworth's theories of oligopoly. Unfortunately, " ... the 
computation of families of contingent demand functions is complicated 
and requires more information than is usually available. However, 
for the purposes of the theory of price-variation duopoly the 
important feature of contingent demand functions is that they are 
rarely convex" causing secondary maxima, (p.87).
This analysis of contingent demand enables us to say that with 
the Bertrand solution "price is not determinate but can fluctuate 
over a range" (p.126). Shubik's diagram (redrawn overleaf, diagram 
2), gives an illustration of this and the line "B' Bj' shows that when 
the number of competitors increases it becomes progressively less and 
less desirable to step out of line with one's price policy. Most of 
the odds-are concentrated on prices lying close to EEj with only a 
small possibility left for any major price fluctuation." Thus average 
price in the Bertrand solution depends on the number of firms in the 
industry as it does with the Cournot solution, aside from the possibility 
of massive inventories.’’
The efficient point comes from another aspect arising out of the 
game theoretic treatment. This is the "minimal surface or threat curve,"
the threat being that of flooding the market with a large quantity of 
6output.
Shubik's main original contribution which takes the second half 
of his book, is his work on games of economic survival. However, we 
leave discussion of this for a while as it is important to consider a
'7 -
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Shubik's Price and Quantity Variation Models 
This diagram is a redrawing of Shubik's Figure 27 p. 126.
DIAGRAM 2.2
E Ej is the efficient point and limiting strategy curve; firms acting 
as if with no market control.
C C| is the Cournot duopoly curve, C  CJ the Cournot n firm strategy 
curve (“ > n > 2)
B Bj is the Bertrand (price-strategy) duopoly curve, B'Bj the Bertrand
n firm strategy curve (Bertrand solutions incorporate consideration 
of contingent demand).
Probability
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concept central to all three works mentioned, that of the non- 
cooperative game and its equilibrium point. The solution comes 
from Nash (1950), and Shubik states that "An n-tuple S is an 
equilibrium point if and only if for every i:
G^(S) >, max (S; e^) for all
Thus an equilibrium point is an n-tuple such that each player's 
strategy maximises his expected payoff if the strategies of the 
others are held fixed. Hence each player's strategy is optimal 
against those of the others" (p. 62, the notation has been changed 
so that it does not conflict with that used elsewhere in the chapter).
It has since been realised that the Cournot equilibrium is a 
special case of the above, with strategy being output (or the Cournot- 
type equilibrium if the strategy is price). Hence the emphasis on 
Cournot in Telser, for example. We shall discuss the idea in detail, 
and to facilitate this we take a very simple example:
Suppose a duopoly with demand conditions given by:
p = 200 - q| - q2 (p is price, q ( and q2 outputs),
and costs: C| = 20qj, c2 = 20q2
For clarity we consider only three strategies for each firm, to produce 
the joint monopoly output (45 units each), the Cournot output (60 units 
each) or the output which sets price equal to marginal cost (90 units 
each). Given these outputs we may solve for profit in each case and 
so obtain a profit payoff matrix:
Firm B's action^
Monopoly Cournot p - MC
Monopoly (4050,4050) (3375,4500) (2025,4050)
Cournot (4500,3375) (3600,3600) (1800,2700)
p = MC (4050,2025) (2700,1800) (0,0)
Firm A's profit 
is put first 
in brackets. 
Firm B's profit 
second
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We have to decide in what sense, and subject to what conditions, 
the Cournot output is an equilibrium point. We can usefully split 
the discussion into two - firstly stability from below, then from 
above. Consider then a firm allowed a choice between outputting 
either 90 units or 60 units. There is no conceivable reason why 60 
should not be chosen as it assures him at least some profit and given 
that firm A chooses 60, firm B cannot do better than producing at most 
60 units. In Nicholson's words the Cournot point is the one "point in 
the matrix which is stable without reference to any other point, for 
the values to A lower in the column are less ... and the values to B 
to the right of it are similarly less ... " (p. 196).
This important result has only recently achieved the recognition 
it deserves for (given that firms are agreed on the policy variable) it 
implies that the Cournot point, not the point where price is equal to
g
marginal cost, yields a lower-bound to the set of reasonable outcomes. 
(See also Cubbin (1973)).
Consider now the type of stability involved in attempting to
achieve'profits above the Cournot point. The choice of strategy here
is more difficult and is known as "prisoner's dilemma". If the firms
may collude, they would obviously agree on the monopoly output. This
is the co-operative solution. However, they are unlikely to choose
it independently. For if firm B were to choose the monopoly output,
firm A could do better for himself by setting output at the Cournot
level (and vice versa). If B then retaliates by setting Cournot output,
. . 9firm A becomes worse off, the Cournot outcome is dominant.
Obviously there are circumstances in which we might expect, even 
without specific collusion, that the firms might reach (or approximate) 
the monopoly output, and others in which near-Cournot output would be 
the norm. All three authors spend some time exploring such situations.
For Nicholson the important factor is time, and in this context 
retaliation time and its effect on discounted profit flows. If firm 
B were utilising his monopoly strategy and firm A switched from this 
to his Cournot strategy, B would lose and A would gain. If B were able 
to retaliate quickly then it would be more likely that they would 
maintain their (seemingly) collusive behaviour than if B could perforce 
only retaliate slowly. Because Nicholson believes that (for example) 
an advertising policy is less flexible he considers that firms are 
more likely to price fairly collusively and be competitive with regard 
to their advertising policies.1*^ Thus, it is impossible to say anything 
very coherent about the behaviour of oligopolies unless we can say some­
thing independently about the state of information in a market. Shubik 
comes to a very similar conclusion regarding the state of information 
and notes that in longer games "the threat of reprisal ... creates 
equilibria which do not exist in the subgames of finite duration"
(p. 225). Telser examines this possibility extensively and states that 
"the Cournot-Nash theory retains its validity in a T-period model for 
finite T despite the fact that now implicit collusion between the two 
sellers is feasible" (p. 139), while "we see that if there is a 
sufficiently high probability of continuing then the two firms will 
collude in order to obtain the joint profit maximum. Otherwise despite 
the infinite horizon, they will find it to be more profitable to compete" 
(p. 145).11
So far it may well seem that the Game-Theorists have contributed 
little that is new to theories of oligopoly, an impression which should 
be dispelled. As noted earlier Shubik's main novelty is in his develop­
ment of "games of economic survival" or in general in the field of what 
he calls "Mathematical Institutional economics". Essentially this comes 
about by limiting "duopoly models to situations in which firms (are)
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assumed unable to borrow outside money" (p. 256), that is by relaxing 
the assumption of "perfect" capital markets. This means that such 
factors as the differing kinds of management structure inherent in a 
capitalist or mixed economy bring about different solutions - the 
owner of an unlimited liability firm may well be expected to act 
differently to the owner of a limited liability company, or one which 
is management controlled. Also of importance, of course, is the 
asset condition of the various firms involved for "The financial 
dominance of one firm may be enough to entitle it to the lion's 
share of a peacefully divided market" (p. 212). In general " ... a 
two person game of economic survival can be completely characterised 
by the corporate assets X,Y, a discount rate p, the numbers A j,A2, 
representing the value of the market to a surviving firm at the time 
of exit of its competitor, and the market matrices ... " (p. 245).
In discussing the "solution" to such a game we should note that 
the outcome is not normally a single determinate point, and that the 
asset structure is of great importance in determining the likely pay­
offs. If the asset structure is"not too" dissimilar, then it may be 
neglected but in general it will matter. Wtile Shubik discusses in 
general terms the Tobacco and Automobile industries, the information 
requirements are tremendous and foreboding for any cross-sectional 
study. Perhaps it is as well to limit ourselves to the assumption of 
"perfect" capital markets or "similar" managements and asset structures 
as an approximation when considering empirical work.
Telser develops his theoretical treatment from the concept of 
the "core" of a game. Without dwelling overtly on the properties of 
the core, we may observe that "an outcome is in the core of a game if 
no subset (coalition) of players can collectively do better for its 
members and thus ' ... no-one can make himself better off by trade.'
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When applied to market exchange this implies maximising behaviour 
analogous to that in traditional theory, but there are contrasts"
(Clarke (1973) p.250 who is quoting Telser).
"The theory of the core ... forces a rigorous examination of 
several of the neglected aspects of oligopoly. For example with core 
theory it is necessary to prove in every case whether or not there 
will be group rationality (Pareto-optimality) and whether or not 
there will be price discrimination." (Telser (1972) p. 119). Thus 
it is a theory which defines competition before deducing its implications. 
The essence of Telser's approach then, is that it takes as given a much 
wider range of situations than traditional maximising theory, and can 
yield a much wider conception of the "solution" to the oligopoly 
problem.
Having said this, it remains true that the traditional theories, 
particularly the Cournot and collusion theories, crop up extensively 
and form the basis for much of the discussion. Indeed, one might be 
struck by the similarity between Telser's book and that of Fellner 
(1949). Each discusses the traditional theories within a wider canvas 
than is usual and ends up dwelling on (he likelihood of collusion.
Further, the empirical work performed by Telser, while painstakingly 
and thoughtfully done, could with minor exceptions have been equally 
performed by someone with little or no background in game theory.
All this is not meant to imply that the theory is useless and the 
empirics mundane, but simply to provide a partial justification for 
neglecting an extensive treatment of game theory in the present work.
I V  Stigler's "Theory of Oligopoly" (1964)
Viewed in the context of the above discussion of non-cooperative
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equilibria it can be seen that in many senses Stigler's theory of 
oligopoly contributes to our understanding of behaviour in much the 
same way as the work on game theory does, that is in setting the 
solution between limits based not on assumption but on deduction.
Indeed, Telser at one point (especially p. 196) develops a rather 
similar model to Stigler's.
The essence of Stigler's approach is to posit a situation where 
overt collusion is illegal but profitable, thus "collusion takes the 
form of joint determination of outputs and prices by ostensibly 
independent firms ... " (p.45). As has been explained above, each 
partner to a collusion has an interest in cutting price (secretly) 
to earn more profit, given that the otheis maintain their collusive 
position. This will cause sales by the chiseller to rise; the question 
posed for the other n-1 firms who do not break ranks is at what point 
a transfer of sales to one firm becomes large enough to be suspicious.
"We move then to the world of circumstantial evidence, or, as it is 
sometimes called, of probability", as Stigler puts it. (p. 48) As to 
the retaliation envisaged, or the possibilities when more than one 
firm "cheats", the theory is silent, yet it remains an interesting 
insight into oligopoly behaviour.
Three interesting predictions which follow directly from the
setting of the model are that collusion will often be effective against small 
buyers, also
/against buyers (like the U.S. government) who report fully the prices 
quoted them, and is limited where the significant buyers constantly 
change identity. However, none of these are particularly important 
cases, so that the evidence on the extent of collusion must in general 
be obtained by considering in more detail the probabilities of detection 
involved, and it is with this area that the paper is mainly concerned.
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Essentially the individual seller has three main areas in which 
he can look for information on chiselling: the behaviour of his own 
old customers, the rival's attraction of the old customers of other 
firms and the behaviour of new customers. It turns out that the 
first and third are the most important.*^ Within these, factors such 
as the number of sellers, the number of buyers, the probability of 
repeat purchase and the rate of entry of new buyers all have important 
effects on the maximum additional gains in custom without detection.
For example, the larger the number of buyers, the less one firm may 
gain at the expense of others without detection so that the more likely 
is adherence to agreed pricing. One interesting result thrown up by 
the theory is that when firms are unequally sized the Herfindahl index 
of concentration becomes the relevant measure of inequality "if we wish 
concentration to measure likelihood of effective collusion" (p. 55).
Actually, as McKinnon (1966) points out, Stigler's exposition is 
in some senses statistically naive as he chooses fixed decision rules 
which are not easily interpreted with reference to each other. Rather 
the approach should consist in balancing the cost of unjustly accusing 
a rival of price-cutting against the losses from undetected price- 
cutting, and a statistically efficient method of pooling (sample) 
information on both the behaviour of old and of new customers should be 
used, bearing in mind the costs of collecting such information. While 
McKinnon's alterations lead to minor differences in the conclusions 
(for example the relative efficacy of observing old rather than new 
customers), the basic findings of Stigler's novel approach remain 
untouched.
Turning to the place of Stigler's theory within the traditional 
framework, we see it as providing some illustrative factors affecting 
the position of price between collusion and Cournot. Foremost among 
these factors are the number of sellers and of buyers (buyers will be
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discussed in a later chapter), and empirical work performed by Stigler 
shows that not only the number of sellers but also the extent of 
market knowledge by buyers alters the actual price away from list 
price. His work should be seen not as a substitute for the traditional 
theories of oligopoly but rather as a complement adding meat to the 
bare bones of traditional theory's crude assumptions; a weighting 
scheme indicating the extent to which various postulates are likely 
to be more nearly true than others.
V Experimental Gaming in Oligopoly
The basic idea behind experimental oligopoly games is that, given 
the number of forces which affect firms' actions in the real world, and 
given the plethora of oligopoly theories, to design a test of a parti­
cular oligopoly theory in the real world would verge on the impossible. 
The experiment thus assists by modelling a simplified version of the 
real world in the laboratory, in order that pointers to the factors 
of relevance to manufacturers in making their decisions can be discov­
ered. We shall briefly discuss some of these experiments in terms of
the insight they offer: the work we consider is that by Dolbear et al.
I 3(1968), Fouraker and Siegel (1963), Friedman (1963), Hoggatt (1967) 
and Murphy (1966).
There are several factors common to all work of this type:— 
the cost and demand functions take fairly simple algebraic forms, each 
firm has one decision variable, the number of firms in the market is 
usually very small, subjects play in "games" lasting for many bids or 
"periods", and no direct communication is allowed between players (see 
Friedman (1969)). Among the many factors differing between experiments, 
we shall focus on three; the number of players, the state of information 
and the decision variable used. Experimenters generally did most of
7 /
30 -
their work with 2, 3 or 4 person games, though Dolbear et al . also 
has an experiment involving 16 players. We should note that in the 
Dolbear and Friedman experiments the structural effects of changes 
in the number of players were minimised by making the market size 
increase as the numbers increase. This has the effect of isolating 
behavioural characteristics for investigation (see Sherman (1971)).
The information given can be characterised either as complete 
(where payoffs to both parties given the respective decision variable 
values are specified) or incomplete (where payoffs only to the parti­
cular individual concerned are divulged). The decision variable used 
is either price or quantity; where price is the relevant variable the 
experimenter has specified differentiated products except in some 
experiments by Fouraker and Siegel and Murphy.1^
Fouraker and Siegel, whose work is the most comprehensive and 
completely documented, perfora two types of oligopoly experiment, 
using both information states. In their "quantity adjuster" models, 
their participants tend to arrive at Cournot contracts when they have 
incomplete information, although there are outcomes below as well as 
above this position and, compared with duopoly experiments, there 
tends to be more dispersion around the Cournot level in their triopoly 
tests. With complete information the contracts are, rather intriguingly, 
more diverse than m  the incomplete information experiments. Their "price 
adjuster" models follow similar patterns, though this time of course the 
incomplete information contract tends to be at the Bertrand price.
In an interesting re-run of Fouraker and Siegel’s price adjustment 
experiment with incomplete information, Murphy amends and extends the 
profit tables to allow bids below the Bertrand price level (which 
involve the players in lossess). He finds that "the change in the 
profit table only has greatly increased the amount of cooperation at
the expense of competitiveness. The new results are more like those 
from (their) complete information experiment ..." He also notes that 
"as more trials were run, the tendency toward cooperative ruling prices 
became more pronounced" (both quotes p. 301).
Friedman's work is based on price adjustment with product differen­
tiation, and the aim is to discover how much cooperation takes place in 
complete information models. In fact, however, he considers that his 
experiments are unable to yield any real evidence on the matter.*'’ He 
does note though that "In comparing the F-S complete information games 
to Friedman's, one difference that stands out is the frequency of joint 
maximum games"*^(p. 410). This, he feels, is a result of the experimental 
design whereby his participants play in several games each, so learning 
more about the technique of play. He finds that the more players there 
are, the less likely is joint profit maximisation to be reached.
Hoggatt's experiments are somewhat novel in that the participants 
were not paid and they compete in duopoly against a robot. Despite this 
element of unreality, the robot opponent permits greater control and his 
second experimental series brings the interesting result that the more 
co-operative the robot, the more co-operative the human player.
Dolbear et al. use a similar basic model to that of Friedman but 
include both states of information. They find that the equilibrium 
market price tends to be between the Cournot and jciit profit maximisation 
positions while being inversely related to the number of firms. The 
other hypotheses they propose do not reach full statistical significance, 
though there is a presumption that full information raises profits and 
the dispersion of equilibrium profits. Thus "Information seems to induce 
bargaining attempts that tend to result in price war or collusion" (p.259).
Summarising the conclusions of the experimenters mentioned above, 
we find the range of outcomes tends to be between Cournot and joint profit
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maximisation and that while "the Cournot solution characterises 
behaviour in incomplete information situations" (Friedman 1969 p.414) 
with complete information there is a greater diversity of outcome, 
partly because a remarkably long time is needed to get the feel for 
the game and partly because this information state provides more 
opportunity for individual preferences to be revealed in play. Given 
this Sherman (1971) feels that the evidence of simple prisoner's 
dilemma experiments which attempt to control for such personality 
factors as sex, isolationism and risk attitude is relevant, although 
unfortunately the results here are not clear-cut. Thus, while in 
common with the Stiglerian prediction a tendency towards more coop­
erative outcomes, even when abstracting from structural factors, is 
apparent, we must expect individual attitudes to play a part.
VI Extensions to the Traditional Models:
From our brief review of Game Theory, Stigler's model of oligopoly 
and Gaming Experiments, we find that the simple model presented earlier 
in this chapter, while obviously not incorporating all factors deemed 
to be relevant, still provides a basis for discussion and straight­
forward empirical work. With this in mind we now turn to generalising 
the simple model of the first section in some fairly obvious directions.
size, specifically because their costs are different:
Profits are given by:
so that the first-order condition for profit maximisation becomes:
d£ . 4 2  - C'.(q.) = 0dQ dq. 1 Hi (4)
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We again assume the second-order condition holds.
From (4), multiplying by q^ and summing over the N firms yields:
£pqi + ZQ Zqi2(1 + V ~ Eqic'i<qi> “ o
so that Epqi - Zqic ’i(qi) 
PQ
Q dp 
P dQ
2
2 2where u = EA^q^ /Eq^ , a weighted sum of conjectural variation terms
If we can now assume that marginal cost is equal to average variable 
cost then Eq^cVCq^) is equal to industry total variable cost. Given 
this, we may rewrite (5) as:
n + F— 5—  = n— r (1 + u) (6) where In I is defined as before
R I n|
and H is the herfindahl index of concentration.
We should now consider the consequences for our theory of the
products not being perfectly homogenous. We first develop the case
1 9where output is again the firm's decision variable. The profit 
function for the ith firm should now be written:
"i = piqi “ ci(qi> " F 
where p£ = f£(q jfq2...... qN>
First order conditions for profit maximisation require that:
dn. dp.
-- = p. + q. --- - c'.(q.) = 0 (7) for all idq. dq. 1
We shall assume that second-order conditions hold.
Multiplying (7) by q. yields:
2 ,X
qi dPi 2
piqi + “ 2 • d?7 Q " C i(qi)qi " °Q i
Now, in order to establish a link between the firm's demand 
function and the market demand function we have to take a pragmatic
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approach and talk about the market elasticity of demand for a homo­
genous product. To do this we rewrite the above equation as:
«i dpi dp dQ 19a
Pi^ i - V'i^i) ■ --Jf - d T - ^  • ^  (8)
where p is defined as: fp^q^/Eq^ = Ep^q^/Q
Summing (8) over i and dividing through by industry revenue gives:
Epiqi - Eqic'.(q.)
_ d P Q
i .
%  d Pi 
q 2 ' d P
d Q
PQ d Q p * d *i
n + F _ _ 1 e  Q 
R dQ * p
2
Q2
d p i 
’ dp
dQ
dq. (9)
Comparing this equation with the equivalents for the homogenous 
product case, (5) and (6), we see that the difference lies in the term 
dpi/dp. Now the reciprocal of this differential is obviously less than 
unity, and in a limiting case is equal to the market share of the ith 
firm. This indicates that the price-cost margin in a differentiated
product industry is greater than that in the homogenous case, all other
, . 20 things equal.
Now, it could be objected that, quantity is not the relevant 
decision variable in the heterogeneous product case, for firms are 
more concerned with setting prices than outputs. This would not be 
a valid objection in a homogeneous product industry, the case Cournot 
considered, because normally only one price may exist in such a market 
at any one time. Even in the situation where products are heterogen­
eous it is not necessarily true that price is the decision variable; 
as an empirical matter price, quantity or a mixture of the two may be 
most important in a given market. Having said this it makes the analysis 
more complete if we consider the results obtained when price is the 
decision variable.2 ' To this end, let us discuss the fairly general 
model postulated by Cubbin (1974):
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Given an industry of N firms selling a differentiated product, 
yet one which is sold at a common market price and produced at common 
costs, he finds that the ith firm's price-cost margin (equal to 
industry price-cost margin) is given by:
where p is price, dC^/dq^ is marginal costs, a is a measure of apparent 
collusion and the industry and individual firm's elasticities of demand
and with a ** 1 we have: p^ - MC^
The second of these is the case of collusion, while the first is the case 
equivalent to Cournot's. (It is not necessarily the Chamberlinian large 
numbers case, which requires in addition that the cost curve has a down­
ward sloping segment, see Harrod (1967) p. 74). The relationship between
these two special cases obviously depends in general on the size of
22E3q^/3pj, that is the degree of homogeneity. One of the most important 
questions to be answered is obviously that of the role of numbers in the 
industry, for in contrast to the previous models, they do not appear
p. - dC./dq. -1
0 0 )
anI+0 - a >rii
(n1 and respectively) are related according to:
where q^ is, as before, the quantity produced by the ith firm. 
Thus, when a = 0, (10) becomes:
- MC.l -1
explicitly.
Consider then, substituting (11) into (10) to yield:
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1  dQ _ J_ d£ _ U4i
N dp. N dp. dp.1 J J N 3p.
(15)
This means that when firm j raises his price without the others 
following suit, the fall in his output is N times as much as the rise in 
i's output consequent on j's action. Also that when j raises his price 
with the others doing likewise, the fall in his output and i's output is 
equal to the rise in i's output when j raises his price without the 
others following. While this is a delicate balance - that is if the 
others follow, their output will change by an equal amount but in the 
opposite direction to the effect on them if they don't follow, it by no 
means represents an obviously significant degree of homogeneity within 
the industry.
The question then arises as to the position of the barely- 
differentiated product industry. In this situation the firm's 
elasticity of demand will be very large (negatively). Thus the Cournot 
rule on price (a « 0) which gives the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium 
will yield a very low margin to all firms in the industry. In contrast, 
if instead the firms were to use output as the competitive weapon then 
the non-cooperative equilibrium would quite conceivably yield a higher 
p r i c e . I n  this situation, how are we to assess the likely outcome 
when apparent collusion is very low?
The most sensible solution for the firms involved would be to 
have an implicit agreement that output, rather than price, should be 
the competitive variable, so that they can at least assure themselves 
Cournot profit. At the same time they should try and increase differ­
entiation of the product, to raise fallback profit. In fact it would 
seem that such an agreement would be fairly easy to enforce, as it 
requires minimal quasi—cooperation and to compete on output rather 
than price would appear a fairly conventional wisdom for making profits. 
This policy would also be likely considering that price variation with
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barely differentiated products would most probably be extremely 
unstable. In any case the game theoretic treatments suggest that 
strategies , such as price-cutting, to which others can quickly 
retaliate and which cause large changes in business are unlikely to 
be profitable in the long-term, and so are unlikely to be used. Much 
more likely is the strategy of gradually trying to build up and main­
tain custom through availability, salesmanship and product differentia­
tion, in the process lowering cross elasticities of demand. The whole 
system of exclusive dealerships could be considered as an attempt by 
the manufacturer to make the relevant policy weapon output. Perhaps
one of the prime examples is the "solus" system of petrol retailing in 
26the UK, price being used as a weapon only by new distributors in 
general. Having said this, the same industry has recently shown signs 
of price competition in the face of stagnant demand, although interest­
ingly enough this competition is mainly by retailers not distributors. 
There also seems to be a feeling that this is "not in the long term 
interests of the industry".
To summarise, we would argue that in barely-differentiated
product industries quantity competition seems to be a more logical
weapon for powerful firms to sue, with price competition as an
27exceptional and drastic step. Given this assumption our previous 
models can be taken as a reasonable basis for a testable theory of 
oligopoly.
VII Conclusion:
In conclusion, we have argued that a model of the form: 
n ♦ F _ P ~ AVC _ i — , (1 + u) (equation (6) repeated)R p |n|
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comes fairly directly from simple models of oligopoly behaviour and 
fits reasonably well a wider class of oligopoly theories, assuming
In addition we should note that Stigler's theory suggests that u=g(H) 
so that we may write:
This equation is relevant for a single industry; when it comes to 
comparing industries cross-sectionally we must realise that L(H) is 
likely to vary between industries due to a number of more or less 
measurable factors such as the ease of collusion and reprisal and the 
state of knowledge in that industry. We turn to testing procedure 
some chapters later after we have considered modifications of the 
theory due to the relaxation of some assumptions made here. However, 
perhaps it should be pointed out at this stage that our purpose in 
empirical work is not to test between theories of oligopoly but rather 
to consider whether the relatively simple models of oligopoly developed 
above yield reasonable results when applied fairly directly to the data. 
In doing this we attempt some recognition of the fact that L(H) is 
industry specific by taking ratios of formula (16) at two time periods 
for each industry.
that we may take marginal cost as equal to average variable cost.^6
n + f
R
L(H) 29(16) where 1 > L(H) > 0, L’ > 0
Pages 40 and 41 have been deleted
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NOTES
1. These ocher factors could also be considered formally as quantity 
differences.
2. See, for example, Cowling and Waterson (1976).
3. See the discussion of Nicholson ( 1972), but see also Telser (1972) 
p.134, who considers that criticism of dynamic assumptions in Cournot 
is somewhat misplaced.
4. Hadar's model has a slightly different approach. See also Friedman 
(1968) for an extension to a more general type of behaviour where 
discounted profits are maximised and the firm assures the others' 
reaction function, not output, fixed.
5. Of course, this discussion assumes that arbitrage is not possible.
Such action would tend to raise the average price paid by final buyers 
as arbitrageurs attempt to make money out of the imperfections in the 
market. The result that average price depends on the number of firms 
should still hold though, for the larger the number of suppliers the 
less the opportunity for arbitrage.
6. As such it is similar to and includes the perfectly competitive output 
point.
7. A rather similar example can be found in Nicholson p. 196.
8. We have taken a model in which output was the operational variable 
but this proposition can be seen to be true also in Scherer's model 
of price variation duopoly (with Cournot-type reaction) in a model 
with product differentiation (Scherer (1970) p. 133 fig 5.1). Construct 
a horizontal and a vertical from the "Cournot" equilibrium point in his 
diagram and notice that the square enclosed by these lines and the axes 
contains no value of profits more than that obtaining at the Cournot 
point for either firm.
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NOTES
1. These other factors could also be considered formally as quantity 
differences.
2. See, for example, Cowling and Waterson (1976).
3. See the discussion of Nicholson (1972), but see also Telser (1972) 
p.134, who considers that criticism of dynamic assumptions in Cournot 
is somewhat misplaced.
4. Hadar’s model has a slightly different approach. See also Friedman 
(1968) for an extension to a more general type of behaviour where 
discounted profits are maximised and the firm assures the others' 
reaction function, not output, fixed.
5. Of course, this discussion assumes that arbitrage is not possible.
Such action would tend to raise the average price paid by final buyers 
as arbitrageurs attempt to make money out of the imperfections in the 
market. The result that average price depends on the number of firms 
should still hold though, for the larger the number of suppliers the 
less the opportunity for arbitrage.
6. As such it is similar to and includes the perfectly competitive output 
point.
7. A rather similar example can be found in Nicholson p. 196.
8. We have taken a model in which output was the operational variable 
but this proposition can be seen to be true also in Scherer's model 
of price variation duopoly (with Cournot-type reaction) in a model 
with product differentiation (Scherer (1970) p. 133 fig 5.1). Construct 
a horizontal and a vertical from the "Cournot" equilibrium point in his 
diagram and notice that the square enclosed by these lines and the axes 
contains no value of profits more than that obtaining at the Cournot 
point for either firm.
)
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9. In Shubik's proposed terminology, the difference, in an n-person game, 
between the three situations is as follows: "A market equilibrium is 
defined to be {k^} - {rj} stable ... if no joint action by the r players 
yields them more than maintaining the steady state, on the assumption 
that each of the k players is committed to a threat strategy, and that 
each of the n-k-r players is playing a steady-state strategy" (p.276-7) 
r and k are specific subsets of the n players. Thus the Cournot equili­
brium is {0} - {1} stable, in that it needs no policing, the absolutely 
competitive equilibrium is {0} - in} stable, while the collusive equili­
brium is in-l} - {1} stable; it needs all to police and carry out the 
threat on the chiseller(s).
10. It should perhaps be mentioned that "competition" to the game-theorist 
is not the same as perfect, pure, absolute or maximum competition but 
is nearer to being a synonym for non-cooperation.
11. This discussion of Telser's appears to have something in common with 
Friedman's (1971) concept of non-cooperative equilibria in "supergames", 
which consist of an infinite number of ordinary games. Here Pareto 
optimal pay-off vectors are among the equilibria, in contrast to the 
ordinary non-cooperative games.
12. A price-cutter is harder to detect by attraction of old customers of 
other firms on Stigler's criteria. The individual seller also has the 
possibility of pooling information with the other firms with the attendant 
risk of pooling with the price-cutter.
13. We do not consider his previous paper.
14. We shall say more about price as a decision variable in the next section; 
with identical products price is not the natural weapon.
15. In his second article, Friedman (1969) includes a remarkably impersonal 
review of his 1963 paper.
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16. He considers that Fouraker and Siegel misclassify outcomes by making 
the wrong assumptions about dynamic adjustments; the effect of this 
reclassification (which does not alter the point stated) is to place 
more of their firms in the Cournot outcome category.
17. Developed also in Cowling and Waterson (1976).
18. See Rader (1972) pp. 271-2. I am grateful to D. Morris for pointing 
this out.
19. This model was originally intended to appear as an appendix to Cowling 
and Waterson (1976), but was omitted for reasons of space.
19a. In this equation dQ/dq^ should again be considered as firm i's conjecture 
about the output reactions of (him and) the other firms when he changes 
his output, dp^/dp is of course not a proper derivative in the sense 
that p is not an independent variable; hence our comments about a 
"pragmatic approach". It is probably best considered as representing 
a certain degree of heterogeneity in the industry, indicating the 
extent to which prices have to move together.
20. We should note that the definition of the Herfindahl in terms of 
quantities in the differentiated product case is not strictly accurate 
unless all prices are identical.
21. Shubik points out that to specify price necessarily implies a willingness 
either to produce a large enough output to satisfy the market or to 
specify in addition a production rate. Thus he develops the concept of 
"contingent demand" for price variation models and quantity variation 
models with product differentiation, on which see our earlier comments. 
Cubbin's model ignores such complications by assuming adequate invent­
ories, a great simplification to the analysis.
21a. This equation represents the actual relation between industry and firm 
elasticities, dependent upon the degree of heterogeneity. Firm i's 
coniecture about the relationship is bound up purely in a, which is a
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weighted average of the individual firms' perceptions about the values 
of dpj/dp^ (see Cubbin, pp. 1-3).
22. See Triffen (1949) p. 104 and elsewhere for explanations of the use of 
this concept.
23. Any variations of a with N would on usual assumptions strengthen our 
result.
24. Allowing for "contingent demand" considerations would similarly 
strengthen the conclusions.
25. This of course depends upon the degree of heterogeneity, as is evident 
from (15).
26. See Shaw (1974) for a discussion of this industry.
27. The formula developed by Weitzman (1974 p.484), though based on a 
different situation, would tend to reinforce these arguments. If a 
firm has some uncertainty about marginal costs in the area of maximum 
profit and the marginal revenue function is of steeper (negative) 
slope than the marginal cost functions (positive) slope, as would be 
the case under our assumptions (see Appendix I), his formula indicates 
that price is an inferior instrument to quantity. I am grateful to 
Avinash Dixit for suggesting the reference.
. . i28. An assumption we should have in any case to make for empirical test. j( t
See also Appendix I.
29. We expect that the slope of L(H) is initially greater than one, but 
slackens off so that L" < 0. This is dealt with in more detail later.
Those oligopoly gaming experiments which attempt to abstract from 
structural effects of numbers in the industry suggest a similar type 
of result to that given by Stigler's theory.
30. This is to some extent novel for Joskow (1975, p. 273) has argued that 
"Virtually none (of the previous empirical work in this area) appeals 
to particular formal models of oligopoly markets".
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Chapter 3; A Consideration of the Problem of Potential Entry 
X Introduction:
In the previous chapter we made the assumption that the number 
of firms in the industry was fixed, that is no entry or exit was 
allowed. Our purpose in the present chapter is to explore the 
implications of relaxing this assumption. Consider initially then, 
allowing perfectly free entry to and exit from an industry, so moving 
to a general equilibrium framework.
Specifically, let us take the case where one industry is 
monopolised and all others contain a very large number of firms, so 
that they can be considered as perfectly competitive industries and 
the marginal firm in each earns zero or "normal1 prof its. The monopolist 
earns above-normal profits so that there is an incentive for firms from 
other industries to enter his industry until returns to the marginal 
firm in that industry are zero in common with the rest of the economy. 
Thus, if the monopolist wishes to retain his position as sole supplier 
of his particular product under perfectly free entry he also must price 
so as to obtain only normal profits.
Further, Fama and Laffer (1972) have shown that even if there 
are only two firms in each industry, and perfectly free entry and exit 
for each industry, then each firm is in effect a perfect competitor in 
that he earns solely normal profits and his output decisions have no 
effect on price. They illustrate this by supposing that one firm 
expands ou^ jfot. The other must then contract output to exactly the 
same extent 1 as this expansion for otherwise returns in the industry
are below normal and exit occurs (after which presumably the survivor
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produces output sufficient to ensure normal returns). Similarly, if 
one firm were to contract output, the other must expand to make up 
the deficit or entry will occur. Thus the actual, as opposed to the 
conjectural, variation is such that output decisions do not affect 
price.
Now in the case where the possibility of entry or exit does 
not exist the optimal reaction will be different from that which is 
required to prevent entry or exit in the previous case. For example 
if one firm contracts output from the Cournot level to the monopoly 
level then the optimal reaction for the other firm is not to expand 
output but rather to contract output to that same level, as we saw 
earlier; each firm has only to consider the others in his industry 
rather than the whole economy. Thus we may say that a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for the number of firms in an industry 
to affect the level of profits in that industry is that entry is not 
completely free, costless and quick. In the remainder of this chapter 
we consider cases where entry conditions affect the established 
firms decision processes to a greater or lesser extent. Exit condi­
tions will receive a more perfunctory treatment.
Those factors which prevent entry being perfectly free are 
known as Barriers to Entry and Bain (1962) has discussed the types of 
barriers which may exist in an industry in some detail. Basically 
he considers that there are three major categories of barriers, 
which are: absolute cost advantages, product differentiation advant­
ages and economies of scale. We leave further consideration of the 
different types of barriers to entry until we have pursued some 
theoretical development.
However the way that Bain has defined and detailed barriers to 
entry does give rise to one problem which we ought to discuss before
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proceeding further. This is the problem of the time interval we are 
considering. It is fair ly obviously not the theoretical short-run, 
for in that case there would not be any possibility of entry. It 
cannot easily be the theoretical long-run either, for that would 
mean no firm having, for example, any product differentiation 
advantage over another, and all firms both potential and actual 
would have access to capital on the same terms. Nevertheless, Bain 
feels that such structural features as entry barriers are not 
ephemeral short-lived advantages, which leads Williamson (1963) to 
consider that we are talking about an "intermediate-run" situation 
(see, for example, p. 113, n. 6). This may in fact cause difficulties 
for the theory.
Bain then defines the "condition of Entry" to be the extent to 
which the established firms may raise price above costs without 
inducing entry, and categorises four general areas in which the 
barriers to entry may place an industry:
(i). Blockaded entry, where barriers are such that established 
firms could price even at the monopoly level yet still not incur entry,
(ii) Easy entry, where barriers are so small that pricing even 
very slightly above costs allows entry,
(iii) Ineffectively impeded entry, where pricing at a level at 
which no entry will occur is less profitable than maximising short- 
run profits and allowing entry,
(iv) Effectively impeded entry, pricing at the level at which 
no entry will occur is more profitable than maximising short-run 
profit and allowing entry.
The level of price, below which no firm, even the most favour­
ably placed, will find it profitable to enter is called the "Limit
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Price." We now consider its formation, or the "Theory of Limit
2Pricing".
IX The Formation of Limit Price - Modigliani and Osborne:
In formulating the limit price, we straightaway run into 
consideration of the expected reaction by the established firms to 
a potential entrant. In fact, the problem from the established 
firms' point of view is that of deciding what the entrant thinks 
they will do regarding their output if he decides to enter. This 
situation of potential indeterminacy is normally solved by making
a particularly useful and straightforward assumption known as "the 
3Sylos' postulate". The entrant assumes that the established firms
will maintain their output in the face of potential entry, and the 
established firms know this to be the case. Making this assumption 
fixes the portion of the industry demand curve along which the entrant 
may operate. A further common assumption made for simplicity is that 
the established industry consists of a monopolist or a tightly knit 
group of collusive oligopolists. We initially consider models utili— 
sing both these assumptions.
The classic article in this area is of course Modigliani's 
(1958); his arguments may be briefly summarised by discussion of the 
comparative statics of his simple case, while we leave fuller consider­
ation until later.
If both the established and potential entrant firms have cost 
curves which are sharply discontinuous at minimum optimal scale, so 
that outputs lower than that are infinitely costly to produce, then 
we may say that the entry limiting output is given by qQ =■ q£ - q, 
where q£ is "competitive" output,^ and q is the minimum optimal
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sc«ils» Defining the size of the market as s = q /q then we may write!
qo = %  <■ ' -  7> (!)
We want to say something about limit price in relation to costs, thus 
we have to transform the above equation into one in terms of prices. 
This in general will involve knowing the form of the demand curve, in 
order to solve the equation:
PL = f(qQ) = f fqc 0  " l)j explicitly (p^  is limit price)
To take a particularly simple example, where the demand curve is of
linear form, p = a - gq then
a- pL “ “ Pc _ 5
qQ = — g--- , qc = — g--- where pc is "competitive" price.
Thus from (1):
PL = a - (a - pc) (1 - 7 )
= p (1 + —  - -)*c p s s*c
Sqc
P ( 1 + — )c Pcs
p ( 1 + -l— |--)c M cs (2), where |n|c = —  qc dP,
the modulus of the industry elasticity of demand at qc .
Other forms for the demand curve give different results; the
constant elasticity case mentioned by Modigliani involves other terms,
since 1 and -r— !—  are only the first two terms in the expansion ofhis
, -i/hl
( i - i )
He therefore writes (2) as an approximate equality. Following from 
this, it is easy to show that:
?•
/
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< t > L  5
PL " pc
h  .8+1 (3)
This of course implies that:
«f), «£>,
- s p i  * »• - f i -  * 0
and if we define the importance of economies of scale as q/qc or
I/s then
H b h
3(q/qc) > o
In the words of his famous quote:
"In summary, under Sylos' postulate there is a well-defined 
maximum premium that the oligopolists can command over the competitive 
price, and this premium tends to increase with the importance of 
economies of scale and to decrease with the size of the market and the 
elasticity of demand." (p.220).
It might be illuminating to illustrate these comparative static 
results diagrammatically (see diagram 1 overleaf). The first is indic­
ated by the two demand curves, Dj ^ at point (pc,E). The steeper 
demand curve is the less elastic and gives rise to a higher limit
price p , scale constant. The second (and third) are illustrated L;E
by demand curves D„ , at points (p E) and (p F) respectively. They /,J c, c,
have equal elasticities at these points by construction. In the
OEformer case size of the market s is given by and in the latter
OFby  — ; thus s is larger in the first case but gives rise to a lower
V
limit price p, _.L J E
Now, Modigliani's more complicated cost curve structures give 
rise to similar qualitative results; essentially we now allow that
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the cost curve may slope less sharply to optimal scale. However, 
given his definition of the size of the market (and optimal scale), 
he is only able to consider a certain class of cost curves. Specific 
ally, there must be a discontinuity in the curve at optimal scale for 
his definition to remain meaningful. Also, Modigliani does not 
consider cases where the cost curves differ between firms. In this 
sense his model is applicable to the true long-run, yet intermediate- 
run factors may be relevant to particular industries' pricing policies 
Lastly, it is not easy to generalise his model to an oligopoly 
situation.
Osborne's (1973) model of limit pricing similarly suffers from 
lack of generality, though of a rather different nature. This is 
what gives rise to lis quite different results regarding comparative 
statics. Osborne considers that we have a Stackleberg situation.
The firm proposing to enter the industry in question believes that 
the existing firm will honour the Sylos postulate; that is, that 
output of the existing firm will remain at pre-entry level. Further, 
the established firm knows that the entrant will act in his best 
interest under these assumptions. This means that the existing firm 
may take advantage of this and act as a leader, the entrant being a 
follower, in the Stackleberg system. We take the second firm's 
(entrant's) profits to be:
n2 “  q2p ”  c 2^q2^’ p = f q^ l + q 2^
These he maximises, assuming q. constant*.
3 ^  “ q2 H  + p " C2 (q2> = 0
(A)
/
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Limit price, Osborne says, is achieved where the entrant's
optimal output is zero. Substituting this into the first-order
condition for optimality ((4) above):
This means that limit price is set at the tevel at which the 
entrant's marginal costs will be at zero output, so that the existing 
firm's limit profit revenue ratio may be written as:
(assuming marginal cost = average variable cost for firm 1).
Notice that in this equation we have no elasticity of demand term 
and also that "It is the behaviour of marginal cost, and its rate of 
change, in the neighbourhood of the origin that, given demand, governs 
the rationality of limit pricing. The behaviour of average cost ... 
is germane only to the extent that it is implied by the marginal 
quantities." (p.78). Osborne does allow the case where the entrant 
has a different (possibly higher) cost curve than the established firm, 
a case Modigliani does not discuss.
The main problem with this analysis is revealed by a consideration 
of the second order condition associated with (4). We have:
c2(°) - cj (qj)
dMR2 dMC2
or, where q2 » 0:
< (0) (5)
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- the slope of the marginal cost curve at zero output must be greater 
(or less negative) than twice the slope of the demand curve. In fact, 
if we define average variable costs as AVC = BCq^),
Essentially, this rules out cases where marginal and average variable 
cost curves b«w steeply enough to fall below marginal and average 
revenue curves respectively, for example in the diagram overleaf 
(diagram 2), the first order condition is satisfied, yet entry might 
be profitable. Two points occur here:
(i) Although entry may be profitable in the case immediately 
above, a firm would surely not enter if fixed costs were such that he 
were unable to cover them. While, for the existing firm in an industry, 
fixed costs are irrelevant as long as variable costs are being recov­
ered; for the entrant, looking around among industries for possible 
entry, fixed costs in a single industry become a decision variable - 
they are avoidable. That is, given a set of industries each with 
identical demand and marginal cost conditions, the entrant would
then Total variable costs = B(q2>.q2
Marginal cost “ ß (q2) + q2B '(q2  ^ •
dAVC = B'(0)
dMC
= 2B'(q2) + q2B"(q2); ^ 2B'(0)
Another way that we may state (5) then, is as:
dp
dq
< dAVC
dq2
2 »
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DIAGRAM 3.2
A case not covered by Osborne's second-order condition
^2 —
MC and AVC are the entrant's cost curves
Osborne's limit price is at the origin of all curves, 
yet the entrant can make no profits at a price 
substantially higher than that.
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choose that industry where net profit was highest (some presumably 
yielding a positive return). This is not taken into account by 
Osborne and perhaps indicates why others have not, unlike Osborne, 
considered marginal costs more relevant than average costs.
(ii) We have to reformulate the problem so that the second order 
conditions are not as restrictive as they appear to be in his case.
The actual extent of restriction imposed by his model (as with those 
restrictions imposed by Modigliani), is of course an empirical matter.
Specifically however, and as a counter-example to diagram 2, if 
we do include fixed costs in the analysis then in an industry with 
constant marginal and average variable costs the same for both firms, 
the Osborne limit price would be unnecessarily low. In diagram 3, 
drawn under these conditions, p^ is the actual price, given the 
demand curve drawn, which would halt entry and is much above the 
Osborne linit price.
It should be noticed that this case of constant marginal costs 
with fixed costs cannot be dealt with by the Modigliani approach 
either.
What the Osborne method in fact does is to combine two operations 
into one, in order to simplify the problem in hand. For an entrant to 
be on the margin of entry, we require that his maximum profit (defined 
as above to include fixed costs) should be zero. This need not 
necessarily occur at zero output, and in fact in general will not do 
so. Having found the price-output combination at which maximum profit 
is zero, we now (conceptually) have to move back along the demand 
curve to solve for the price at which = 0. This is the limit 
price. Since Osborne considers only those cases where maximum profit 
is zero at zero output, then his method is limited. At the same time, 
we shall want to obtain comparative static predictions in a form
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DIAGRAM 3.3.
A case not covered by either Osborne or Modigliani
is the actual limit price, and D the positioning of the entrant's 
demand function under that case. pQS is the limit price, and D' the 
position of the entrant's demand curve under Osborne's assumptions. 
MC, AVC and ATC are the entrant's marginal, average variable and 
average total cost functions respectively.
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suitable for estimation purposes, and where the definitions are 
meaningful, unlike the Modigliani examples.
The problem may be stated fairly easily, and is solved using 
parts of the analysis of both Osborne and Modigliani. The potential 
entrant's problem is:
Maximise: II2 = pq2 - c2 (q2> - F 2; p = f(qj + q2>
This yields the first order condition:
Equation (6) defines firm 2's reaction function in implicit form, i.e.
q2 = ‘¡’ (q ,)-
Meanwhile, the established firm's problem is:
Maximise: II j = pq( - c j (q^ - F (; p = f(q] + ‘t>(q1))
subject to: JI2 = II2(qj) $ 0.
(g = ) P + 92 ÏÏQ ‘ C2(q2) = 0? ( 6)
qj 5 0
Assuming q. ^ 0 ,  the constrained maximisation problem yields the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions:
dq dq
0
n2(qj) i 0* E n2(q,Q = 0
X 0
(X is the Lagrangean multipHer for the problem) .
Now, if X > 0:
n2 = pq2 " c2(q2) ‘ F2 
dll ( q . )  d n „ ( q . )
------ -X j ■ -  = 0
(7)
and
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Alternatively, if A = 0, we have:
P<J2 _ c 2^ q 2^ “ F 2 S 0 (7a)
dHjiq,)
= 0 (8)
dq2 _ 3s /3q,
from (6),
thus: <p
(9)
In the case where A > 0, pricing according to the Sylos postulate 
would fail to prevent entry. The established firm, if he wishes to 
prevent entry, is therefore bound to set a lower price and take output
conditions that the potential entrant, maximising perceived profits, 
finds that it is just not worthwhile his entering in that he makes at 
most zero profits on entry. Here then equations (6) and (7) can in 
principle be solved simultaneously by the established firm for qj, q2 
and so p. In order for this to be done explicitly here, we would need 
to know the functional forms of the demand curve and both cost curves.
We shall not want to assume all these in general, though we see that 
without assuming a form for the demand curve the analysis can proceed 
very little further.
Following Modigliani for the moment, we may write:
9
beyond the profit-maximising point. The output chosen will satisfy the
q lL ^ q2M
where q2M is the output which maximises firm 2's profits and q )L the 
limiting output for firm 1.
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Thus :
ML - Q 0
’2M
= Q (i - j)
However this is not very useful since s is no longer a constant. 
As stated earlier, our goal is to solve for that price which the 
established firm may set without incurring entry. Using solely the 
information available above we are unable to derive such a price in 
general, since our equations are in terms of output.1^ * For concrete­
ness we take the constant elasticity of demand case so that:
ML kp.
- n
Thus p = p (1 - — ) L &
and Q 
M/|n|
kp
q lL " 1/|nl
P <— ) (10)
From (7): P =
c2^q2  ^ + F2 
~ * 2 ~  + q2
which we may write as:
p = a v c 2 + a f c 2 (11)
where AVC2 is the average variable cost of the second firm at output 
q2 and AFC2 the average fixed cost for firm 2 at that output.
». /H + f nNow (— )L =
PL - AVC, AVC,
= 1
(AVCJ being defined analogously at output qj),
so that from (10) and (11):
(ILtZ)
v R 'L
AVC,
1 -
a v c 2 + a f c 2
M l / h
ML ( 12)L Q J
It is not particularly enlightening to attempt to solve this equation 
any further. However, we might note that, to a first-order approximation,
it may be written:
(JLLi, .
' R 'l
AVC, MC~
(7AVC2 + AFC2 AVC2 + AFC21 (12a),
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MC2 being the second firm’s marginal cost at q2 ( = q2M>.11
We should also consider the situation obtaining where A = 0, that 
is pricing with regard to the entrant (i.e. according to the Stackleberg 
postulate) prevents entry. As such, Osborne (1973, p. 74) calls it the 
situation where "the theory will be logically consistent". It should be 
distinguished from the position of blockaded entry, for that is where 
setting profit-maximising price, without regard for the entrant, fails to 
make entry attractive.
Of particular interest here is the possibility (since we have not 
specified ccst functions) of defining a point at which Osborne's 
"consistency condition" is just satisfied, in that pricing according to 
the Stackleberg postulate makes it just not worthwhile to enter. 
Inequality (7a) then takes on the form (7), and (6), (7) and (8) are all 
true at a single point. This point represents the highest possible price 
(and lowest possible output) at which entry may be prevented by using the 
Stackleberg policy; or, to look at it another way, the minimum level at 
which entrants' costs have to be in order that consistent following of the 
Sylos postulate will prevent entry. To solve partially for this limiting 
consistent point, we write from (6), (7) and (8):
MC, being the established firm's marginal costs at q,LC» the limiting 
consistent output.
AVC2 + AFC2 - MC
|£|(, + <t>')
AVC2 + AFC2 - m c 2
q lLC
Q
AVC2 + AFC2 - MC,
This means that: “ a v c 2 + a f c 2 - MC, +(AVC2 + AFC2 - MC2)(1 + <>')
and we have, as an alternative to (12), the limiting consistent margin:
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AVC2 + AFC2
A VC I-
Equations (12) and (13) can be considered as more general formulations 
than the models of Modigliani and Osborne, though they do not appear to be 
in a form particularly useful for prediction.
We can in fact verify both Osborne's and Modigliani's results as 
special cases of (12). In the case of Osborne we had:
which was a special case among the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and that:
Recall that for the entrant's optimal output of zero to yield the 
limit price then Ej = 0 at q2 = 0. This means of course that the entrant 
has no fixed costs. But in this case c2(0) = AVC2(0), and we may rewrite 
the formula for the profit-revenue ratio as:
This is precisely the formula obtained from (12) when q^, = 0, 
with AFC2 = 0.
Modigliani simplifies the problem (when dealing with his more 
complicated cost structures) by assuming that both firms have the same 
cost curves, there are no fixed costs and (at least in his diagrams) that 
the established firm has always attained his lowest unit cost position.
We have from (12)
if MC, = AVC 1
AVC j
a v c 2 (0)
AVC: T V .  ;/.ni
L
where AVC, is a constant
Unfortunately it does not appear possioie to establish Modig.izm
- 64
results rigorously with the apparatus that we have developed, we must be 
content to see their applicability in many cases. Taking, for example, 
his prediction regarding increased economies of scale, we note that this 
is defined by him as represented by a cost curve which is everywhere 
steeper than one showing lesser scale economies. Now in certain cases 
this would not affect (n/R)L> specifically where all cost curves are 
steeper than the demand curve at the relevant point, so that a corner 
solution is reached.
However, we may take a more straightforward case, where the demand 
curve touches firm 2's cost curve from below. Here the cost curve is 
more bowed than the demand curve and its slope is initially greater 
(negatively) but finally smaller than the demand curve in the relevant 
region. Thus if the cost curve becomes steeper due to greater economies 
of scale then the second firm's output increases as the cost curve and 
demand curve have the same slope further along the cost curve (nearer to 
the point at which costs cease to fall). Since the "size of the market" 
is fixed, so fixing the demand curve, and because Modigliani's economies 
of scale always last for the same interval of output then the steeper cost 
curve must be nearer the origin. Thus althoujji the second firm's output and 
total output rise, firm one's output will fall (see Diagram 4 neglecting 
the dotted lines). The import of this fall in the established firm's 
output is that he can allow limit price to rise. In terms of the equation 
for (n/R)L , q,L/Q falls and this fall outweighs the rise in AVCj/AVC^ as 
economies of scale increase.
Despite this, it is not completely clear that if the market is such 
that the established firm is not producing at his minimum cost then the 
result that increasing economies of scale increases the limit price cost 
margin necessarily follows through. This possibility is indicated, 
though not demonstrated, by diagram 4 where the dotted lines refer to the
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Modigliani's Economies of Scale effect
DIAGRAM 3.4
D is the industry demand curve, fixed by "market size".
C2 is the entrant's steeper cost curve ("greater economies of 
scale") yielding output for firm I of q )2, total output Q2 and 
limit price of C. Under cost curve Cj, output for firm 1 is q^, 
total output is Qj and limit price is A. In each case at the 
respective limit prices, firm 2 is on the margin between entry 
and exit since zero profits are being made.
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established firm's cost functions under the two assumptions about 
economies of scale. Firm l's price-cost margin is greater where 
economies of scale are smaller, the difference between price and cost 
being AB in the first case and CD in the second. (Both output points 
appear to be blockaded entry positions though, the requirement that the 
first firm's output be beyond the point at which marginal revenue cuts 
marginal cost from above is not satisfied).
Modigliani's definition of the size of the market, "competitive
output" divided by minimum cost output while, as he admits, having
13drawbacks for empirical estimation does lead to fairly unambiguous 
results. For as the size of the market increases, elasticity of demand 
and scale economies constant, the output of the established firm if he is 
to prevent entry must similarly rise. In fact the output of the potential 
entrant will usually also rise slightly but not, it would appear, enough 
to be greater than the increase in output of the first firm ( see diagram 
5). Thus in the equation from (12) we have that q,T/Q rises; AVC. 
divided by AVC2 probably rises also. That is as the size of the market 
increases, the limit profit-revenue ratio falls. It is again possible 
that this conclusion may be upset when we allow the market, before and 
after the size increase, to be such that the first firm may not attain 
full scale economies, though as the market size increases this situation 
becomes less likely.
Finally, we ought to examine Modigliani's prediction regarding the 
elasticity of demand. Superficially this looks fairly straightforward 
since q ^ / Q  < 1» thus in (12) raising the elasticity of demand |n| means 
reducing the exponent on q iL/Q which raises the second term and therefore 
reduces (n/R)^. Unfortunately the actual outcome is rather more complex 
because when elasticity of demand changes ordinarily so will both qj and q2 -
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Modigliani's "size of market" effect
DIAGRAM 3.5
The industry demand curve here is constantly elastic. As market size 
increases, scale economies constant, the entrant's cost curve shifts 
from position Cj to C2* Pl j » Q j i» anc* are Price> firm 1 s
output, and total output initially; P ^ »  ^12 an^ ^2 a^ter t^e
increase in market size.
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One prediction which follows fairly directly in our model of 
equation (13) is that, if fixed costs faced by the second firm on entry 
rise, then the established firm acting according to the postulates is 
more likely to prevent entry. The upshot of this is that the limiting 
consistent margin should rise consequent upon an increase in AFC2 in 
equation (13). Equation (12a) also indicates that higher fixed costs 
for the entrant produce a higher limit margin. Notice that an increase 
in the variable costs of the second firm, with those of the first firm 
remaining unchanged can be dealt with by the Osborne or Modigliani models, 
using the former if a horizontal cost curve is elevated. In the Modigliani 
case, a cet. par, increase in the second firm's variable costs can be 
thought of as an increase in economies of scale where the established firm 
has exhausted his scale economies (i.e. in producing at minimum cost). Thus 
the prediction that an increase in the second firm's variable cost will 
raise the limit price-cost margin is unambiguous.
H I  Some Measurement Problems
The basic model developed above suggests that there are two main types 
of factors which affect the limit price. These are scale economies and cost 
advantages. We now consider some of the measurement problems associated 
with them.
For analytical convenience, Modigliani separates what we commonly call 
scale economies into two different effects. The first is what might be 
called the extent of scale economies, that is the range of output or the 
"size of the market" in his terminology, over which they operate. Having 
abstracted this he is then free to consider a standardised scale economy of 
length one unit and use the drop of this curve, or what might be called the 
degree of the scale economy, as his economies of scale effect. While this 
is elegant, it is not particularly helpful from an empirical point of view,
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due to his definition of the size of the market. Furthermore, we should 
expect some interaction since they are not separable in practice.
In point of fact many empirical studies use a scale economy measure 
which is at best a proxy for only the first of these effects. Comanor and 
Wilson in their classic (1967) article for example, use the average size of 
plants accounting for that half of output produced in larger plants. Caves 
et al. (1975) attempt to do better by using a composite measure based both 
on a value similar (or identical in their empirical work on the U.S.) to 
Comanor and Wilson's, called MEPS, and on a "cost-disadvantage measure".
The latter is taken as the ratio of the average value added by the smaller 
plants divided by average value added by larger plants where again the 
distribution of plants is cut at the 50th percentile of output. Their 
composite measures are of two sorts, the first being the product of MEPS 
and a zero-one dummy cut-off variable for extent of cost disadvantage, 
while the second is the ratio of MEPS and the cost disadvantage measure. 
Although these measures are ingenious, and probably an improvement on the 
original, nevertheless there is no real theoretical basis for that particular 
type of combination. Their proxies would appear not to take account of curv­
ature in the scale curve which may greatly affect the level of the limit 
price as the diagram overleaf shows (diagram 6). They may also be measuring 
fixed rather than variable cost advantages. Unfortunately scale economies 
are very difficult to categorise by means of a summary statistic, and even 
if it could be done the way in which such a statistic should enter a multi­
variate relationship is not clear.
Superficially, since absolute cost disadvantages (or advantages) 
enter more directly into a relationship such as (13) they might 
appear to be easier to measure than scale economies. This is not the 
case. An entrant is at a cost disadvantage relative to the established 
firm if he cannot reach the level of that firm's cost curve on the same
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basis that the first firm did. As Sherman (1974) puts it:
"A cost of hiring resources is not in itself an entry barrier.
A prejudicial circumstance, however, that places potential entrants 
at a disadvantage can easily mar the prompt adjustment of resources 
to meet consumer demand." (p. 244)
Theoretically, then, large capital requirements are no barrier 
to entry unless the entrant does not have access to that capital on 
the same basis. Thus the entrant is at a disadvantage and his cost 
curve is raised above that of the established firm by the discounted 
value of the extra payment on capital demanded from the entrant firm; 
not an easy thing to measure even in the simplest case of the capital 
required to set up plant.
A similar argument would appear to hold for other types of 
"capital", for example, the capital provided to the established firm 
in the form of goodwill towards his particular product, perhaps due to 
advertising. In the case of advertising, we in fact know even less 
about how it is supposed to affect the limit price. The theoretical 
gap here has been noted by Williamson:
"the study of the entry question can hardly be considered complete 
until selling expense has been introduced formally (rather than discon­
nectedly - or not at all) into the analysis" (p .112, 1963).
Williamson attempts to plug this gap by setting up a model where 
"selling expense" is treated as the product differentiation barrier, 
and its increasing use raises the limit price in a sinusoidal manner. 
Revenue is also increased by selling expense. Profits are maximised 
subject to price being less than or equal to the relevant point on the 
limit price curve. Using this model, except where entry is blockaded,
he finds that:
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3R
3q
3R
3S
(R is revenue, S selling expense and X (> o) the lagrangean multiplier.
From these equations we may derive the following expression for 
the limit price-cost margin:
then his model does nothing to fill the gap in the theory, though it 
makes it more obvious and indicates the types of factors we need to 
know about. The fact is that equations such as Q 3 & 0 3 )  provide very 
little guide to profitable empirical work.
Some Extensions:
Despite the rather negative conclusions of the previous section 
we ought to consider the possible directions in which the basic model 
ought to be extended to render it nearer to reality. We briefly outline 
some of these before moving to consideration of a selection in more 
detail:
1. Our assumptions about the established industry have been extremely 
naive, either there is a monopolist or a tightly-knit collusive oligo­
polistic group in residence. As Stigler says "The theory of Oligopoly 
has been solved by murder" (1968 p.21). In order partially to remedy this
Other notation is ours; since entry does not taka place, q = Q).
3R
Obviously, unless we are willing to quantify ^P/3S and ^PL/dS
)
situation we later take the case where the established firms form a 
Cournot oligopoly but collectively act as leader to the entrant's 
followers as an example of the extensions possible.
2. Perhaps less importantly, we have also assumed that there is 
only one potential entrant to the industry. While there are quite 
likely to be several potential entrants, it is unlikely that many will 
be equally favourably placed to enter. However we do consider this 
situation briefly later in the present section.
3. The model presented above is purely deterministic. If the 
established industry prices even slightly above p^ then a firm is 
bound to enter, while a price below pL will shut out any possibility 
of entry. Such a situation has tempted some, for example Williamson, 
to ask whether a more probabilistic setting for the model might not 
be superior. While we will not investigate this suggestion in detail, 
it will be mentioned again in the following section.
4. As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Bain
considered that there are two cases where the limit price would be
important, those of effectively impeded and ineffectively impeded
entry. According to his scenario, the firm either prices at pL and
keeps out all entry or prices at the short-run profit-maximising price
(1954)and allows entry over time. This dichotomy prompted Hicks, in
an exploratory paper, to point out that it might be optimal instead to 
price at some value between the two. That is, long run profits may be 
maximised by retarding rather than preventing or passively allowing 
entry. To this end, Hicks developed the concept of "stickers and 
"snatchers" who tend to put more weight on long-run considerations and 
quick profits respectively. Since then there have been many papers 
which have considered the possibility more fully, and we attempt an 
evaluation of these papers in the next section.
5. Lastly, we might reflect on the validity of the key assumption 
of limit pricing theory, the Sylos postulate. An interesting alter­
native due to Spence is discussed in the penultimate section of this 
chapter.
Let us now assume that there are N established firms each with a 
profit function of the type:
"ii pqli - C Ii(qli> - F ti
First order conditions for maximum profit require that:
dIIli dp de d£ d°‘2 dql , . . n
“  = P + q li dQ • dîj. + q li dQ • C li(<1li} = °dq
Assuming for simplicity that these firms act towards each other (though 
not the entrant*^) in a pure Cournot manner, we may set each firm's 
perceived derivative regarding established firm reactions, dqj/dq^ = 1. 
Multiplying the above equation by q^. throughout:
Pqli + q K  SQ (I + <l’,) “ q liC li(qli) = ° (l(>' defined as before>
Summing over the N firms:
-iLjUd . i <'«
p^ l P dQ
Equation (14) holds at the total output point under the postulates.
Let us make the simplifying assumption (which may or may not be 
reasonable) that the established firms are able to co-ordinate in some 
manner in order to set limit price if they so wish. If this be the case 
then there seems no particular reason why the limit price should necessarily 
change if there are N, rather than 1, firms in the established industry.
The limit price, after all, may be obtained by the simultaneous solution 
of equations (6) and (7) alone. Our attention then focusses naturally 
upon the question of consistency, and we here move towards the N firm
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equivalent to equation (13) by partially solving (6), (7) and (14). 
Rearranging (14):
Limit profits in the established industry are given by:
where AVC, is the average variable cost of producing output qj.
Again assuming that we have constant elasticity of demand so that (10) 
continues to hold, we may write the limiting consistent margin from
but this time for consistency 8^ven ^7 (15) and involves the
concentration in the established industry measured by H,. In the 
particularly simple case where MC,£ - MC2 (for all i), so that the 
marginal cost of the potential entrant is equal to the marginal cost of 
all the established firms, then all established firms are of the same 
size and H, - This yields the following expression for consistency:
p - AMC1 16
From (6) we may substitute for p to yield:
(AVC2 + AFC2 -AMC,)
and we have still:
a v c 2 + a f c 2 - m c 2
dp
dQ
Thus since Q « q,L£ + at c^e limiting consistent point:
AVC2 + AFC2 - AMC J
(15)
Q AVC2 + AFC2 - AMC, + H,(AVC2 +AFC, -AMC,)(i +«')
(12) as: «ILcl'/W
AVC2 + AFC2 Q
/ r-
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,n + f
1 R ) LC
AVC
AVC2 + AFC2 ( — !-------- )
1 +
i / | n |
As the number of firms increases it would seem more likely that 
consistency occurs. A similar sort of result would presumably obtain 
in the more complicated case where Hj falls (as in (15)). For as the 
number of firms increases it is optimal (under the Sylos and Cournot 
assumptions and in a short-run sense) for the sum of outputs of the 
established firms to increase so making it less likely that the entrant 
can make profits in the residual demand. Since this increase in output 
is bound up in the determination of the limiting consistent profit revenue 
ratio the latter also should fall. (However this assumes that AVC2 + AFC2 
does not rise sufficiently to offset the rise in Q j l c/Q)-
Sherman and Willett (1967) consider a further elaboration of the 
basic model where there is more than one firm considering entry into an 
industry. They utilise a game-theoretic framework, but it is easy enough 
to place their problem within the context of the present model. If we 
take first the case where each firm considering entry has no knowledge of 
other potential entrants, then the analysis follows the pattern we have 
already specified in every respect. For if the entrant knows nothing of 
others then the established industry must treat him in this light and 
attempt to maximise industry profits, subject to the constraint that the 
maximum profit the entrant can obtain is zero. It is as if that firm were 
the only potential entrant.
As an example of a more complex case we take, with Sherman and 
Willett, the situation where each entrant is completely cognisant of the 
other aspirants to that industry. The established firm's problem1  ^ is 
to maximise II^ , subject to • (maximum) $ 0 for all j (unless entry is 
blockaded).
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2j
For maximum profits:
c2 (q2 j ) -
an
-  - * ’2j • S f .  - '¿<i2J> ■ »
assuming the potential entrants do not recognise I the established 
firm will react to them so they consider dc,/dq„.' 2j
Also, under our assumptions regarding potent entrants' reactions
to other potential entrants, they perceive that dc ,. = E, so the
above equation becomes:
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would be only partially aware of his rivals, in which case the solution 
would lie between the two extremes presented above.19 In general, we 
find, with Sherman and Willett, that "Potential entrants discourage 
entry".
V Dynamic Entry Models:
Recently several papers concerned with the optimal dynamic 
strategy of an industry faced with potential entry have been written. 
Among these are papers by Pashigian, (1968), Gaskins (1971), Kamien 
and Schwartz (1971), Pyatt (1971), Ireland (1972 (a),(b)), Jacquemin 
and Thisse (1972) and Schupack (1972). We here attempt a brief 
evaluation of these, considering the Gaskins and Kamien and Schwartz 
papers in more detail.
The general approach of these papers is first to postulate a 
fixed entry limiting price, below which no new firms will enter. As 
Jacquemin and Thisse, overstating the determinacy of static entry- 
barrier theory put it: "The work of Bain, Sylos-Labini and Modigliani 
allows us to determine the exact size of the discrepancy between the 
limit price and the competitive price" (p. 69). To the extent that 
this assumption is simplistic, the models lack economic content. 
Secondly, the established industry (which is normally a monopolist, 
possibly with a competitive fringe, or collusive group) is considered 
to maximise long-run profits (at some relevant rate of discount) using 
a particular control variable, usually price. Thirdly, the assumption 
which makes these models novel is the reaction that potential entrants 
are assumed to take with respect to some industry performance charac­
teristic (prices, profits or "profit opportunities"), known as the 
state equation. The inherently dynamic problem posed in this manner 
is then solved using calculus of variations or control theory.
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Attention naturally focusses on the path followed by industry price 
over time and any comparative static predictions which can be gleaned 
from the models. We proceed here by stating Gaskin's basic model, 
discussing how it relates to the other papers, and then returning 
to our consideration of Gaskin's and Kamien and Schwartz' dynamic
c is average (or marginal) cost, t is time and r is the discount rate. 
The established firm wishes to maximise long run profits, the control 
variable being price. The rate of entry is given by a linear function
If industry price is above the limit price this causes entry by a 
passive competitive fringe.
Using optimal control theory, Gaskins forms the Hamiltonian for
the problem and solves with the help of Pontryagin's maximum principle
and a phase diagram. He finds that the optimal price path involves
the established firm cutting price over time from a point below the
myopic profit-maximising price to the limit price, with the change in
21price slackening off as time passes.
Compared to Gaskins' model, Pashigian's earlier paper has a more 
limited aim. He considers only the two classical policies of short- 
run profit maximisation and limit pricing and simply derives the 
optimal point at which to change from one to the other. Pyatt's 
paper is rather similar to that of Gaskins, though he places it
results.
Gaskin's maximand is the function:
V = J [p(t) - O  q j (p(t),t) e rt.dt (18)
o
where q,(p(t),t) = Q - q2 (t)
= f (p(t) ,t) - q2(t) (19)
/
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within the context of a Harrodian type model (e.g. Harrod (1967)). 
However his reaction function is linear in profits not prices, and 
the outcome that in many, but not in all situations, firms may 
¡. ' ‘ L‘ise profits in the short run ..." (p.254) is rather different.
It is interesting to consider why this is the case. Ireland (1972(b)) 
has explored this result and finds tnat it occurs because Pyatt's 
reaction function is linear in profits (see pp 7-8). Although 
Gaskin's reaction function is also linear, profits are not normally 
assumed to be linear in prices so that Gaskin's reaction function is 
not in fact linear in profits and his conclusions are in some sense 
more general.
Actually, one of the problems of modelling in this area appears 
to be that what seem to be fairly subtle changes in specification can 
lead to widely differing results. As an example of this, one of 
Gaskin's results is that if the dominant firm has no cost advantage 
then in the long-run its market share will tend to zero. However, 
when Jacquemin and Thisse consider an extention to Gaskins' model 
whereby the dominant firm is allowed to take-over entering rivals 
(if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs) they find that the 
dominant firm with no cost advantage will achieve a positive long run 
market share. On a similar point, Gaskins finds that when he intro­
duces growth into his model the above-mentioned result does not hold 
and even with no cost advantage the dominant firm does not eventually 
price itself out of the market. Now his dominant firm demand function 
(equation (19)) is altered to :
q | (p(t),t) = f(p(t))eSt - q2 (t)
in the growth case. But, as Ireland (1972(a)) points out, this essen­
tially assumes that only the dominant firm grows, fringe firms derive 
no benefits from industry growth. If we adjust the above equation to
ai
allow fringe firms to grow at the same rate as the dominant firm then 
Gaskins' conclusion regarding the growth case is upset. As a final 
example Schupack introduces advertising as an additional control 
variable in his models. Depending upon the way it is introduced, 
long-run equilibrium price will either be raised while short-run 
price is lowered, or short run price is raised, long run price 
remaining unchanged.
Kamien and Schwartz build a model rather different to those 
we have so far considered. Their purpose is not to derive an optimal 
path as entry proceeds but rather to discover the pricing policy
prevailing until entry occurs with the help of a simple two-period 
22analysis. An interesting departure is that they view entry 
probabilistically.
Profit before entry takes place is given by: egt nj.(p(t)) 
where the industry grows over time at rate g and profits are a concave 
function of price. After entry, since this is purely a two-period 
model, profits are maximised in the industry. Also because industry 
attraction increases with the market growth rate they assume that the 
magnitude of the entering firm may also vary directly with the market 
growth rate. Expected profit after entry is then
egtniI(g) with Jl^Cg) £ 0; 0 £ ^ ( g )  < II j max.
is not a function of p in the context of their model because 
profits are always maximised (with respect to price) in the second 
period.
Entry is a probabilistic function. They assume that the amount 
of entry is not a function of first period price but in fact it is the 
timing or occurrence of entry which is stochastically governed by the 
established firms pricing policy. A higher price makes entry more 
attractive. The (instantaneous) conditional probability of entry
H2
at time t is then given by:
h(p(t);g) 5 0 where 3h/3p 5 0, 32h/3p2 i 0, (p i 0), 3h/3g i 0
We may write h(p(t);g) = F^(t)/(1 - F2(t)) where F2 (t) is the 
probability that entry has occurred by time t.
Drawing these various strands together, the problem is to 
maximise:
subject to F^(t) = h(p(t)) (1 - F2(t)). F2(0) = 0 .
(Kith Katr.ien and Schwartz, we have suppressed the arguments relating 
to g in this equation). Again the problem is one in control theory 
and is solved for the optimal price p*. They find that p* is in fact 
a constant lying between the short-run profit maximising price and 
the limit price.
Recently Kamien and Schwartz (1975) have built a similar model 
to that laid out above but concerned with a Cournot established 
industry rather than a monopolist. They find that either the firm 
realises the possibility of entry but considers it independent of 
its own actions and thus prices in a short-run profit maximising 
manner, or there is a Chamberlinian zero-profit equilibrium or 
finally that output exceeds and price falls short of the myopic 
profit-maximising level so that the firm's marginal revenue is less 
than its marginal cost due to its taking account of rivals. In each 
case, unless marginal and average costs are equal, a Chamberlinian 
equilibrium eventually ensues, as we might expect.
We now turn to a comparison and discussion of the comparative 
static (and in Gaskins' case comparative dynamic) predictions of 
these two models. As regards the predictions of his first model,
oo
V
O
e-(r-g)t dt
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Gaskins obtains the following comparative static predictions:
< 0 - the dominant firm prices to allow less entry as
his cost advantage increases.
til * 0 - As the dominant firm's discount rate rises, he 
sacrifices long-run market share.
the more rapidly rivals respond to price signals,
dk the larger is his long-run market share.
the initial size of the competitive fringe does
0
not affect its final size.
(^is the equilibrium market share of the competitive fringe).
The first, second and fourth of these predictions seem eminently 
reasonable. The prediction regarding the response coefficient k is 
rather more surprising, Gaskins does not explain it fully but it may 
occur because the earlier periods are weighted more heavily and this 
is when most entry will occur. Ke obtains very similar predictions 
to these using his growth model.
Much of the interest focusses on predictions regarding price. 
These are at two levels, equilibrium price and price path results.
From his growth model, Gaskins obtains the following signs for equil­
ibrium price level changes:
Recalling our earlier comments on Gaskins' specification of the 
growth model, we should probably treat at least the first of these 
predictions with caution. The third and last of the predictions are 
as would be expected, whereas the others are less intuitively obvious.
Finally turning to his predictions on optimal price, we should 
note that Gaskins has obtained these by means of inspection of changes 
in the phase plane portrait. While this can show us changes in the 
position of the optimal traj ectory, it says nothing about velocity 
along the price path. He therefore adds the caveat that "Each of 
these conditions indicates the short tern effect of variation of a 
particular model parameter." (p. 314) To that extent he establishes 
the following results which hold in both static and growth models:
r  <‘> < °
r  «> > °
^  (t) > 0  if f" (p)a c = 0
4 £ ( e >dq < 020
The first of these is the counterpart to the earlier result on 
§2» while the second, third and fourth are intuitively fairly obvious. 
However he does state a further important result for certain classes 
of demand curve, including linear and constant unitary elasticity 
types. This is that
< 0
which together with the third of the results immediately above implies
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We shall comment on this prediction shortly.
Kamien and Schwartz also obtain some comparative static results 
regarding their (constant) price policy. They are:
> 0 where is affected by some exogenous change.
4 ^  < 0
dg
dp*_____
d(barrier) > 0
Of these predictions, the first two seem unexceptional; our attention 
naturally focusses on the third and fourth results. As Kamien and 
Schwartz explain, an increase in the growth rate causes current profits 
to be larger so that entry is more attractive. Since future profits 
will similarly be larger, firms are more likely to want to enter the 
industry and possibly will enter in a bigger way. However in consid­
ering this result we must remember the asymétrie nature of their 
model; entry only occurs once. If there were the prospect of future 
entry or other firms interest in entry at the same time, then a 
potential entrant would be likely to take this into account when 
deciding upon the profitability of entry. It may be the case that 
such effects would weigh heavily against their prediction.
Kamien and Schwartz do not have limit price explicitly in 
their model, it is somehow implicit in their h(p(t);g) function.
Thus to derive their prediction regarding barriers they split this 
hazard function into separate components and an increased level of 
barriers to entry is given by a fall in m in the function:
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h (p;g) = mk(p) J(g)
This is in fact not the only way in which higher barriers to entry
might be considered to enter their hazard function, and other formu-
23lations can alter this prediction.
We should also consider Gaskins' result that, for certain 
demand functions a rise of p with respect to c can cause p* to fall.J-i
At the same p* before and after a rise in pL> both the benefit, in 
terms of extra profit, of maintaining this price rather than p^, and 
the cost in terms of future entry fall (see diagram 7). It is not 
intuitively obvious that one will definitely change more than the 
other, this will depend on the shape of the profit function (and the 
reaction function if we allow it to vary), as his limited result 
implies.
Having said this, it remains true that Gaskins' result is 
extremely annoying to those who wish to perform empirical work 
explaining price-cost margins while including as explanatory variables 
measures of barriers to entry. For we are not assured that an increase 
in our measures of entry barriers will necessarily raise price and so 
price-cost margin. In fact, it is probably not unfair to say that 
dynamic entry models have rather negative concisions for cross-sectional 
empirical work on explaining the behaviour of profits. If we recall 
the predictions on price that Gaskins and Kamien and Schwartz have 
given us we find that, as we would expect, actual price tends to be 
between myopic profit-maximising price and limit price. Apart from 
this we find that the discount rate affects price, yet there is no 
particular reason why it should vary between industries; that entrants' 
responsiveness affects price, where the same comment applies; that 
post-entry profit opportunities affect price, while there is no real 
reason why these should suddenly change; that the size of the initial
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DIAGRAM 3.7
The effect of a rise in limit price on Gaskins' reaction function
+
q^ is the rate of entry
G is Gaskin's reaction function before change in p^> G' that for 
the new p'. (equation (20)).
p* is the pre-change optimal price at a certain point in time. 
Benefits and costs are not, of course, measured on the same 
scales in the diagram which contains insufficient information to 
enable us to perform measurement.
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fringe, whatever that is, affects price; and that growth rate and 
barriers to entry may or may not affect price. This is not meant to 
imply that those building dynamic models have been wasting their time, 
just that both their assumptions, which lack economic richness, and 
their predictions do not particularly lend themselves to use in 
empirical work.
VI Spence's Contribution
As we have noted at the beginning of this chapter, the key 
assumption of limit pricing theory is the Sylos postulate, an 
assumption which permits great simplification in the treatment of 
potential entry. But this does not mean there is anything sacred 
about supposing that established firms maintain output in the face 
of entry; they might conceivably contract or expand output though 
the former would appear unlikely. In fact among alternatives,
Andrews (1949) assumed that the entrant would normally obtain only 
his share of the increase in output (see Bhagvati (1970 p. 302)) 
and consideration of an active output expansion policy on entry has 
received attention in the literature on predatory pricing and else­
where (see particularly Yamey's (1972b)discussion of the concept of 
predatory pricing). However it was left to Spence (1974) to relate 
the idea of output expansion, together with its implications, formally 
to limit pricing theory.
Such a policy requires capacity to be in excess of current out­
put except when entry occurs. Spence's key postulate is therefore 
that "capacity will be maintained at a level where, if entry is 
threatened, the existing industry can expand output and lower price 
within the time required for the entrant to enter, to a point where
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profits cannot be made by the entrant in the residual demand" (p.2, 
our emphasis). Any potential entrant must of course be fully aware 
that this is established industry policy. We proceed by first 
elaborating Spence's simplest model:
In the long run variable costs are a function of both output 
and capacity, but capacity does not affect marginal costs. Therefore 
in the short run variable costs are purely a function of output:
c, (q, » k) = Cj (qt) + rk
where k, capacity, is measured in output units and r, the cost of 
capacity, is chosen to allow this. Since, if entry occurs, the firm 
must expand output to capacity then capacity must be at least equal 
to the entry limiting output, q 1L, which we will here write kL to 
avoid confusion. Thus capacity, but not necessarily output, must be 
at the level indicated by the Sylos postulate, and as such k^ is 
determined as in our previous models. The established firm's profits 
are of course given by II j (q j , k) = pq j — Cj(qj) — rk, making the not 
implausible assumption that capacity costs are the only (potentially) 
fixed costs. Profits are maximised subject to the obvious constraints 
that output cannot exceed capacity but that to prevent entry capacity 
cannot be less than k^  . Formally, maximise:
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There are three cases of economic interest to be derived from (22) 
Firstly, if y = 0 but \ i 0, then X = r and
p + q i 5q = Ci ( ' i i ) + r  [q, = Qj
This is the long-run blockaded entry position.
Secondly, if A ^ 0, p ^ 0, we have that q ] = kL and
P + ql " Cl (qi>
That is output is taken beyond the short-run profit maximising level 
because of the threat of entry. This case is identical to that which 
we have previously considered at length, since qj is set equal to q 
to forestall entry.
Finally, Spence's model allows us to consider a further case of 
extreme interest where X= 0, y ^ 0. Here we have y = r, k = k^, 
but qj < k. Also:
P + ql ZQ = CI (ql )
"the short run pricing game is to some extent, strategically indepen­
dent of entry" (Spence p.7). In other words, the determination of 
price and of capacity to deter entry are conceptually separate. As 
long as no entry occurs, qj = Q and we have:
W (23)for the established firm (MC is marginal cost)
This case extends fairly easily to the situation where we have 
more than one established firm. Essentially we have that marginal 
revenue is equated to marginal costs for the ith established firm. 
Capacity to deter entry may be determined along the lines of our 
previous model of the N firm case by solving for q ^  which gives k^ 
and so the capacities for the individual firms. In the short run, 
assuming that marginal cost is equal to average variable cost for
established f i r m s ,  we have fo r  a monopolist from (21):
n + f
R W  ’
and for an established oligopolistic industry we would argue from the 
previous chapter on oligopoly we have:
We comment further on the implications of Spence's results for the 
measurement of the profit revenue ratio in Chapter 5.
From his basic model, Spence goes on to consider several 
elaborations. He first takes the case where capacity affects marginal 
costs and finds results similar to those presented above. Marginal 
revenue is now equal to the partial derivative of variable costs with 
respect to output. He also relates his model to the Averch-Johnson 
(1962) result and includes intertemporal considerations along Kamien 
and Schwartz lines. He finally extends it to cases where control 
variables other than capacity are manipulated by the firm in a similar 
manner. However the main novelties of his approach are illustrated by 
the above discussion.
In evaluating Spence's contribution, we should note that a monopo­
list wishing to prevent entry without charging limit price for his 
product must ensure that his intentions, should entry occur, are 
completely clear to any would—be entrants. If this is reasonable, and 
if capacity does not affect marginal cost, then the Spencian particular 
solution is dominant, in that it offers more profit to the established 
firm. For fixed costs are no higher than urvlef a static limit pricing 
policy yet output is at a more profitable level. ’ Indeed his particular
n + f
R
H( 1 + u)
solution is dominant even over a dynamic limit pricing policy under these
92 -
assumptions■ For what retards entry is not price, but the expectation 
of the post-entry situation. If this is more effectively signalled by 
capacity than price, then price may be maintained at a short-run 
profit-maximising level while capacity does the work of retarding 
entry, as the threat of the established firm flooding the market 
causing new entrants’ losses becomes more real. Throughout the 
sequence, fixed costs are no higher, but output is more optimally 
regulated, than under the dynamic limit pricing policy.
When we move to considering an oligopolistic industry, we must 
bear in mind that capacity is a double-edged sword, for a policy of 
price—chiselling by an established firm is relatively easy to imple­
ment. Here the firms have to allocate excess capacity amongst them­
selves; this is conceptually exactly the same problem as that already 
covered of oligopolists deciding upon the limit price. Now it would 
seem that a policy of price-chiselling by any established firm is 
relatively easy to implement, so the limiting quantity will be quickly 
produced. Yet, for the very reason that it is easy for each firm to 
expand output, we would not expect such an expansion to take place.
The argument here is exactly equivalent to that Nicholson (1972) makes 
(see chapter 2). Reaction times are short, shorter than when there is 
no spare capacity, so the transitional profit gains to any firm seeking 
to sell at capacity are small. This makes price-chiselling an unlikely 
strategy to pursue.
On the other hand of course, if capacity affects marginal costs 
deleteriously, if capacity has to be kept needlessly high to dissuade 
entry or if a combination of low pricing and spare capacity is required, 
then Spence’s novel result is not necessarily superior to some limit 
pricing policy. The costs of the above effects have to be traded off 
against the benefits of persuing his policy.
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yjl Conclusions:
Many of the sections of this chapter have been ended on a 
rather negative or even pessimistic note. It would seem that the 
commonly categorised barriers to entry do not affect performance 
in a particularly clear-cut manner. The possibility of retarding 
rather than preventing entry adds to these complications. With 
this in mind it would perhaps seem that when turning to empirical 
work, as a first approximation it might be better to take a Spencian 
view of short-run pricing behaviour. The alternative is to include 
statistics purporting to measure barriers to entry as determinants 
of industrial performance; many of these variables could only be 
included in an ad hoc manner. On this point we note that the 
problems of ignoring barrier to entry variables may well be less 
severe when, as is intended, ratios of the performance variable at 
different points in time, not the level of profits, are to be 
"explained".
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NOTES
1 Constant returns to scale exist everywhere in their economy.
2 Osborne (1964) considers that the theory of liir.it pricing (p.39o)
"is not a theory of price, but a proposition in Welfare Economics".
We disagree, considering it to be a theory suggesting the level at 
which price will be set in order to prevent entry under certain 
assumptions. The firm is then free to decide on its actual pricing 
strategy while bearing the limit price in mind, as will be discussed 
later.
3 After P. Sylos-Labini (1962), one of the early contributors. An 
alternative, predating Sylos, was provided by Andrews (1949) and 
refined by Edwards (1955), on which see later.
4 That output at which price is equal to marginal (and average) cost for 
all firms.
5 We shall subsequently alter this notation slightly further away from that 
of Modigliani.
6 This is not precisely Modigliani's definition.
7 Assuming the second firm follows the Sylos postulate, and so believes
8 Notice from (8) that we should have -1 < <j>' < 0 (see also Osborne).
0 In fact, with certain types of demand curve the result may be indeterminate.
1 From (6), substituting in for elasticity of demand we have:
Substituting for p from (7) and rearranging:
9 That is, unless — -- L = 0, which seems unlikely.
• dn2 (qj )
dq
MC,
= AVC2 + AFC2
at the total output point.
Now, to a first order approximation:
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Together with the equation above this demonstrates result (12a).
This gives a limiting consistent margin in that a margin below this 
value would imply negative rather than zero profits to the potential 
entrant. A margin above this value would fail to prevent entry, so 
being inconsistent. In an actual situation, of course, (13) would only 
be true by accident.
Modigliani neglects this possible situation.
These drawbacks are especially severe when we relax his assumptions 
about the shape of the cost curve.
As Fisher (1959) points out, if the Cournot producers also act towards 
entrants in a Cournot manner, then entry proceeds freely. Here dq2/dqj 
is the entrant's actual reaction to established firm output changes.
The fact that there is only one established firm may imply that scale 
economies exist up to a very substantial proportion of industry output. 
But this is not necessarily the case.
AMCj is the weighted average of the established firm's marginal costs.
We take a monopolist for simplicity.
This formulation implies that all j firms have the same cost function. 
Unless they do we run into problems with their simultaneous entry. 
Further theorising in this direction would seem rather spurious unless 
we could contemplate identifying prospective entrants and the likelihood 
of their entry in empirical work.
The notation is based on that earlier in this chapter.
Jacquemin and Thisse point out that this is a fairly typical result of 
the control theory approach.
To avoid conflict without previous symbolism we shall call the periods
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I and II and it will be understood that the profits accrue to firm 
1, the established firm.
23 I am grateful to George Yarrow for pointing this out to me.
24 That is unless by chance entry is blockaded at limit price.
Power; the co n sid eratio n  o f mutual re la tio n s  between producers
I Introduction:
We have so far been implicitly assuming that each industry in our 
system has no connexions with any other or, to be rather more precise, 
that each industry sells in markets where it alone has market power and 
buys all inputs from competitive industries. While this might be 
empirically apt, it is theoretically illogical in a model concentrating 
on using market power variables to explain industry performance. In 
fact the area of bilateral or multilateral power has received little 
attention in either the theoretical or the empirical literature of 
Industrial Economics.* For this reason we shall start our discussion 
of the topic of bilateral power, leading up to the development of a 
particular model, very much from first principles.
At first sight, our task might seem hopeless; we have Hicks (1935) 
who wrote:
"Bilateral Monopoly is a phrase which has been applied to two 
different problems ... . The first is the case of isolated exchange, 
or exchange between a group of buyers and a group of sellers, each 
acting in combination ... . Now so far as this problem is concerned 
I think one may say that there is complete agreement among economists 
... that ....the. problem is indeterminate ... .
"The.second problem is a more complex one. It arises when the 
commodity sold is a raw material or factor of production; so that we 
have to take into account the relation of the buyer of the raw material 
to another market — that in which he sells the finished product. For 
this problem ... there is indeterminateness also ... " (pp. 16-17)
While thirty five years later, Scherer considered that:
The theory of Bilateral Monopoly is indeterminate with a 
vengeance. It embodies all the problems met in oligopoly theory 
... i.e. do the parties attempt to maximise their individual profits, 
ignoring their interdependence, or do they co-operate to maximise 
joint profits? And, unlike oligopoly, even if the (two) parties do 
collaborate to establish the joint profit-maximising output the price 
is indeterminate within a potentially wide range." (p.242)
What then of bilateral oligopoly?
. 2
The Nature of the Indeterminacy under Bilateral Monopoly:
We start by considering Hicks' first case. In doing so we
follow Morgan (1949) in his clear exposition of the problem; he gives
a full list of the assumptions required. Let us consider that there
are two industries, the iron ore industry and the steel industry.
There are very many firms in both industries, yet trading is performed
on an industry-wide basis as if by a monopolist and a monopsonist.
Everywhere else in the economy perfect competition obtains. Expansion
of the ore and steel industries leads to rising prices for their
factors of production (other than the ore exchange price) and falling
prices for steel, but there are no technical economies or diseconomies
present. Thus the average and marginal value products of ore (to the
steel industry) curves are downward sloping whilst the average and
marginal cost curves of ore production are upward sloping (see Diagram
I). Of course, as Morgan points out, AVP is not the true average
value product curve since, as the price of ore changes, the proportions
in which inputs are used changes so that average physical productivity
changes. Given the ambiguity, it might possibly be better if we
thought of the inputs as being used in constant proportions so that
3
average physical productivity may remain constant, though then the
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Possible outcomes of trade between the iron-ore and steel industries
DIAGRAM 4.1
This diagram is substantially a redrawing of Morgan's (1949 p.374) 
where he discusses the same problem. Labelling is discussed in
the text.
marginal physical productivity curve disappears. We discuss such a 
model later in this section.
Leaving aside this consideration, we turn to the diagram to 
discover the various possibilities. If we first allow that both 
sides of the market are atomistic then although it might seem that 
the industry would set marginal cost equal to marginal value product, 
this is not in fact the long run equilibrium. For firms may enter 
the industry on either side. As a consequence the supply curve for 
ore becomes the average cost curve, since firms will enter until 
output is driven up to the point at which both average and marginal 
cost for the firm equal price paid. Similarly, the average value 
product curve becomes the demand curve and industry equilibrium takes 
place at A.
Now if the ore monopoly (selling organisation) could set price 
while the steel monopsonist would accept this then the steel monop- 
sonist is a price taker. Given a certain ore price, he would buy up 
to the point at which price paid is equal to marginal value product. 
His demand curve is therefore the marginal value product curve. The 
ore monopoly of course sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost 
and thus equates the curve marginal to the marginal value product 
curve (MMVP) to marginal cost, with exchange of pjq| - In like 
manner, if the ore monopoly was a price taker, so that the steel 
monopsonist could set price, then the supply curve of the ore mono­
poly becomes MC. Thus the steel industry equates the curve marginal 
to this, MMC, to its marginal revenue which accords to the marginal 
value product (marginal physical productivity times marginal revenue 
which is price). In this case the choice would be point P2q2■ <It: 
is clear that qj is not necessarily less than q2 in all cases.)
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Finally, it is possible that the joint profit maximising position 
could be achieved. Here marginal revenue to the steel industry would 
be equated to marginal cost for the ore industry, and q3 units would 
be exchanged. However, the price is not fixed, since both firms may 
make profits anywhere between points B and C on the diagram; the 
firms must bargain between themselves as to price, in some way not 
specified by the theory.
In summary on this simple case, we may note that the industries 
have opportunities similar to those of duopoly open to them. They 
may either co-operate and maximise joint profits (in which case 
though, we agree with Scherer that price remains to be determined) 
or they may attempt to act partly independently, and somehow reach 
an equilibrium with more or less co-operation. Notice that, in 
contrast to the duopoly case, independent action tends to result in 
lower output than maximising joint profits. However, there seems no 
reason why, for certain categories of quasi-independent action, the 
solution need be indeterminate. The position at which we normally 
start the. analysis of a Cournot duopoly path to equilibrium is one 
where neither price nor output are equal.
Of course the situation where a monopoly buyer has no product 
market power is somewhat unrealistic. However we may perform the 
same type of analysis assuming that the monopsonist is also a mono­
polist, that is in Joan Robinson's terminology, the buying firm is a 
monemporist. We have now to relabel die average and marginal value 
product curves as the average and marginal revenue products respect­
ively, and of course average value product will lie above these. With 
this difference, the range of outcomes is much as before. One point 
should be noted: the maximum profit that the monemporist can obtain 
is given by exchange at point C on the (appropriately relabelled)
/
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diagram 1• He cannot therefore gain extra profit by equating the curve 
marginal to the ore monopolist's "supply" curve, MMC, to his demand 
curve while paying p2 (or even p3). The total maximum area of profit 
available is the same whether or not the buying monopolist has mono­
psony power also.
A similar situation exists even in the case where average costs 
are invariant with output, so that no opportunity for the exercise of 
monopsony power exists. This is the case discussed by Scherer (1970) 
and illustrated in our diagram 2; the additional assumption that input 
is converted in fixed proportions into output is utilised. A compet­
itive industry's demand would be along AVP so that the factor monopolist 
would wish to sell qj units at price pj. A product market monopolist 
would prefer to buy qj units at a price of only P2, while a factor 
market monopolist selling to a monopolistic industry taking price as 
given would like trade of q^ units at a price pj. The joint profit 
maximising solution is exchange of qj units at some price between P2 
and P|. Again, individualistic action seems to dictate an exchange 
of output.units less than or equal to the joint profit maximising 
exchange, and under joint profit maximisation itself, price is indeter­
minate .
Ill Approaches to Solutions:
There have been a large number of authors eager to solve the 
previously noted indeterminacy problem by splitting the proceeds of 
bilateral monopoly power between the participants. Many of these 
studies have had as their prime concern the union-management bargaining 
process. Because of this they tend to be mainly concerned about 
institutional factors.^ While we shall touch obliquely upon such 
studies, our main concern in this brief review will be the more
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A simpler bilateral power situation
DIAGRAM 4.2
Here average cost is invariant with output, so no opportunity for 
the exercise of monopsony power exists. AVP is a competitive 
industry’s demand for the input, which is used in fixed proportions. 
MRP is the curve marginal to that, and MMRP the curve marginal to 
that. Output qj, q2 » <13 correspond to prices Pj, P2 > P3 and are 
explained in the text.
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analytical studies with somewhat wider relevance. Most of the work in 
this (narrower) field has been concerned with solving the indeterminacy 
under joint-profit maximisation bilateral monopoly. One notable but 
largely neglected 5 exception is Cournot's approach (1927 Chapter IX), 
slightly refined by Zeuthen (1930 Chapter III). This will receive 
detailed consideration in later sections; at present we shall discuss 
the joint profit maximisation "solutions".
Both Bishop (1963) and de Menil (1971) review parts of this 
literature and, as they imply, much of it is game theoretic in 
approach. In the language of the Theory of Games, Bilateral Monopoly 
is normally considered to be a two-person co-operative non-zero sum 
game, with fixed-threat bargaining. It is non-zero sum because there 
are gains from trade and is fixed threat since the most obvious and 
compelling threat is to refuse trade. As von-Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1953) analyse the game, there is a solution given by the contract 
curve, or the line BC in our diagram 1. This is of course not a unique 
solution since any point on the contract curve will do as well as any 
other, so that we have come no further than orthodox theory will take 
us. However, many other game theorists are willing to add extra 
assumptions in order to prescribe a unique outcome and we shall describe 
some of their models in outline — detailed consideration and critique 
would seem unnecessary given the work of Bishop and de Menil.
The most famous of solutions is undoubtedly that of Nash (1950).
At the joint—profit—maximising output we may define an objective-payoff 
frontier in profit space, a straight line of unit downward slope 
defines each player's profit. From this we map to utility space to 
derive the utility frontier using the players' utility of profit 
functions. Discussion then proceeds on the basis of choosing a point 
on this utility frontier (drawn for a special case in diagram 3),
/
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DIAGRAM 4.3
The Nash Bilateral Power solution
The solution maximises the product of the utilities of the
* *two players at points U|, u^.
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which is scaled to set the threat point at the origin for both players. 
Besides assuming efficiency, Nash uses three other assumptions to 
provide a solution, now known as the Symmetry, Transformation 
Invariance and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axioms. The 
first asserts that if the utility frontier is symmetrical with respect 
to Uj and u2> so that we can change the axes without altering the 
functional form, then the solution gives equal utility (measured from 
the threat point) to both players. Transformation Invariance allows 
for order-preserving linear transformations of utility to occur 
without altering the solution. If the utility frontier is now 
unfavourably altered at any but the above given solution point, this 
does not alter the outcome by the third axiom. These axioms are 
sufficient to establish the Nash solution which involves maximising 
the product of the two players' utilities.
Now if we are willing to restrict ourselves to utility functions 
which are linear in profit for both parties, we may dispense with the 
third axiom, since the utility frontier is always a straight line. We 
might well want to make this restriction when talking about pure 
profit-maximsing protagonists. If a firm wishes to maximise profit 
then naturally profit is the only argument in its utility function. 
Further, a pure profit maximiser should be indifferent between 
receiving £A from source a plus £B from source b as compared with 
£A ♦ B from source c, or again between receiving £A with certainty 
and a 50% chance of receiving £2A. Thus a pure profit-maximiser 
must have a utility function linear in profit, so that if both firms 
are pure profit-maximisers the utility frontier becomes linear (as in 
diagram 3). In this case, the first two axioms are sufficient to 
establish the solution where equal utility increments and equal profits 
are received by each player. We shall continue by considering only 
pure profit-maximising firms.
Given this assumption, we turn to a consideration of Raiffa's 
four solutions (1957). Of these, one is equivalent to that of Nash, 
and two others are also equivalent unless for some reason the 
utility frontier does not continue uninterruptedly from one axis to 
the other. In the latter two theories Raiffa effectively rejects 
Nash's third axiom. This makes no difference unless we consider that, 
while being pure profit-maximisers, one or both of the firms is 
subject to some external constraints; Bishop gives the example of 
minimum wage legislation, yet if such legislation were general it 
would surely be built into the underlying cost curves. Raiffa's 
final scheme departs more radically from the Nash solution, since 
for this solution he rejects the transformation invariance axiom; 
once we have done this we can say very little about the actual 
outcome.
A further approach along similar lines to the above is the 
Zeuthen (1930 chapter IV) theory, taken up more recently and put into 
a game-theoretic framework by Harsanyi (1956). While the basis of 
Zeuthen's theory is to be found in his desire to explain the bargain­
ing process in terms of successive concessions rather than a wish to 
develop a determinate theory from a small number of axioms, Harsanyi 
in fact shows that (at least as he interprets Zeuthen) the solution 
point is identical to the Nash point - that is as given by the product 
of the utilities of the two parties measured from the threat point.
Foldes (1964) has a rather different approach to finding a 
determinate outcome under joint—profit—maximisation bilateral monopoly. 
His model has as its analytical basis a Hicksian—type theory of 
bargaining where determinacy is obtained by taking into account time 
preferences, or threats of delay before trade can take place. Such 
threats can be used to extract concessions. Thus, his bargainers
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have utility functions with arguments of profit share obtained and 
time before agreement is reached. He shows that the point at which 
agreement is reached is that point where:
3u/3t _ 3u/3n,
3v/3t “ “ 3 u / 3 J I 2
u and v being the first and second bargainers' utility functions with 
arguments t and ITj and t and JI2 respectively. In a simple example 
where utility is a linear function of discounted profit flows, Foldes 
finds that
1 s
r being the first bargainer's time rate of discount, and s being the 
discount rate for the second firm. That is, the smaller the firm's 
discount rate, the larger its profit share.
In fact Bishop (1964), in deriving a "Zeuthen-Hicks" theory of 
bargaining, obtains precisely the same result though by different 
means as in the above example of the prediction from Foldes' theory. 
Bishop shows that his solution involves maximising u(v) ; in the 
special case where r « s the outcome is of course identical to that 
which Nash prescribes. Actually, there seems in general no reason why 
the discount rates of the two actors involved should differ system­
atically in the absence of any possibility of entry. If this is 
indeed acceptable then both the immediately preceding theories should 
lead to a result identical to the half-way rule obtained from the 
simple Nash case considered earlier. In order for the discount rates 
to differ we would presumably have to introduce liquidity constraints 
into the analysis.
A more recent paper by Spindler (1974) which is also concerned 
with finding a determinate solution under bilateral monopoly, reaches
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the conclusion that joint profit maximisation with each firm taking 
half the profit available is the most reasonable outcome. His 
argument is that the bargaining power of each firm can be directly 
measured by the degree of economic dependence of the other firm, 
which dependence is linearly related to the amount of profit to be 
received, since each extra unit of profit has the same value. Both 
firms are in a position to offer a share of the same total profit 
area initially, thus both have equal bargaining power initially. 
Whenever one or the other firm has a greater relative bargaining 
power it is less dependent on the other firm and so should be able 
to extract concessions. The natural outcome of such a process is 
that bargaining power and economic dependence are equalised when both 
firms receive a half share of the profits available.
While discussing joint-profit-maximisation bilateral power 
models, we should also mention that in Stigler's (1964) theory of 
oligopoly, buyers enter the picture explicitly. However, Stigler 
specifically does not wish to discuss situations where the number of 
buyers are few, so that we shall not consider his paper further in 
the present context.
We could of course criticise the assumptions underlying the 
above models especially those based on the axiomatic approach; Bishop 
(1963) has an extensive critique along these lines. It is probably 
more useful though, to accept that despite the widely differing 
starting points of the theories of determinacy the conclusion that 
two monopoly firms facing one another should share equally the profits 
accruing by joint maximisation would find widespread approval. This 
solution appears eminently reasonable unless we accept that there are 
systematic factors which would tend to make either one or the other 
party predominant in any bargain. Having said this, we should perhaps 
note that such a solution could be considered as either a normative or
109 -
a positive conclusion. Again Bishop considers this question in some 
detail, and while the axiomatic approach implies some positive 
theoretic value in the solution, Raiffa for example believes that his 
solutions are normative in the sense that they are alternatives which 
a "fair arbitrator" might suggest. To the extent that such a fair 
arbitrator seems to occupy a similar post to that of the Walrasian 
auctioneer we may well consider that the solution outlined has 
positive content.
IV Extensions to the Joint-profit-maximisation solution:
It is when we move from considering bilateral monopoly under 
joint profit maximisation to situations more commonly obtaining in 
the "real world" that we get into some difficulty in extending the 
solution discussed above. In fact work in this area is almost non­
existent, so that when de Menil, for example, moves towards his 
empirical work he states that:
"since the Nash model refers to bargaining between one 
employer and one union the equation had to be tested on highly 
unionised industries." (p.51)
We should first consider extensions to the fixed proportions 
model described above when there is more than one firm on each side 
of the bargain.^ Assume for example that we have a monopoly buyer 
A, who is also a monopoly seller in a market where customers have no 
buying power. A purchases inputs from level B and transforms them 
costlessly and linearly into his output. At level B there are two 
firms who buy all their inputs from price-takers (see diagram 4).
We can immediately isolate polar cases. It might be the case that 
A is able to play the two firms at B off one against the other for the 
contract to supply q^ units of their product to him. Trade will then
no -
DIAGRAM 4.4
Polar cases in a "two against one" situation 
under joint profit maximisation
A is a monopoly buyer and monopoly seller who purchases inputs from 
level B, transofrming them costlessly and linearly into his own output. 
Thus final (and intermediate) product output is at level qm while 
bargaining goes on our price paid. MCg is the cost curve for both
B firms.
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take place at a price equal, in our diagram, to MCg. Alternatively 
the same two firms might tacitly be able to collude and act as a 
monopolist in which case, as we saw earlier, trade should take place 
at Pj (halfway between pm and MC^), with each firm supplying half of
neither of the firms at level B should be persuaded to sign an 
exclusive contract at any price below p£ (half-way between p( and 
MCg) since more profit can be obtained by collusion with the other 
B firm.
Even with this very simple example it can be seen that once we 
move to considering the effects of having more than one firm on 
either side of the bargain then we have to solve an oligopoly problem. 
While this is not the normal type of oligopoly problem in that total 
output is determinate we have similar polar cases and presumably a 
solution akin, for example, to the Cournot solution. It would seem 
legitimate that there can be this range of possible outcomes, since 
all that we need for joint profit maximisation is (tacit) agreement on 
the total traded quantity and the ability of the A sector to impose the 
profit maximising price on the final consumers. Collusion within the 
A sector about final price need not imply collusion regarding the 
price paid for inputs (or vice versa). One point, discussed earlier 
in the chapter on oligopoly models, arises again here: the range of 
outcomes in bargaining between sectors A and B is circumscribed by 
the ability of any one firm or small group to tender for an exclusive 
contract, so that again inequality of firm size is important. Some 
type of numbers equivalent measure of concentration would seem rele­
vant here for this reason. Thus we might say, in a rather ad hoc 
manner, that the level of the traded price (and so the level of price- 
cost margins on both sides) will depend on the equivalent numbers of
the required output. Further, given that collusion is possible, 10
/
firms on both sides of the market and the extent of their realised 
interdependence.* *
We now leave this two sector model at its (limited) stage of 
development and proceed to further considerations which are required 
for our model to provide even a reasonable mirror on the real world. 
First let us take the situation where A is supplied by two mono­
polists providing products which are perfect complements in the 
production of A's product (say labour and capital used in fixed 
proportions, for example). In this case any of the three parties 
can threaten to halt the operations of the other, assuming no other 
sources of factors or outlets. Thus the only effective coalition 
involves all three parties and under the Nashian scheme the product 
of their utilities becomes the effective maximand. By symmetry the 
solution involves each player obtaining a third of the profit maxim­
ising surplus even if, for example, one input is a relatively 
unimportant part of the product. In extending the model in this 
manner, we run into one of Bishop's criticisms of the model. He 
notes (p.5 79) that if a previous monopoly union were to split itself 
into n constituent skill unions then the Nashian arbitrator would 
award each party l/(n+l) of the total profit, whereas previously 
Labour as a whole obtained only one half of this surplus. The most 
obvious, though not fully satisfactory, answer to this point is to 
say that if indeed each of the separate skills is indispensable then 
the monopoly union obtaining initially was not an optimal structure 
for that particular industry.
At the other end of the spectrum, if the two factors are 
perfect substitutes then of course the bargaining power of the input 
sellers is only that of a duopoly. This indicates that in the case 
where factors are imperfect substitutes so that we have the possibility 
of variable proportions some solution between these polar extremes
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should be achieved, though it must be admitted that the limits are 
potentially extremely wide.
Another complication which should be introduced into the scheme 
is to allow sellers of factors to supply several sectors of industry 
with intermediate products, rather than just supplying sector A. It 
is of course possible that the firm(s) at B can obtain a large share 
of the profits of each of these sectors. This is however not 
necessarily the case unless B is able to practice discriminatory 
pricing as between the different types of uses to which each such 
sector puts its product and can prevent significant resales. It may 
therefore be the case that B is forced to sell at a common price to 
all users dependent on its general market power vis a vis the power 
of its buyers.
One rather important feature of our economy which causes 
difficulties for the joint profit-maximising approach (and maybe 
also others) is that many of its products pass through, not just 
two, but a whole chain of manufacturing stages on their way to the 
final consumer. This means that we ought to consider whether the 
joint-profit-maximising type of bargaining and share-out approach is 
applicable to a "chain of monopolies" situation where the total share 
is that area between final price and cost levels at source, or whether 
some prices are necessarily parametric. In other words we should open 
up the possibility that the margin in industry B is determined not 
only by the power of sector(s) A but also sellers to B and sellers to 
these industries. A related problem is the extent to which strong 
intermediate—prdduct suppliers can push up prices despite a weak 
final market sector. When we bring such matters into consideration 
then a partial equilibrium approach becomes increasingly difficult 
to maintain, yet any general equilibrium framework for the type of
/
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economy visualised here would necessarily be extremely complex.
Rather than developing the model outlined above in any of the 
directions indicated we shall turn to the alternative formulation 
proposed by Cournot (1927, Chapter IX) and discuss extensions to his 
model in some detail. In doing so we shall find that the considera­
tions noted above also enter into such an enlarged Cournot model, and 
we shall be content to provide fuller discussion of them in that con­
text. Once the Cournot model has been formulated and its ramifica­
tions explored, we shall be in a position to compare the predictions 
it provides with those of the joint-profit-maximising model and 
thereby reach some conclusions on bilateral power models in general. 
Unfortunately, unlike the pure oligopoly case discussed in an earlier 
chapter, it proves very difficult to say anything very concrete about 
the possible performance of a general bilateral power model where 
joint-profit-maximisation and Cournot behaviour are to some extent 
polar cases.
1 7Cournot's Model
Cournot begins his analysis with a copper monopolist and a zinc 
monopolist who must both sell to a perfectly competitive brass 
industry, for there are no other uses for copper and zinc. The 
brass industry is able to convert these two inputs costlessly into 
brass and we assume one unit of each input produces one unit of 
output.*^ Further, entry into the copper or zinc industries is 
impossible. In fact, the problem of potential entry is not dealt 
with in this chapter, in the sense that we either assume barriers to 
entry high enough or assume that capacity is maintained (in a Spencian 
manner)'1iigh enough to remove any threat to established firms' short 
run profit-maximising behaviour.
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Profits in the brass industry are given by:
"Bi “ PBqi ‘ Pcqi ' Pzqi 
First order conditions for 
each firm:
for each firm i - 1 , 2.... n
profit maximisation then imply for
dHBi
dq. (1)
Thus, the (identical) derived demands for copper and zinc are 
given by:
q = f(pB) = f(Pc + Pz)
The copper monopolist's profits are given by:
II = p q - c (q) - F c *c’ c c
Now, Cournot assumes the copper monopolist maximises profits with 
respect to price not quantity, since his output must be identically 
equal to that of the zinc firm and the brass industry. This means 
that we may write
dn__c
dpc
q + p d£c dp *c
(2)
Here, d£
dpc
But Cournot assumes
from the Copper man's point of view, that is the Copper monopolist 
assumes that changing his price will have no effect on the price set 
in the zinc industry.
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Similarly, the zinc monopolist assumes:
We have then, from (2)
(Pc - c ’c)
dPB -q (3)
or IR . ¿R
pc dpB
(A)
and similarly for the zinc man.
From (3) and its equivalent for zinc, with the aid of (1):
- cc z -2q
PB ' dcl
(5)
where |nfi| is the elasticity of demand for brass. (5) is Cournot's 
result, but we shall instead follow the direction in which (4) takes us, 
and attempt to obtain price-cost margins for copper and zinc in this 
manner. .Note that (4) may be rewritten as
pc - c ’c 1 £ b
pc K K
and what we would want to do is to interpret the right hand side in 
terms of the elasticity of demand for the copper monopolist’s product.
Now, this is not a model of Bilateral Monopoly in the modern sense; 
previously the term had two meanings.*^ But Zeuthen(I 930) uses the model 
interchangeably in both the case of a copper-zinc—brass situation, and 
the situation where a monopoly seller faces a monopoly buyer, and 
states that "If we consider actual examples, we have in all essentials 
the same case (as the former) when two monopolistic concerns face each
/
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other as buyer and seller" (p.64). The easiest way to see this is if
we consider that the copper monopolist is integrated vertically with
all the brass producers, but that now brass competes with other
products in a perfectly competitive market. The copper owner-brass
producer now has monopoly power in that he provides the only use for
zinc (and has a monopoly n  copper). Even if brass had no substitute
so that he provided both the only use for zinc and held a monopoly in
the manufacture of brass and kindred products, the situation should be
no different, since a monopolist may take his profit only once. He
may charge himself a monopoly price for copper, o r charge himself
cost-price for copper and charge a monopoly price for brass: to do
both would reduce output to such an extent that profits would be
reduced.'^  We proceed to develop the Cournot model of bilateral 
in effect
monopoly assuming^that the Copper monopolist is now vertically 
integrated with the brass industry.
VI Our Basic Cournot Model:
We have, for the brass and zinc firms respectively:
(6) 
(7)
nB ’ pBq " pzq " Cc (q) ' FB
" z “ pzq * Cz (q) " Fz
Again, profits are maximised with respect to price, but the Cournot
assumptions have to be modified slightly. We take it that B assumes
that ,dp_
■ 0;
dP*
if B alters his price then this will not, in his opinion, affect z's
price. 18
/
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The equivalent assumption for z is that
dpI
dp_ = 1.
This is again in the spirit of Cournot's "quasi-competitive" 
assumptions; his firms assume that their actions will have an effect 
on the others equivalent to the actual effect if the firms were all 
in perfectly competitive markets. For, if z were to raise his price 
to the firms in a perfectly competitive industry, then their marginal 
costs would rise by that amount and so too their prices. Incorporating 
these assumptions in the maximisation of (6) and (7) yields the 
following equations:
dnB
dpB
, dq 
q PB dpB '
dq
PzdpB "
c- ¿a = o
c dpB
(8)
and d II dqq + p j “
z dpB
c' ^  
z dpB
z
dpz
= 0 (9)
Adding these two equations above gives:
2q ♦ <P„ ~ c'c - c'z) ^
or BPn " c' 2
TCI
(10) (identical to (5))
Forming predictions in terms of B's and z's individual margins, we 
note from (8) that:
This means that B's price-cost margin remains unchanged when faced by 
a monopoly seller, because he treats that firm's prices as given in
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making his decisions. This feature of the Cournot model becomes quite 
important when we turn to the empirical tests.
Equation (9) is more difficult to interpret initially. We have:
= -£L 
P_
dp_B
dq
1
( 12)
lnBl Pz
Now, we know that the demand for z's product by B is given by B's net 
marginal revenue curve. Thus,
IIN(X MR - c'B c PB (i - —  ) - c
K' c
Therefore.
1
*
q dpz
d MR
(— 5- 2- - c" ). dq c q ® B  A  dMSB c"c-q N
nz Pz" dq MRb - c'c pz ( MRb • dq MRb J
If we make the assumptions that the marginal cost of production, c'c> is
constant, and that B faces constant elasticity of demand (both of which
appear empirically plausible and are defended in Appendix I), then we
19 . .may simplify this relationship greatly. The latter implies the parti­
cularly simple result that the elasticity of B's marginal revenue curve 
is equal to the elasticity of his demand curve.
Thus the above relationship becomes:
PB 0  -
(12a)
rr (i -- »1*1 J
Then from (12) and (12a), aiKl the definition of z's margin is:
1 (13) 20
This is interesting, for it implies that, contrary to what might be 
thought, it is possible that if a firm faces a monopolist, then this may 
allow it to have a higher price—cost margin than if it were to face a
/
large number of buyers. As can be seen from equations (10) and (11), 
what is actually happening here is that price rises very high and 
output is much reduced, for output is lower than it would be if 
there were only one monopolist in the market or if joint profit 
maximisation was the agreed policy. The situation in fact has a 
nice symmetry with Cournot's duopoly model, as can be seen in 
diagram 5 (overleaf).
VII Some Extensions to the "Cournot" model:
Having built the basic model, we seek to extend it. This is done 
in the following ways:
(i) We allow B to use other than one unit of z's output to make 
one of his own.
(ii) We consider the case where there is more than one firm of type 
B, and more than one of type z in the brass and zinc industries,
(iii) We allow firms B to buy from other industries than z.
(iv) We., allow firms z to sell to other industries than B.
Some of these extensions require more theoretical development than 
others; we take them in the above order:
(i) Firstly consider the case where B buys say two units of z's 
product in the course of making one of his own; or more generally,
(for efficient production).
We also have to alter our assumptions about changing prices as far 
as z is concerned. If z raises his prices, B will have to raise his 
by 1 (or twice) as much in order to leave profits unchanged. Thus,
q_ » s q . We then have: D Z  Z s (s - 1 , for example), z z
8.Z
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DIAGRAM 4.5
The Cournot Bilateral Monopoly solution
Revenue
For ease of draftsmanship we have used linear demand and marginal 
cost curves. The Cournot Oligopolists produce output Oqj and qj^ at 
price p.. The Cournot Bilateral Monopolists produce output Oqj sold 
by the first to the second at price P| and by the second at price Pj*
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dJI
We have -3—  
dpz
or
^  \  \  
dqB ' dpB ' dpz
0
^ B
dqB
04)
The demand for z's product is now according to its^marginal revenue 
product, lhat is:
Note that the elasticity of this marginal revenue product curve is still 
|nz l as in (12a). We again work in terms of |r^  | in obtaining the 
price-cost margin equation.
From (14)
V z  dpB
P, d(ln
qB dpB SzPB 
PB dqB Pz
and substituting (15) and (12a) into this:
1 (16)
Thus, the extension of the model to a simple proportional relationship 
between B's and z's output, rather than a one-to-one relationship, does 
not alter z's price cost margin from its former value (and neither will 
it affect B's price-cost margin). This is to be expected as such a 
proportional relationship amounts really only to a change in units.
We could continue by developing a model where there is a more flexible 
relationship between the two outputs; however this would yield somewhat 
intractable results, and in any case the data to be used (UK input- 
output tables) assumes constant proportions, so that there seems little 
point in developing the more complex model.
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(ii) Assume now that there are m, rather than one, purchasing firms in 
the B industry, and n selling firms in the z industry. We then have, 
for individual firms:
We take it, with the support of result (16), that we may simplify by 
making q ^  = qfi^  in (17), and that the results would be identical if 
q_. = s q . . We further assume that each of the i firms in the B 
industry act as Cournot oligopolists towards each other, and that the 
j firms in the z industry do likewise, and we retain the assumptions 
of the earlier model regarding relations between the B and z industries.
A question however arises as to the appropriate control variable in the
21firm^ maximising process; we assume it to be quantity.
From (17) then (with q ^ = qfi^ ):
(17) i = 1,2,. . ,m
n .
ZJ (18) j = 1 ,2,. . ,n
dpB dqB
qzi dpB • dqB .
Under our assumptions, each B firm takes it that:
0
so that we have:
“qBi dqB
Multiplying by q^ (= qfi^ ):
2 dpB
and summing over the m firms
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îpBqi " Zpzqi _ Zcci-qi = " dq~ ¿qBiB
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so that in (20), with similar manipulations to our previous cases
Thus, for z both the number of firms in the z industry, and the number 
of firms in the B, or buying, industry matter, in contrast to the 
situation in the B industry.
(iii) Allowing B firms to buy from other industries than z does not 
affect either B's margin or z's margin. To see this, assume B buys 
also from an industry y, and replace (17) by:
"Bi “ PBqBi ~ Pz'lzi " P y V  " Cci(qBi)'
- No essential change occurs in either (19) or (21), the price-marginal 
cost margin remains as it was.
(iv) Despite this, the situation where z sells to more than one 
industry does have some effect on z's margin, though not on B's (since 
B takes z's price as given in making his calculations). The effect on 
z's margin comes about because he now takes into account that other 
industry as well. The formula yielded is in fact a fairly straight­
forward generalisation of (21).
We take only the case where price does not differ between the two 
(or more)markets z sells to, so that discrimination is not possible.
The model we build only has two buying industries A and B, but the 
generalisation to many markets is obvious.
We have then, for z, assuming he is a monopolist:
Hz
(21)
where qz “ 9A +
sales to the A and BHe maximises profits with respect to q^ and q^ 
industries. Thus:
( 2 2 )
an
z
3qA
+ qz
°PZ
T 1 - c 
3qA 2
» 0
an
z
^Z + qz
3pZ
~ C
°q3 Z
= 0
From (22) and (23) we immediately see that
3PZ 3PZ
3qA 3qB ’
as a condition of profit maximisation.
(23)
Multiplying (22) by qA and (23) by q^, and adding yields:
3p_
'A
3P,
PZ-(qA + qB) + qZ (qA 3^7 + qB “ Cz'(qA + qB} = ° (2Z°
^A B
We consider that q^, Z 's sales to the A industry, produce q^ 
units of A's output, so that q^ = s^qA for efficient use,
and similarly q' = sDq_.
b b b
Firm z then assumes for sales to A:
^ A  , . ^ A  
dPZ ' dqA
and similarly for s
Mow:
3pZ _ 3PZ dPA
°qA " 3PA ’ dqA
es far as Z's assumptions
ales to 3.
dpz dpA
d ÿ  • d-77 n 1 ' ‘p p j‘ ^ A di.
about A are concerned, and similarly.
3pz dpa
3qB S3 dqB
(z assumes A and B to act
from Z's point of view, 
independently)
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Thus in (24): d ?A d PRq p - c' q = -q (q s .--- + q s .--illz z  zH z Hz W A A dq. q3 B d q /A B
n + for: — Y ~  z - ( V k  Ü A  + Ï !
Pz ' dqA pv 'd<l, }z B
Sow, the demand for z's product from A is:H
p = NMRP *z A
nA 1
PA O  - —  ) - c ’ s
|nA> -1
(25)
(where c'A are A's other marginal costs), 
and from B:
H
= SMRP_ =
o LpB (1
3pz dpA „ HA s
3qA
= -5-- (1 -
dqA m A l a
in
Substituting these relations into (25) yields:
n + f 3P-,z ! °‘B °pz
Pz 3qA (1 - pz ' 3qB (1 _ ^B }
|n,| I'M J
. KqA qz 3p2
pz ‘ 3q. qZ pz 3qB (1 - B )
Recall that
S(1a
XZ
Pz 0qB 
do
write these = —  . --- = ---  , taking it that q can be
p dq n zz z z
We shall
considered an independent variable.
dqA , 3^z dqB 
qB
(i.e. = Ü E
d<l, 3qA ‘ dq„ ' 8qR ’ dq, ’
dqA , dqB
d q z  + dqzbut 1)
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Then from (26)
(27)
This result is obviously easily capable of generalisation to 
the case where z sells to a great number of industries rather than 
two. Note that, since we have assumed that the price to every industry 
is the same, then
which is the proportion of revenue gained from industry A by z, and
similarly for B.
Equation (27) can further be generalised, without making any 
particularly severe restrictions, to the case where there are many
then the entire expression in square brackets in (27) becomes 
invariant with respect to the structure of the z industry. Now 
considering that there are n firms in the z industry, not all of 
equal size, we may for each firm write:
where C is the (constant) value in square brackets. 
Thus:
23
firms of unequal sizes at level z. If we assume that for all i (firms)
(28)
1 2 9
- q q . dp= Z HZ1 *z
2 2
where X^ = — ^— ‘----- > allowing for the firms in the z industry to
entertain other reactions besides the pure Cournot reaction between 
themselves; if they are strict Cournot firms of course X^  = 0.
industry z.
Equation (30), straightforwardly extended to the case where there 
are more than two buying industries is a fairly general Cournoc-cype 
formulation of the typical short-run profit-maximising industry. As 
such it is the basis for later empirical work. It is obviously not 
completely general, for other extensions do suggest themselves, but
we consider these to be of second-order importance, lor example, 
although z does not affect B's margin, and so does not affect any j.irms
d
Equation (19) would appear to hold true as long as — —
&qAi
true, but this is implied by the relations (28) anyway.
is
From (29) summing over the n firms:
C l  " T  (1 + Xi>
2
where u z
and is the Herfindahl index of concentration for industry z. 
Therefore:
(30)
assuming chat marginal costs are equal to average variable costs in
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buying from B, B does himself affect the z industry margin, so that 
those firms which buy from B will affect B's margin and, through it, 
z's.
VIII Comparisons with the Joint-Profit Maximising model:
As was discussed earlier in the present chapter, this Cournot 
model is by no means the only theoretical model of bilateral power 
possible, but it is one model which yields quite firm conclusions with 
fair ease. These conclusions are of a rather surprising nature, as a 
moment's consideraion of equation (30) will show. For example, as 
increases there will a ceteris paribus increase in — r “ "2, In 
general then, the suggestion is that it would be better to be faced 
by buyers with market power than by a competitive industry. It may 
well be that the model developed here is idiosyncratic in this 
respect.
For as Hicks (1935 p.18) points out, the determinacy of the 
Cournot model is assured by the assumption of the buyer that a 
change in his price does not affect the prices charged for inputs.
This belief effectively disallows the possibility that the buyer has 
any monopsony power, for he treats input prices as parametric. Under 
certain circumstances such a model would not be unreasonable. For 
example there is no monopsony power independent of monopoly power 
available to a buyer who faces horizontal supply functions for all 
factors; the case mainly discussed above where the buyer uses inputs 
in fixed proportions and has average cost equal to marginal variable 
cost (as with Scherer's model) would fall into this category. However 
as has been suggested to me by John Kay, it remains true that the
assumptions made in the course of developing the model may favour the 
2.5suggested conclusion.
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One problem with disallowing monopsony power if the circumstances 
above do not hold is that we might normally expect monopoly power to
difficulties in a more general model than Cournot's because the
poly power may well be at least partially offset by a concommitant 
increase in B's monopsony power.
Unfortunately then, unlike the pure oligopoly cas^ it is by 
no means easy to generalise from the Cournot model to other plausible 
models of firm behaviour. For in general, B's margin could well be 
affected by the z industry whereas here it is not; z's margin is thus 
also affected by the firms from which it in turn buys. Whilst noting 
this caveat, and the subsequent limitations placed upon the model, let 
us turn to the important question of the extent to which the model 
developed above is representative of a general class of bilateral 
power models by considering its relationship to our ideas on the 
joint-profit maximisation model as outlined earlier. In performing 
this exercise we shall note that empirical work with an equation of 
the form of (30) above will use ratios of that equation at different 
times in the cross-section. Thus while the actual margin may well 
be different under different behavioural assumptions, the ratio of 
two margins at different time periods may vary much less with the 
particular behavioural assumption involved.
To facilitate comparisons, let us take the simpler form for the 
Cournot equation as given in (21). This may be rewritten.
n £
be positively associated with monopsony power. z This causes
increase in z's margin predicted because of an increase in B's mono­
(21a)
As was said earlier in this section, we have the somewhat surprising
conclusion that
132 -
-,n+F _>
— 5—  - H (|n | - H )-2. lnBl
3HB 2 B B T_ |
However, if we consider a change in H^:
< f ! >
3H I^b I " H B ’ ^
then we see that this will be greater than the above, since we must 
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have (|nR| “ H ) > H . Further if we consider an increase in both
H_ and H :D Z
,n+F3 ( ^ * >  W
T h |n, | "bI-v ’+VK I-  V " 2 ,,n+F .3 (-5-2)> — ^ —  > 03HB
This means that although an increase in the power of the industry to 
which z sells will increase the margin for the z industry, greater 
increases in the margin will result from an increase in the power of 
both z and its purchaser(s), because both the difference between final 
price and costs and share of that profit area increase in the latter 
case, instead of merely the height of the total profit area.
In fact if B sells to a further industry C we have:
then
n + fb - h b m c lR B hc!-Hc T h J
3 ( ^ ) B 1 lncl
3hb lid  "Hc ' Tn^ l
which will be greater than 
3( ^ 2 )
3HB
under quite plausible circumstances.2® Thus it is
quite likely that the z industry's share of total profit accruing to 
the B and z industries drops when rises, although its profit revenue 
ratio rises. The point is that when rises, so that the number
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of firms in that industry falls, then output is necessarily cut back, 
thus final price and so the total price-cost margin to the chain of 
industries rises. We have seen that this causes the margin for the z 
industry to increase; however it is a debatable question as to whether 
its share of the total margin increases because the total price-cost 
margin is likely to increase proportionately more than that margin 
for z.
Put this way, the conclusion of our Cournot theory that an 
increase in increases the margin for the z industry seems much 
less surprising than it does at first sight. Furthermore, the types 
of effect that changes in the market power of the B or z industries 
provoke seem rather similar between the two theories. In saying this 
it must be remembered that a decision to act in a joint-profit- 
maximising manner over splitting the proceeds of market power in the 
B sector need not imply that the firms in B are able to collude to 
produce output equal to that a monopoly firm B would produce in their 
place.
To elucidate, consider that there are say two firms at level B 
and they act towards the final buyers as a Cournot duopoly. Given 
this, total output, final price and the margin between price and 
costs is determined. Suppose now that they are faced by a few 
powerful sellers of their inputs and decide to act with these 
sellers jointly rather than, as with the Cournot bilateral monopoly 
model, treating their prices as parametric. What this means is that 
total output and so input quantities are determined, but that 
bargaining may take place over the prices at which these inputs are 
exchanged. As far as the input producing z firms are concerned, we 
would expect their share of the total profits to rise if their number 
diminished. If instead the number of B firms dropped (to one) then 
we would expect the share of the z firms to diminish but in our
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example the profit area has risen greatly so that the margin actually 
obtained in the z industry may well be larger than before. This 
would of course depend on the precise formula used for splitting 
the proceeds. Finally if the number of firms in both B and z 
industries fe-ll then we would expect the margin for the z industry 
to rise, and to do so more than in the immediately previous case.
In other words, at least in the qualitative sense there seems 
no reason why our Cournot theory of bilateral power should not act 
as a proxy for alternative theories of bilateral power also, with 
the caveat that it does not really incorporate the influence of 
monopsony power nor power among suppliers lower down in the production 
chain. Having said this, it is unfortunately true that we cannot 
generalise the Cournot theory in the same elegant manner as was done 
with the pure theory of oligopoly.
I* Empirical Work:
As we said earlier, very little empirical work has been done
using variables purporting to measure bilateral power, although
several writers have mentioned it as a possible influence on profits
(e.g. Shepherd 1972). In this final section we first comment briefly
29on two recent papers which have developed bilateral power measures 
and then move on to a few points regarding the use of bilateral power 
measure in empirical work.
Guth et.al. (1973) developed some "buyer concentration ratios" 
for factors of production sold as intermediate products. These were 
not actually based on any clearly defined theory, and in fact they 
did not use them to test any structure-performance hypotheses. Their 
measure can be symbolised as:
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BCRj = E a^ CR4- (31)
proportion of• ith industry output sold to the jth industry as 
indicated by 1963 input-output tables for the U.S. Having calculated 
these measures, they found that BCR^ < CR4^ in general. They then 
used their measures to test the "countervailing power hypothesis" 
that high "buyer power" is associated with high seller power, but 
the relationship was barely statistically significant.
More relevant to our present purpose is Lustgarten's (1975)
paper where he does include "buyer power" as an explanation of price-
cost margins in the U.S. His theoretical discussion of their place
in such a relationship rests largely on an analysis similar to that
in Stigler (1964) regarding the costs of collusion among buyers,
though he considers that "collusive agreements are less likely to
be successful for buyers than for sellers, because firms are typically
sellers in only one market but buyers in many markets" (p.126), so
that the gains from collusion are smaller for buyers. The measure of
bilateral power that he uses, which is loosely based on the above
argument, is identical to that given in equation (31), although he
also briefly adduces arguments for, and measures three other aspects
of buyer power - "relative buyer firm size", "average annual firm
31
purchase" and "sector dispersion of buyers". Lustgarten s BCR 
measure is then used to help explain the 1963 level of price-cost 
margins, the other explanatory variables being the four-firm 
concentration rate and the capital-output ratio. It proves to have 
a negative and significant though not powerful effect on price-cost 
margins. He performs the further experiment of splitting his sample
1
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into"low seller concentration" and "high seller concentration" 
industries on the hypothesis that buyer power matters little unless 
sellers have the opportunity of gaining prices significantly above 
marginal cost. For each of these samples price-cost margins are 
regressed on the capital-output ratio and his BCR variable, though 
surprisingly not on seller concentration, an omission which probably 
helps to explain the dramatic fall in overall significance in both 
samples. Buy-er power now has a stronger negative effect on margins 
in concentrated industries but an insignificant effect in unconcen­
trated industries; these results might change if seller concentration 
was included as an explanatory variable. He also uses his BCR 
measure to explain advertising expenditures.
We may rewrite our own measure of buyer concentration for the 
z industry from (30) as:
from z. We expect HDITV to have a positive effect on price-cost BUY
margins, since (30) becomes:
Immediately we notice that while from Lustgarten's results, a cet. 
par, increase in the market power of one of the j industries will
^  and our prediction would be for a rise in the margin. It remains 
to be seen whether this will be borne out in our results. Notice
a . 32
J
(32)
cause an increase in BCR and so a decrease in the seller's margin, in our model an increase in a buyer's market power causes an increase in
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however that our prediction can be argued to follow more directly 
from a well-defined theoretical model.
Mo\xig more closely towards the equation to be estimated
empirically, we take ratios of (33) between two time periods to 
yield:
dropping the z subscript for simplicity. Let us assume following 
chapter 2 that we may write
which appears to have some advantages both in simplicity and 
flexibility since it allows the reaction to a change in concentration 
to be both greater or less than according to Cournot (see chapter 5 
for more detail on this point) . Also assuming that
and hat some factors might affect changes in price-cost margins across 
all industries to the same extent we have:
New, reactions to changing buyer power need not be according to the 
pure Cournot bilateral power model. To allow for this in a fairly
33
L(Ht)
as
and that we may approximate this function by the form
a > 0
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simplistic manner we could alter (34) to read:
n+Ft
R 8
A (35)
which may be written more concisely as:
A(AH)a (AHbuy)B (35a)
By introducing the coefficient 8 we allow for changes in buyer power
over the period to affect margins (across all industries) to a greater
or a lesser extent than implied by the Cournot bilateral power model
which seems a sensible generalisation.
Further elaborations which are fairly easily introduced are to
allow the elasticity of demand for z's product to vary in some
determinate manner and to allow some lag in reaction to structural
changes. These points will be discussed in more detail in later
chapters, as will problems encountered in attempting to obtain values
for H using equation (32). Apart from such considerations, (35)
BUY
becomes the basis for empirical work.
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FOOT NOTES
1. Indeed a recent 600 page text in Industrial Economics (Devine et al. 
1974) allocates the subject a bare half page! Two empirical studies 
will be commented upon briefly in the final section of this chapter.
2. Machlup and Taber (1960) also consider this question to some extent.
3. The problem is that noted by Vernon and Graham (1971) which can lead 
to vertical integration between a monopolist and a perfectly 
competitive industry being profitable.
4. Many of these works have as their origin or inspiration Hicks'
(1964 ch.7) original strike threat model. An example is provided 
by Johnston (1972b).
5. Sonneschein (1968) has a few comments.
6. In the sense of von-Neumann and Morgenstern.
7. Extent tihat in Foldes' more general formulation, the transformation 
invariance property need not necessarily be assumed.
8. See p. 48 for a statement to this effect.
9. If, for example, there is more than one supplier of an input which may 
be used in variable proportions with another (or many other) input(s) 
then the situation becomes more complex as explained later. It is for 
this reason that we choose to indicate extensions to the model from 
this more limited point of departure.
10. and has negligible costs associated with it.
11. For example, one formula which would fit into this scheme and has other
desirable properties is to share total profits between A and B sectors
by giving the B sector n "A-—  o f the total, where nA - number of
nA B
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firm equivalents in sector A, ng = similar for B. This has the 
desirable property of allocating half shares whenever n = n_, and
A  U
more generally of yielding the same shares whenever the ratio n^/n^ 
is the same.
12. A. Cournot (1927 chap. IX).
13. Cournot assumed proportions m f : m2, but it makes little difference.
14. See the conclusion to the previous chapter on this point.
15. We shall not consider second order conditions explicitly in this 
chapter; in general we shall require that the slope of the firm's 
marginal revenue curve is steeper than its marginal cost curve.
16. See Hicks (1935) also Machlup and Taber (1960).
17. See Scherer (1970) pp. 242-5 and Needham (1970) pp. 117-122. This 
assumes fixed proportions in manufacture, see Vernon and Graham (1971).
18. We comment on this assumption in the penultimate section of the present 
chapter. As a shorthand method of referring to the actors involved, we 
shall henceforth use B to refer to the (firms in the) brass industry, 
or the brass monopolist, and similarly z for the zinc industry.
19. Since MR - p + q.^, then - 2 |{j. + . This means that:
*  H dq’ dq dq dq^
3 . .
MR
dMR
dq
which bears no simple relationship to nB as a general rule
20. I am grateful to John Cubbin for pointing out an error in my original 
formulation at this stage. Also to Avinash Dixit for pointing out 
another!
21. See our comments on this choice in chapter 2
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21a The first of these assumptions is purely for simplicity, ana is 
made with the support of result (16), while the second is the 
normal Cournot oligopoly assumption. The final assumption is 
that of the z firms regarding the assumed relation between their 
demand curve and that of the B industry which we have made earlier. 
As such it describes the behaviour of z rather than B and occurs 
in the equation above in the text in inverted form. It should of 
course be distinguished from the actual relation enshrined in the 
equation of the demand for z at the bottom of the page.
(P.T.O.)
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22. The meaning of c ^ is Ec'^q^/q , it is of course necessary at least
for (21) to represent a point of maximum profit.
23. If we allow z to discriminate between buying industries in charging them 
different prices, we obtain as an alternative to (27) the following:
(R^ is the proportion of revenue gained from industry A, similarly for 
Rg, and Rz is total revenue. 10zAi is the elasticity of demand for z's 
sales to A, similarly ihzB| is the elasticity of B's demand for z's 
product) .
It should perhaps be pointed out that, as we approximate the 
generalisation of (27) for empirical testing purposes, we are essentially 
not making any distinction between it and the generalisation of the 
above formula.
24. This definition is the same as that of equation (5) chapter 2.
25. It must be admitted that the prediction that when Hg increases,
[(n + f )/r‘Jz increases cet.par. does not necessarily follow if we
allow for inputs to be used in variable proportions or even if the 
demand curve is of a different type to that assumed here. On the 
latter point, compare our model with Zeuthen's examples using a Cournot 
model with a linear demand curve of slope -1. (Zeuthen 1930 p. 85).
27. This is a simplified argument, assuming both |nfi| and |nj fixed. In 
fact of course, assuming |nBl fixed in this context is reasonable, bu- 
we should remember that |nj is a function of when differentiating
that [ tig | > Hg for net marginal revenue product to be positive and so
RA R,‘B
z1 'zB1 (1
H,B )
26. Though see our comments on Guth et al. (1973) in the next section.
with respect to that variable. However, the conclusions are not 
changed when we do this. After some manipulation we find that while:
-  1 4 2  -
3K (as in the text),
. ...+F. 
3(— )Z 1 v .. , ,—  C— z; , smaller than the aoove.
28. The precise condition is that:
30.
TT + F TT+Fc _ i . B / H3 > <=*.> / H z
n + f
As mentioned earlier, in this case the formula for — -— z will not beR
entirely accurate.
Which, like ours, are not actually measures of monopsony power, Out 
measures of seller concentration.
Though they do make a number of points regarding the way that such a 
variable should be constructed.
We will not discuss these alternatives further.
We call our measure one of buyer power on tne grounds that Gutn n_. 
and Lustgarten use the name. Actually though, it is rather a misleading 
title. As we have seen in previous sections, oligopsony considerations 
are not taken into account in forming the measure. Rather, tne seliCiS 
are aifecteci in the pure Cournot model, by their perceived version of the 
demand curve facing them, which perceived curve is sained according io 
the net marginal revenue product ot the buyers, n  ia thus the sv.lii..0 
power of the buyers (3), which determines the net marginal revenue 
product and so the effect on the sellers (z) . Hj in i-Obmula is cn<- 
selling power of a particular industry of these Duyera. 
neglecting any consideration of the problem of potential entry.
See equation (16) chapter 2, and the arguments for it.
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Chapter 5: A CONSIDERATION OF SOME ADDITIONAL POTENTIALLY RELEVANT FACTORS
I Introduction:
In the previous three chapters we have developed a basic theoretical 
framework for consideration of structure-performance relationships.
Having done this, we now attempt an assessment of the empirical literature 
in the field and then go on to discuss some generalisations and wider 
theoretical considerations. This will lead us to our empirical estimations 
in chapter 6.
Drawing together some of the results of previous chapters, we argued 
in chapters 2 and 4 that allowing for quite general reactions among firms 
within an industry but imposing a strict Cournot-type reaction to other 
connected industries gave a relationship:
Further, we. suggested in chapter 2 that Hz(l+uz> - LZ(HZ) where 1 > hz(Hz>
> 0, l'> 0 so as mentioned in chapter 4 a simple and flexible form for z
the ratio of the function over time which obeys these restrictions might be
BUYz
( 1)
(equation 33 chapter 4)
, a > 0
(dropping the z subscript for simplicity).
Hence, supposing for the moment that |n| and HBUY remain constant between
two time periods,
Therefore values of a - 1 would indicate a Cournot-type reaction while
proportional increase in profitvalues greater than one imply a more than
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on revenue, and values less than one a less than proportional increase.
We cannot say with certainty however that if a were greater than unity 
then firms are acting more collusively. For example, if two firms, 
merged to one then the more collusively they were acting beforehand 
the less the rise in profit-revenue ratio would be. This is rather a 
special case though, in general an increase in the degree of collusion 
when the number of firms falls is indicated by a value of a greater than 
one.
Similar, though much less definite considerations would lead us to 
treat the term in like manner to allow reactions other than the
strict Cournot one towards changes in bilateral power.* Then assuming 
that the elasticity of demand does not change between the two periods in 
question leads us to the formulation:
a (T T ) " A-(AH)° <ahbuy)6 (2)2
(equation (35a) chapter 4)
If the elasticity of demand is liable to vary differentially across 
industries within the time period, then this relationship has to be
3amended. The obvious form is:
A('ir) “ A-<AH>“ (ahbuy)B (Alnl)_l (3)
which is derived from (1) utilising the approximations discussed above 
to obtain (2) except that elasticity of demand is allowed to vary between 
periods. (A|n| = Int|/|n£_ f|) • In a later section of this chapter we 
consider some argixnents bearing on the determination of the elasticity 
of demand in relation to its likely changes between time periods, that 
s^ in the business cycle.
As we said, this model neglects the possibility of entry. However, 
we concluded in chapter 3 that the relationship between (those factors, 
ior example the level of advertising expenditure, commonly categorised
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as) barriers to entry and industry performance, especially as regards the 
likely effect of changes in their magnitude upon changes in the profit- 
revenue ratio, is by no means clear-cut. We also noted that the model 
formulated by Spence had the implication that short-run pricing behaviour 
could be considered as more or less independent of entry considerations 
provided capacity is maintained at a level sufficient to prevent entry. 
Such action would normally appear more profitable than a limit pricing 
strategy since fixed costs should be little or no higher than under the 
limit pricing policy yet price and variable costs may be set at more 
favourable levels. For these reasons we feel disinclined to consider 
altering the formulation of the model to incorporate variables purporting 
to measure barriers to entry, despite the fact that they are extensively 
used in other UK studies (see sectionll). Having said this, it remains 
true that a Spencian outlook does have implications for the estimation 
of the model, and we comment on these when we discuss the dependent 
variable specification in section III.
Other areas which receive some discussion later in this chapter 
are the problems involved when firms are assumed not to be purely profit 
maximisers, and the question of lags in the relationship with associated 
possible problems over simultaneity. Of necessity these topics will not 
be treated with the same degree of formality and rigour as other aspects 
of the model.
First, however, we turn to the empirical literature. Because of 
the quantity of work in this area we feel disinclined to present a formal 
review, particularly since there are at least two recent papers (Weiss, 
1971 and Yamey, 1972) which have dealt at some length with this general 
area. In contrast, similar studies for the UK have only recently been 
forthcoming, and their numbers are small as yet; in the next section
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discuss them individually, albeit briefly. Despite the fact that we do 
not wish to discuss individual studies for the US, we feel we should 
comment on what is probably the main point of contrast between UK and US 
studies. Nearly all the latter use the profit-capital ratio as the 
dependent variable, whereas we (among others) have exclusively used the 
profit-revenue ratio. This important divergence is discussed in the 
third section of the chapter.
II Previous work in the area performed on UK data:
Both Yamey (1972) and Weiss (1971), in their reviews of the structure- 
profit relationship for the US, consider that there is a significant, 
though not powerful, influence exerted by concentration on performance 
(however defined, see the next section). Thus from Weiss:
"Almost all of the 32 concentration profit studies except Stigler's 
have yielded significant positive relationships for years of prosperity 
or recession, though they have depended on a wide variety of data and 
methods" (p.371).
This conclusion mainly emanates from studies which do not include 
important structural variables apart from concentration. There are two 
main methods people have used in adding variables representative of 
barriers to entry; the dummy variables approach and the continuous entry 
variables approach. The former, characterised by Bain and Mann, gives 
a significant empirical place to concentration in combination with 
barriers (see Weiss p. 376 for references and results). An example of 
the latter is provided by Comanor and Wilson (1967) who find concentration 
fairly collinear with their "minimum efficient scale" variable (a barrier 
to entry) and, probably for this reason, unable to exert a significant 
independent influence. From the results of such multiple regression 
analysis, Yamey still feels able to conclude that "the concentration ratio
/
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emerges as a more or less powerful partial 'explanation' of differences 
in profitability ... " (p.302) and Weiss similarly is "reluctant to 
reject the independent importance of concentration ..." (p.378) The 
pattern to be gleaned from previous work in this area performed on UK 
data is somewhat ambivalent. We refer here mainly to eight studies, 
those by Phillips (1972), Shepherd (1972), Holterman (1973), Khalilzadeh- 
Shirazi (1974), Caves et. al. (1975); also Dutton (1976), Hart (1975) 
(both working papers), and Cowling and Kelly (1976) (listed separately). 
Apart from Cowling and Waterson (1976), which has a similar approach to 
the present study and is not discussed in this section, the only other 
published study at time of writing (as far as we are aware) is an early 
paper by Hart (1968), mentioned by Yamey. This differs from those 
catalogued above in using a profit upon capital surrogate instead of the 
profit-revenue ratio, and he finds a positive but insignificant effect 
of concentration upon the dependent variable. In addition there are 
probably more unpublished studies but we cannot undertake comprehensive 
coverage of these. We proceed by listing what we hope can be taken as 
a typical (good) equation from each of the five authors, then commenting 
upon some salient points.
Phillips:^  71 observations; data : centred on 1951.
5- - 0.147 + 0.0010 CR3 - 0.1127 APS + 5.609 A
(2.22) (2.22) (2.76)R
- 0.0730 CR3.A - 0.0118 G + 0.002 EPF + 0.0155 PROCON 
(1.51) R 0.50) (1.27) (1.01)
r2 » 0.260, r » 0.45 (defined below)
t statistics in parentheses.
Shepherd; 113 observations; data: 1963, 1958 average figures.
| - 14.5 + 0.122 CR - 6.797 K - 0.005 R + 4.788 G
(0.035) (13.232)Y (0.003) (2.029)
standard errors in parentheses, R = 0.166
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Holterman:5 113 observations; data: 1963
-  = -0.026 CR - 0.00 EB + 0.123 A + 0.061 G
^ R(-1.09) (-0.96) (5.88) K (3.64)
+ 4.291 KA + 1.437 K
(2.10) 0 (4.14) R R2 = 0.4544
r - 0.425
t statistics in parentheses.
Khalilzadeh- Shirazi: 60 observations; data: 1963.
i  - 6.34 0.009 CR + 0.833 MEPS + 0.081 KA + 0.038 G
(0.34) (3.86) (2.34) 0 (1.46)
+ 2.97 PDD - 0.082 IMP + 0.103 EXP 
(2.95) (-1.34) (2.09)
R2 = 0.598
r = 0 . 6 0
t statistics in parentheses.
Caves et.al.: 60 observations; data: 1963
n
R 5.50 + 0.044 CR + 0.071 KA + 0.050 G + 2.97 PDD 
(1.88) (1.99) 0 (1.94) (2.87)
- 0.051 IMP + 0.109 EXP + 
(-0.81) (2.16)
0.640 MEPSJO
(3.41) -
R 0.578
r = 0.35
t statistics in parentheses.
Dutton: 34 observations; data: 1963.
log - 1.693 + 0.082 log (CR4.A) - 0.016 t, - 0.395 t2
(2.21) (2.06) (-0.12) (-2.23)
- 0.184 Mj - 0.410 M2 g2 „ 0<490
(-1 .77) (-2.53)
t statistics in parentheses.
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Hart; 112 observations; data: 1968.
log y  “ -0.487 + 0.0056 log CR5 + 0.1560 log K + 0.0346 log G 
(0.1816) (6.1927) L (0.5147)
+ 0.0717 log A - 0.0217 log MEPS + 0.0026 log IMP 
(4.2514) R (0.7664) (0.2221)
R2 = 0.4207
t statistics in parentheses
Definitions:
n
R
CR
CR3
CR4
CR5
APS
EB
MEPS
MEPS10
K/Y
KA/0
K/L
Net output - wages and salaries 
sales (estimated value)
For Hart, the denominator is net output, 
average of 4 digit , 5 firm, sales concentration ratios
3 firm concentration ratios (source: Evely and Little, 1960)
4 firm employment concentration ratios (source: Sawyer, 1971)
5 firm employment concentration ratios (source: National 
Institute)
average plant size measured as thousands of employees per 
plant (source: Evely and Little)
average size of the largest plants (ranked by employment) 
accounting for 50% of industry employment 
size of the mid-point plant as a percentage of net output 
(as a percentage of employment in Hart s work)
MEPS if the costs of operating above this level are less than 
90% of those of a smaller operation, zero otherwise, 
capital expenditure/net output
net assets/gross output (order level). Holterman and Khalilzadeh 
use different definitions of net assets
capital expenditure/labour
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R
K/R
G
A
A/R
PDD
EXP
IMP
M .
M.
1
l2
EPF
PR0C0N
r
R2, R2
sales
capital expenditure/sales
change in sales 1963/1958 (for Phillips, — -tPut —  output 19h8
y output 1948
for Hart, proportionate change in sales 1968/1963) 
advertising expenditure
advertising/sales. (based on a more aggregative level than 
the majority of the data)
1 where A/R > 1%, zero otherwise (some data from US sources)
exports as a percentage of industry output
imports as a percentage of industry output (or sales)
(Source: input-output tables, disaggregated)
IMP > 5% I
' (Source: Annual State of Trade for UK)
IMP < 1% J
tariffs/imports > 5% (source: see Dutton) 
tariffs/imports < 1%
"effectiveness of price fixing"; see Phillips for details.
1 where industry is a "producer good" industry, zero otherwise. 
Again see Phillips
correlation between "concentration" and "scale barrier" variables 
coefficient of determination and corrected ditto.
Except where otherwise stated, data comes from the Censuses of Production 
and is (roughly) at Minimum List Heading (MLH) level.
As we can see from the results all these studies are similar in 
that they use multiple regression analysis on a Comanor-Wilson type of 
structure-profit equation.6 They all include a concentration variable 
and (apart from Shepherd), at least one continuous entry variable. We 
have argued that the most relevant concentration variable is not the 
simple five-firm (or three-firm) ratio, and have argued against the
inclusion of barrier variables.7 All studies but Phillips include 
some version of a capital-output ratio, we explain why this might be 
relevant in the next section. They also mostly include a growth term.
The theoretical justification behind entering such a variable is not 
always clear though. For example:
"In a growing market is it easier to make profits than in a 
stagnating one. The demand curve is continually shifting to the right, 
thus raising the equilibrium price. It takes time for supply to increase 
through entry of new firms or the expansion of capacity of existing firms, 
and during that time higher profits are made by existing firms in the 
industry" (Holterman p.121).
The problem we have with this argument is that if demand is growing 
at a known constant rate than there seems to be no particular reason to 
expect any lags before output expands. Again, if demand is falling at 
a rate which then suddenly decreases, firms might come up against 
capacity constraints having planned for a larger decrease in output so 
that profits might rise despite a negative growth rate. Unplanned growth 
or decline would appear more germane. This perhaps helps to explain the 
erratic significance of that term.
Moreover, these studies not only have several variables in common, 
those for 1963 all use very similar data. The main source is the 1963 
Census of Production. One might perhaps consider that they all wished 
to test very much the same theoretical relationship between concentration, 
entry barriers and profits but in the face of imperfect data amended their 
models according to their own particular judgements: Shepherd decides to 
remove some random noise by averaging over two periods, he decides against 
including additional structural variables on the grounds of lack of data. 
Both he and Holterman are of the opinion that the whole sample should be 
used whilst Khalilzadeh-Shirazi would rather select a more homogeneous
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subgroup. In including variables to represent barriers to entry, 
Holterman is in favour of one measure of minimum efficient plant size 
while Khalilzadeh chooses another; she favours a continuous advertising 
variable while he plumps for a dichotomous classification. Dutton in 
contrast considers that, since concentration is only effective (in 
the longer term) in the presence of barriers, her concentration and 
(advertising) barrier variables should be multiplicative rather than 
having separate influences. The main novelties (apart from the cost 
disadvantage measure of Caves j^t.aK) are probably Khalilzadeh's import
g
and export variables and Dutton's tariff variables.
Unfortunately the various estimates produced do not,as we might
hope, perhaps even expect, yield similar conclusions. Some of the
differences are fairly straightforward; it is quite possible that
Shepherd's concentration ratio is significant while others are not
because of multicolinearity problems between it and the plant economy
measure. Caves et.al. consider this to be reasonable when they compare
9
alternatives for the latter (see their p. 137). But could multi- 
colinearity really be responsible for making both of Holterman's 
measures of these variables insignificant and of wrong sign? Comparing 
the coefficients and significance of the capital-output ratio and 
especially the growth variables also yields some rather unexpected 
divergences.
Looking at the 1963 studies alongside Phillips earlier work and 
Hart's work on a later period, we find some measure of agreement in 
that the advertising variable is significant in all studies where it is 
included. Since however the numerator of the dependent variable contains 
advertising expenditure (among other things) as well as profits, then 
this result should be treated with some caution. Apart from this, 
Phillips' results differ from those of Khalilzadeh and Holterman in that
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the concentration variable is significant and the plant economies 
variable is (oddly) negatively significant. In the case of Hart's 
work, comparison is made slightly difficult by reason of the different 
dependent variables he uses. Notice though that his factor proportions 
variable is significant, in common with most other studies where it is 
included. Also we see that his plant economies variable is insignificant, 
unlike Khalilzadeh's, and his growth variable is insignificant, unlike 
Holterman's. A further interesting feature is that when he includes the 
number of firms rather than a concentration index, this variable achieves 
(negative) significance in an otherwise identical formulation.
In short, confident conclusions on the effects of changes in 
structure on profit performance in the UK are not easily drawn from 
published work. There are two main morals that might be taken from this. 
Either the data are not sufficiently good to indicate the nature of the 
true relationship that rules in our economy, or the theory lying behind 
the equations does not hold good. It was for the latter reason that we 
decider! to attempt a much fuller examination of the relevant theory 
before proceeding to tests, taking little from other empirical studies 
for granted.*® Even then, given the unexpected divergences between, say, 
Holterman and Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, it could be the case that the selection 
of the sample might play some part.
Cowling and Kelly's work differs from the above studies in being at 
the firm level across the food industry. As such, much of the data comes 
from non-census sources. Their basic approach is to relate price-cost 
margins to concentration advertising and firm size variables. After a 
correction for heteroskedasticity, they find that both advertising variables 
(of which they have two types) and concentration affect margins, probably 
to a non-linear manner.
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III On the choice of the performance measure:
We now turn to the somewhat vexed question of the choice of performance 
measure in structure—prof it studies. As we have said, most studies taking 
the United States as their data base use the ratio of profit to capital, 
sometimes just called profitability which we shall write n/E,  whereas those 
UK studies so far produced use (n+F)/R, the profit-sales ratio, otherwise 
called the profit-revenue ratio or price-cost margin.11 We attempt to 
discover the basis for the existence of these competing measures, and also 
to suggest the superiority of the latter for our purposes.
Collins and Preston (1966 and elsewhere), who are almost alone in 
using the price-cost margin for a study of the US, are fairly explicit 
about the hypothesis they are testing when they state, for example, that 
"the closer an industry is to a monopolistic structure, the higher will 
be the price-cost margins, after account is taken of difference in capital 
requirements ... Of course^the optimal price-cost margin under monopoly 
is a function of the price elasticity of demand" (p.228).
Yet Benishay (1967) is equally explicit in his criticism:
"But the price—cost margin, or profit margin on sales, is not the 
relevant rate of profit ... . Competitive forces tend to equalize rates 
of return on equity or on assets not profit margins on sales, for invest­
ment will flow from poorer to better returns on investment. The use of 
s sales profit margin to represent a rate of return on assets or on equity 
is simply inappropriate" (p.73 , his emphasis).
However, if we revert to Bain (1951), we find that "Average excess 
profits on sales should thus be higher with than without monopoly or 
effective oligopolistic collusion. This prediction evolves into one 
that there will be larger profit rates with higher seller concentration 
than with moderate or low seller concentration... (p. 295). He goes on 
to make his position even clearer:
r --
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"As the hypothesis is developed to this point, the predicted 
profit-rate differences are explicitly differences in ratios of excess 
profit to sales. Because data on profit rates on equity are more 
readily available (for the U.S.), let us enquire whether the predicted 
relationship should also hold for the ratios of profit to equity ... .
For comparisons of individual cases the answer is no, since the ratio 
of equity to sales will vary among cases. However, so far as there is 
on average among groups of firms or industries being compared about the 
same ratio of equity to sales, their average equity rates should stand 
in about the same relation as their sales ratios" (pp. 296-7).
Yet, despite profit-sales figures being more easily available in
the UK, the debate has relevance for our work when we find in Khalilzadeh-
12
Shirazi (1973) that:
"Most US studies of structure-performance relationships have 
employed rates of return on owner equity as their dependent variable. 
Conceptually, this is the proper variable, since we are testing against 
the null hypothesis generated by the competitive model that rates of 
return are equal (in the long run) across firms and industries" (p.2) 
(though in fact he finds some theoretical place for the price-cost margin 
and uses it in his empirical work) . The thesis of this section will be 
that both null and alternative hypotheses need to be considered, and that
this has implications for the choice of measure.
Now the null hypothesis Khalilzadeh-Shirazi mentions is not unique 
to profit on capital; in pure economic profit terms profit on anything 
would be equated (at zero) across industries under competition. It is 
only when we move to considering recorded profit that difficulties arise 
Recall that under monopoly:
• • P - MC _ n whereas under competition
P is price, MC marginal cost and n the elasticity of demand. Thus
1 5 6
making the assumption that marginal cost is equal to average variable 
13 .cost and multiplying numerator and denominator by output we obtain
,. . II + F R - C  1the profit-revenue ratio   —  as — -—  = -— r ror monopoly, anaK K | n |
• • n + f
for competition — -—  = 0. More generally we have found that under
a given market structure in a particular industry we may write: 
n + F H(1 + u)
h i
(equation (6) chapter 2; this no 
bilateral power considerations)
Without changing the nature of the argument in this section, we drop 
the (1 + u) term and rewrite the above equation more simply as:
JLjL Z  = H (4)
R TnT
Multiplying both sides of (4) by R/E then indicates that
n + F H R (5) ‘4
E j n i ‘ E
is an equivalent relationship concerning profit on equity. Again under 
competition (U + F)/E = 0.
The null hypothesis is the same; why then should the proponents o 
the profit on equity measure want to take the alternative hypothesis i.n 
what looks to be a more complicated form (and a form which 0en»_rates 
some further difficulties, as we see later)? The answer presumably lie 
in the fact that we cannot measure profits in the manner in which econo 
mists are accustomed to speak of them. Specificeliy, us
that variable costs may be split up into labour costs (wL) and capital 
costs (mK)1^  (others can of course be added).
Thus though profit is given by:
H = R - w L - m X - F ,  
what we actually measure is:
(n + F)M = R - wL,
. 16
since we cannot easily measure the cost o. capita.!., 
profit-revenue ratio then we have:
for the measurec
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T7 + F ( ) K , mK“ w -f --R (8) ,
and by the same token:
n + f
V E 'M
H R mK
TnT ' E E (7)
Now, if we could assume mK/E to be constant a<cross industries in
that K = iE say (where i is the rate of interest in units of the
reciprocal of time and E equity in pounds sterling) , we would have:
n - f
v R \M
H miE (8) from (6)= TnT + R
j /II + f n 
and ( E M
H
TnT
R. rr + miE (9) from (7).
The null hypothesis in the latter case would then be simpler than that
in (8), due to its yielding a constant value in the cross-section.1^
In fact Stigler (1963, ch.3), in tackling the problem of the null
hypothesis, implies that we would expect the rate of return on capital
18in a set of competitive industries to approacn equality. This equality 
comes about because firms are assumed to enter an industry until entre­
preneurs providing capital services earn only a normal return on their 
investment.
However, for an important reason we may consider tnat an approach
TT ■p’ . . .using (— ■ ) as the dependent variable provides a superior estimating
equation. This arises because if the entrepreneur supplies capital plus 
his services in a monopoly industry then he will obtain an extra return, 
being the monopoly profit involved. As a consequence, his capital s.otn. 
due to its being in that monopoly industry will be worth more and snou.d 
be revalued in the capital market to reflect that increased (monopoly/ 
return. The import of this is that we should expect if H increases, and 
with it the monopoly return, then E also will increase so eroding that 
return.19 There are two important consequences flowing from tms
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possibility. Firstly, it it illegitimate to derive (8) and (9) from 
(6) and (7) in general, because we cannot assume mK/E to be constant. 
Secondly, in using an approach along the lines of (7), the effect of 
monopoly in the product market is ameliorated in the equation by the 
effect of the capital market in revaluing assets. When doing such 
work on the structure performance nexus we should wish to test the 
gross effect of product market power not the net effect once the 
capital market has revalued the assets concerned to some extent.
That is, if the sales/asset ratio falls as K rises then (6) clearly 
becomes the better form to use. In this context if is interesting to 
note that Qualls (1972), who reworks the studies by Bain and Mann 
using the profit-revenue ratio rather than their profit equity ratio, 
finds that "In general, the results confirm their basic conclusions 
concerning the importance of concentration and the height or entry 
barriers in influencing market performance. In some instances, however 
minor modifications are called for, and in others consiaerable strengtn 
ening is provided" (p. 151). One of Collins and Preston's studies
(continued on ?. 160 
- p. 159 has been omitted
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also finds the price-cost margin to be better explained than profitability.
Given that the profit revenue ratio seems superior to profit on 
equity in this pure oligopoly model, there appear to be two defences for 
using the i  approach. One is that entry barrier theory may indicate 
the relevance of profit on equity rather than profit on sales, since 
what is relevant to the entrant is the return on the capital he invests 
upon entry. Another is that entrepreneurs acting in the best interests 
of their shareholders should in fact attempt to maximise profit on 
equity. However the latter argument would seem to be a red herring, 
for no formal model has been given by the proponents of this approach 
(as far as we are aware), and it is hard to see how one yielding 
different but still sensible results could be produced. In any case, 
the fact that profit on equity is the maximand provides no assurance 
that a simple relationship linking profitability to structural features 
will result.
The first argument is perhaps best illustrated by the position of 
Weiss (1971) who says that the profit-revenue "ratio would be a correct 
statement of the optimal margin if entry were blockaded so that margin 
depended on demand elasticity". Yet he believes that "conditions of 
entry rather than elasticity is the main determinant of optimal margin 
in most markets. The entry-inducing price yields a normal return on 
total investment (including entry costs) to the most likely entrant.
The optimal price is a functionof the entry-inducing price. It should 
yield a correspondingly higher return on equity to insiders the higher 
the barriers to entry and the greater the insiders' ability to collude 
(p. 367 footnote 6).
However there are other ways of looking at the established firm's 
position having regard to entrants. From Bain (1959) for example we have 
that "the condition of entry may be measured by the degree to which
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established firms can persistently elevate their prices above minimal 
average or competitive costs before making it attractive for new firms 
to enter." (p.33) Again we have Modigliani's (1958) famous quote:
"In summary, under Sylos' postulate there is a well-defined 
maximum premium that oligopolists can command over the competitive price 
and this premium tends to increase with the importance of economies of 
scale and to decrease with the size of the market and the elasticity of 
demand" (?.220).
As we have seen, both these statements can be easily translated 
into the form of a measure of limit price-cost margins, and in fact we 
developed our models of chapter 3 purely on the basis of predictions 
about the size of the price-cost margin. For example, with the simple 
Modigliani model we found:
20
PL 0 1 h is
(equation (2) chapter 3).
Then, making the same assumptions as we did with regard Lo measurement an 
the oligopoly model above, we have that:
= 1 + P’4 (¡0)
 ^ R ' LM |njs+1 h
,3 + F _ ___ !__ . 1  + mK (11)
 ^ E JLM I n i s+1 ' E &
There would seem to be little to choose between these two limit prrcing
formulations as regards ease of estimation.
Further, the main message of the dynamic limit-pricing models 1 is
probably that, in general, industry price will be set with regard to both
22 ,
limit price and short-run prof it—maximising price, so as 
rather than prevent new entry, since this mixed strategy is more profit­
able in the long term than either limit pricing or myopic pr
1 6 2  -
maximisation. In this case, an amalgum of the two relationships 
discussed, that is some combination of (10) and (-), or alternatively 
of (11) and (7), is probably required and given our earlier arguments 
the profit-revenue ratio retains its superiority over the profit-equity 
ratio in empirical work.
Suppose now that capital costs are all capacity costs. Spence ('.¿7-0
then suggests that capacity is fixed by the aesire to prevent entry at
a level k_ . As such it is determined outside of the short-run profit- L
maximising framework. We now have fixed mX = rju so that pront pres 
all fixed costs:
u + F + rk. = R - w L  L
which is equal to price minus average variable costs multiplied by 
output. In this case the measured quantity R - wL is equated witn tne 
theoretical quantity, price minus marginal and so (given our assumption:, 
of appendix I) average variable cost, and hence trom equation <u3) 
chapter 3:
+ F + r k
¿  v.
1
Fñl ( 12)
Here there is no problem over the capital output ratio.
To the extent to which capital costs are not a n  fixed in
sense:
i (13)
where <$ is the proportion of capital costs not ..e.ating -o t..u ut.i.o. 
of capacity, so not fixed. A certain proportion o. capital cos-s ... y 
he fixed if, for example, the Spencian solution does no. h o n  f y 
that the extent of overcapacity to dissuade entry varies with the heig.it 
of the actual price above limit price. Another example is tne cuse 
discussed bv Snence where capacity costs affect marginal costs. If we now
/
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generalise (¡3) to the level of equation (1) this chapter:
.IT + F. * raK
<— r— )M ” 5 r
H (1 +u) . HgijY
( 1 4 )
we see that a Spencian outlook has largely separated the effect of 
potential entry out from the effect of established numbers, ihe former 
being fixed in the short term in his framework.
Now as we said earlier, the strategy of retaining capacity at the 
limit-pricing level would appear more profitable than limit-pricing 
itself. Thus, given this model, our plan will not be to include as 
explanatory variables either variables attempting to measure barriers 
to entry or the capital-output ratio (or some proxy) but rather use only 
determinants of actual market power (horizontal, bilateral and proxies 
for the change in elasticity of demand). However on the left hand side 
of che equation we shall experiment with subtracting certain proportions 
of (a proxy for) the capital-output ratio to see whether this improves 
the fit of the relationship. If it does not, this would appear to be 
evidence in favour of the Spencian arguments.
We should contrast quite strongly the separation achieved aoove 
with the situation obtaining under the preceoing assumptions when the 
explanatory variable is the profit equity ratio, or "profitability .
From (13) we may obtain:
II + F. , mK 
<— E— 5 M " 6 T
R
E | n '
while from (14): , „
(15)
( E  ^M ” 6 E M
The variable on Che right hand side is now a mixture of two types Oi. 
effect. We have as before the effect of established industry numbers
«is reflected in H. But we also have If the height of entry barriers
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change then deterrent capacity will have to change. In the profit-
revenue ratio case (as in (14)) this effect is subsumed in the dependent
variable. By comparison in the present case a fail in entry barriers
necessitating an increase in capacity means that equity may well rise
initially, the firm now requiring increased capital in plant ana so on.
Thus when using profitability as the dependent variable it seems that
its explanation should be sought both from market power and barriers to
entry variables in the reasonably short run.
The fact remains that observers using profit-revenue ratios have
obtained statistically significant results on barriers to entry variables,
as we saw in the previous section. If the argument of the present section
is accepted there would seem to be at least two possible explanations of 
24
this. The first is that in actual practice (as Bain (¡551) hoped)
profit-equity ratios may vary rather similarly across industries to
profit-revenue ratios. A second is that of the variables used, some are
similar, or identical, to components of the dependent variable and others
may well be quite collinear with concentration variables. Examples of the
25
former are the advertising-sales ratio and the capital-output ratio. On 
the latter the proxies used to represent minimum efficient size oi plant 
or firm are based, like concentration measures, on statistics measuring 
the size distribution (of firms or plants) within the industry.
IV Elasticity of Demand and the Trade Cycle
Perhaps coincidentally, in 1936 two articles appeared concerning 
the effect of the trade cycle on the elasticity or demand and so on 
Profits in oligopolistic industries. We have Harrod who said that in 
a slump:
"(A man) is loth to relinquish enjoyments to which he has become 
accustomed (in the boom), and immediately begins to cast about tor means
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of meeting adversity with the least inconvenience to himself. That 
same force of habit which in times of improvement tends to make him 
an imperfect buyer, reinforces his activity when it is a question of 
economising • •• (therefore) once the slump has set in, demand becomes 
suddenly much more elastic." (1936 p.87).
In contrast, Galbraith argues that:
"Where the decrease in demand is the result of depression, an 
increase in elasticity may be considered improbable. People with 
decreased money incomes and increased concern for their economic 
security are less rather than more responsive to lower prices. Producers 
and consumers alike tend to postpone purchases of durable equipment. The 
market comes to be composed more and more of very able and very needy 
buyers. Demand is less rather than more elastic" (1936 pp. 463-4).
Undoubtedly, part of the reason why they reach different conclusions 
is due to their respective desires to explain different "received facts" 
of the depression they had recently experienced. Galbraith's concern 
was the observation that prices in oligopolistic industries appeared 
sticky in the downswing whereas Harrod wished to explain a fall in 
profits. Both arguments seem to hold some water, for they appeal to 
different facets of the slump.
Harrod's picture is of a satisficing individual who is more dili—
8ent in searching for his purchases in the slump, he moves nearer to
26choosing the consumption bundle which maximises his utility. However, 
a similar point has been made by Cowling and Cubbin (1970) of a maximising 
individual who faces search costs:
"At high levels of demand market share is determined more by 
considerations of availability than fine price differences. On the 
other hand in a recession the time and trouble involved in finding the 
best buy* have a lower value placed upon them"(p. 20).
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As Stigler (1966 p.2) says: "the buyer searches for additional 
prices until the expected saving from the purchase equals the cost of 
visiting one more dealer so that if earnings are lower and/or hours 
are shorter in the slump, the opportunity cost of search drops, more 
search takes place, fewer people pay or are willing to pay high prices, 
and the elasticity of demand increases.
Galbraith's point is much more of a comment on the propensity to 
save. This is clear in a similar argument made by Sylos-Labini, who 
quotes Schumpeter with approval:
"People who in a depression worry about their future are not 
likely to buy a new car even if the price were reduced by 25% especially 
if the purchase is easily postponable, and if the reduction induces 
expectations of further reductions" (Sylos-Labini 1962 p. 70 ).
As such it is more difficult to formalise within the present 
context than the Harrodian argument, though it does appear to relate 
more obviously to durable goods. A simplistic justification might lie 
in the idea that those consumers who would only buy the good at relatively 
low prices tend to be more affected by the desire to increase their 
savings in the slump; that is their ratio of the marginal utility of 
savings to the marginal utility of consumption of that good rises 
relatively more than that of those previously willing to buy the good 
»t relatively high prices. If this were true then the demand curve 
would become more steeply inclined in the slump.
The alternative argument, especially in the form stated by 
Cowling and Cubbin, is easier to symbolise. Suppose an individual s 
demand for a commodity is related to the true price the consumer pays 
(that is the manufacturer's price plus opportunity costs of search, see 
Mincer (1963)) in constant elasticity form. Then:
9 “ a(p + cu) ^
where c^is the opportunity cost element and a the individual's elasticity
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of demand
Thus: d£
dp M  a (p + c q ) "  I“ !'1
and so: (p +c^ p
This last quantity is the elasticity of demand as faced by the firm. 
Now:
so that if the opportunity cost rises, elasticity facing the firm falls.
If we consider that a drop in the individual's income or wage rate 
causes the opportunity cost of search to fall then we would expect 
elasticity of demand facing the firm to rise in the slump.
The problems arise in this case when we move to considering 
measurement of the relevant variable having this effect on opportunity 
costs and so the firm's elasticity of demand. Fairly obviously for 
the final consumer it is income per unit of time. But what of the buyer 
which is a firm? It would seem most sensible to consider that the vari­
able is again income (or revenue) per unit of time. As an ad hoc justi­
fication let us note that in the case of the consumer his opportunity 
cost is assumed to fall because the price per unit of output he produces 
falls. Therefore by analogy the price per unit of the firm s output 
drops (in a depression) which means that the opportunity cost of 
searching for inputs falls and more search takes place; staff are 
switched towards searching for cheaper inputs so that the manufacturers 
that the firm buys from are faced with more elastic demands for their 
product. In summary, the elasticity of demand for a particular industry s 
products then increases with a fall in the per unit incomes of its 
purchasers.
However, we have no real theoretical guidance as to how to 
aggregate these income falls across the various purchasers of that
/
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particular product because we do not know the functional form of the 
relationship between opportunity cost and demand. If it were of 
constant elasticity form then presumably aggregation would proceed by 
calculating geometric means (as with log-linear engel curves), but 
this is infeasible. Given such a situation, aggregation has to 
proceed in some arbitrary manner, and we might as well choose the 
method that seems most straightforward. One candidate which then 
presents itself is to take the downturn in the industry in question 
as a measure of the downturns in incomes of those industries and 
consumers which purchase from it.
Unfortunately, using the ratio of revenues between the two 
periods in that industry as a proxy for this effect brings difficulties 
in its path. There is first the problem of spurious correlation since 
revenue would appear both on the left and right hand sides of the 
amended equation (3) and there is a second attendant problem that bias 
and inconsistency result when one of the right hand variables is related 
to the error term in the statistical version of the equation. For this 
reason a better proxy, which is also related to the slump but not as 
directly connected to the dependent variable, might be the percentage 
unemployed in that industry. The higher the unemployment rate, the 
greater the depression in that industry so hopefully the lower the 
opportunity cost of search of buyers from that industry and the more 
elastic is industry demand. Replacing elasticity of demand by a 
function of the percentage unemployed in (3) we have:
Since unemployment is only a proxy, we might consider as a simple
¿(SiE) - A (AH)° (AHBuy)6 (AU)"Y; a,6,6 positive;
or
log A ( J I i I )  - log A + alog(AH) + 61og(AHBUY) - ylog(AU) (16) 
K
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alternative formulation: 
jl+F
log Û(-R-) = log A + alog(AH) + 81og(AHBUY) - y(AU) (17)
We leave the problem of the time period over which AU is measured until 
the final sectianof this chapter.
Such a proxy has the property that it might be able to take into 
partial account other factors not as yet mentioned which might be 
considered to affect the model. For instance it is possible that over
the cycle the relationship between marginal and average variable cost 
27may change slightly and such a cyclical variable may pick up effects 
like these to some extent. The other side of this coin is that a 
negative coefficient on AU need not be evidence in favour of Harrodian- 
type arguments regarding cyclical behaviour of the elasticity of demand.
Although this formulation arose from Harrod's arguments rather 
than Galbraith's, this does not imply either that a positive coefficient 
on AU need be evidence in favour of the latter. For as we implied 
earlier, the two positions are not necessarily mutually inconsistent 
as they look at the problem from rather different standpoints. We have 
said little about the Galbraithian argument and its implications though 
we shall experiment with the idea that durable goods (to which his 
arguments mainly seemed to refer) may be differentially affected by 
cyclical fluctuations. There are in addition alternative reasons why 
we might expect such a differential effect between durables and non­
durables; these are mentioned in Cowling and Waterson (1976).
V Managerial Discretion - A few comments:
Our approach to the literature in this area will be particularly 
cavalier, for a discussion of any length would take us well outside the
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main areas of the thesis. We shall be content merely to point out that
whilst the rest of the thesis has incorporated the assumption that firms
wish to maximise profits» by no means all of our conclusions are negated
if we take account, in a very naive manner, of the possibility that
managers might have objectives in addition to profit. To this end we
utilise a managerial utility function for a monopolist, involving
preference for a factor of production, and then move to calculating the
price-cost margin. Some extensions to an oligopolistic industry are
suggested. The approach then is similar to that of Peel's (1973)
generalisation of the "Dorfman-Steiner" result though our conclusions 
28are not as strong.
In this section we shall not concern ourselves explicitly with 
the power of shareholders or owners of the firm. Thus management's 
utility function always contains profit as an argument but we do not 
specify reasons for this. The constraints on the maximand are then 
purely definitional; we give a full set below.
Profit II = p.q. _ c(q) - F
We utilise the assumption of earlier chapters in specifying the variable 
cost function c(q) “ c.q, where c is marginal and average variable cost. 
However when we wish to talk about preference for a particular factor of 
production, we let c(q) - wL + mK, that is we assume there are two 
variable factors of production. Quantity supplied is then a function of 
the two variable factors q = q (L,K). Revenue R - p.q, and quantity 
demanded is specified as q^ = q(p,z). Quantity supplied will equal 
quantity demanded at equilibria. (z is simply an additional demand 
shift variable and like F does not play any real part.)
The procedure we adopt is to form a Lagrangean function from the 
naximand and relevant constraints. We then derive the first order
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conditions for a maximum; second order conditions are neglected. 
Suppose a managerial utility function of the type:
29
U - U(n, L) ’
Form the Lagrangean:
G “ U(n,L) + A ( ß  - qs(K,L)] + A2 [q  -• q(p.z)j
+ Aj Qn- pq + wL + mK + F ^
Some relevant first order conditions are:
3G
an
M  x 
an j = 0 (18)
3G
3L
M  _ x
3L 1
3q
i f + V  = 0 (19)
3G
3K
3q
-A —  
1 3K + A ^ m = 0
(20)
3G
3q x, + a2 - a3 P = 0
(2 1)
3G
3p
-A li . 2 3p A3 q 0 (22)
Now we have that costs are:
C - wL + mK + t ,
so that:
dC - wdL + mdK,
assuming that w and m are' considered by the firm as constants, :
addition to F being constant.
Also:
dq8 - 3qs“ al * dK
3qs
+ i f  • dL
(23)
to 0 1 dC wdL + rtldK (24)dq, 3qc 39s
i f  * dK + 1 L * dL
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Now from (19): X! 3q
X3 3L
X1 3«s
X3 dL
X. 3qMs
X3 3K
311 l_ 
3L ’ X,
3U/3L
3U/3II from (18)
(20) yields
Substituting these values into (24) we obtain: 
X, 3q
MC
s .. . \  * _ % dK + 3U/3L 
X^ ~3L ' dL X3 3K ' dK 3U/3n 1 dL
ir  • d L  +  -à • d K
3U/3L ___
3U/3II ‘ 3q
dL
"at • dK + ' dL
or MC
Now from (21): p
+ B (say)
X ,  +  x 2
p - MC 
P
X2 ~ X3B 
X1 + X2
Since
then from (21) :
_ X.q
3q/3p
X„
X +X„
from (22),
ia
3P
Thus : p - MC 
P FT
X3B
X l+X2
(25)
substituting back for B:
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p - MC 
P
But from (23) ,
1
w
1 3U/3L 1
P 3U/3JI ' 3qs dK + 3qs
3K • dL 3L
3«S dK 3qMs dqs
3K ’ dL 3L dL
Finally then:
p - MC 1
V  ■ w
3U/3L 1
3U/3II ‘ dq 
P
dL
(26)
We should note here that we still have technical efficiency, for we are 
on the production surface. Preference for a particular factor can 
simply be thought of as changing the price relatives between factors 
of production as viewed by management. A more general approach (along 
the lines, say, of Moreland (1972)) would allow for technical ineffi­
ciency, but once we incorporate such considerations we would expect to 
be able to say little about the margin. However, a simpler model, 
with margin unchanged from the profit maximising case, would result if
the managerial preference factor (e.g. staff expenditures) was assumed
. , 30to be a fixed expenditure rather than affecting marginal costs.
In order to evaluate qualitatively the price-cost margin indicated 
by equation (26) we have to consider the relative magnitudes of the two 
first-order partial derivatives with respect to utility and the nature 
of influences on their size. Obviously we could incorporate a plethora 
of such influences, particularly factors like the nature and extent of 
shareholder power and so on. However, our concern is more specifically 
with possible cross— sectional differences between the relative magni­
tudes mentioned, assuming managers and shareholders to be fairly homo­
geneous groups so that we may talk more nearly in ceteris paribus terms.
/
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From this pent of view the costs of non-profit-maximising
behaviour presumably depend inversely upon the earnings under profit-
maximisrig behaviour, so that we would expect movement furthest away
from profit orientation when the maximum profits obtainable are largest.
On this we note that the less elastic is demand, the higher is the
margin and so the more opportunity there is of moving away from a
profit-maximising position. The suggestion is then, that the ratio
of marginal utilities varies, amongst other things, with the inverse of
31the elasticity of demand. If this is so, then from (26) we have:
If we can accept this then we may say that even under the more 
general situation of the alternative behavioural assumptions postulated 
above, the margin will vary with numbers in the industry. For, from 
(27), if that firm is simply the ith in an n firm industry (each firm 
having identical marginal costs) we have:
under pure Cournot assumptions. Explicit generalisation beyond this 
stage is somewhat difficult unless we are willing to specify the 
functional form, but in principle could be accomplished. It is of 
course most likely that with a utility maximisation model of this type, 
reaction to a fall in numbers is attenuated in comparison with the 
reaction under profit maximisation. This is because, when potential 
Profit rises, as long as profit claimants become no more powerful, 
there is a further chance for management to indulge in non-profit
p - MC 
P
32
(27)
n + f
R
p - MC . *----- lP
- h (
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• • 33oriented discretionary behaviour. We shall not explore this avenue 
further, so we neglect the possible influence of (bilateral) share­
holder power on our model. To do otherwise would involve a very 
substantial data collection problem in order to perform tests.
VI Lags and Simultaneity
One assumption implicitly underlying equations (2) and (3) of 
this chapter is that changes in an industry's structure immediately 
effect changes in the margin. Our initial purpose in the present 
section is to consider this assumption in more detail, from whence we 
shall go on to discuss some related points. Actually, if we remind
O /
ourselves of the data to be used, the assumption we have made need 
not be as strict as that. Since the change in structure is that taking 
place between the 1963 and 1968 censuses of production, then it is 
possible to maintain equation (2) while allowing structure to affect 
performance up to almost five years later. For it might be the case 
tha^say, concentration increases the day after the census form is 
submitted and that the margin gradually moves upward towards a new 
equilibrium over the period so that performance in the year reported 
for the next census reflects a large part or even the whole of this 
change in the margin. This is obviously a completely atypical case 
though and we can say little about the average lag, if any, between 
changes in actual structure and actual performance in the data.
As far as factors which can theoretically affect structure in
equation (2) are concerned, we should note that an increase in concen-
35tration (measured by H) can come about either by merger or by 
reallocation of sales among Ihe existing firms. HBUY is increased by 
the same factors in the buying firms, but in addition by reallocation
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among purchasing industries. Unfortunately, very little work has been 
done on the sort of lags to be expected from such structural changes, 
which is a manifestation of the fact that industrial economists have 
not particularly concerned themselves with conduct as the link between
reason or another (e.g. a merger or a successful advertising campaign), 
a reallocation of sales in favour of the larger firms in an industry, 
then the Herfindahl index rises. This increase in power might mean for 
example that a loose collusion among large firms can be strengthened at 
low cost or that price leadership becomes more straightforward; the 
mechanics of an ensuing eventual increase in margins are fairly clear 
but the path to the new equilibrium is ill-defined. In a time of 
incomes policy it is probably difficult to move in any way but with 
caution; if there are worries about reference to the Monopolies Commission 
caution is again required; in the case of a merger it may take time to 
move to a profitable organisational structure. The benefits of an 
immediate increase in margins via higher prices are obvious, what is 
lacking is any comprehensive succinct evaluation of the mass of factors 
which go to make up the costs of moving quickly to a new equilibrium 
position and so indicate the likely time-scale.
Given this situation, how are we to treat the timing question in 
empirical work? One piece of evidence which assists us to some extent 
is Singh's (1971) belief that it can take up to five years between a 
merger and its effects on performance. This gives a rough outside limit, 
though not one which circumscribes us greatly since we cannot obtain data 
after 1972 in any case. Changes in structure between 1963 and 1968 then 
are expected to influence performance sometime between 1963 and 1972.
But we cannot take the whole of this period, for if there is a lag in 
the relationship, performance changes between 1958 (the previous census 
year) and 1963 will still be feeding through in the early years. As we
, . 36structure and performance. In the case where there is, for one
/
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have no data on performance between 1963 and 1968, we are left with two 
favoured but rather imperfect proxies after taking timing into account.. 
If we believe the lag to be short and/or that the majority of structural 
changes occurred early in the period then the 1963 to 1968 change in 
performance should be most affected. On the other hand, if the lag is 
long or structure changed mainly towards the end of the period, 1968 to 
1972 performance changes should be used. The latter is unfortunately a 
poor proxy even on those assumptions, covering only four years and not 
including quite as full responses to the questionnaire as previous years 
(at the time of writing). It is quite obvious that the empirical results 
we obtain can throw little light on the timing question given the very 
limited data at our disposal; we shall simply seek a reasonable degree 
of explanation.
The question of lags also crops up in connection with the use of 
unemployment changes for changes in the elasticity of demand as in 
equations (16) and (17). There are two points here. The first is that 
even in the contemporaneous form (with the 1968 on 1963 performance 
variable) we should not necessarily use unemployment changes between 
those two years. This is because it is well known that unemployment 
lags behind many other cyclical variables. For this reason the change 
between 1969 and 1964, say, may be more relevant. Secondly in the 
lagged form (with 1972 on 1968 as the performance variable) it is not 
clear that the lag on unemployment should be of the same length as 
that on other structural variables. It is unlikely to take longer for 
firms to react to changed demand conditions than to changed industry 
structure; rather it may well not take as much time, although again 
there is little previous work to guide us. This point of course holds 
in addition b the first for the lagged relationship. For these reasons
)
we indulge in some experimentation on the lagging of the unemployment 
proxy in empirical work.
Moving very briefly to a somewhat wider consideration of an
equation such as (16), a further fundamental assumption we have made
is that the performance variable is the dependent variable, while
those on the right hand side are independent. As some writers (e.g.
Phillips 1970) have argued, this is not necessarily the whole story.
Indeed, in discussing dynamic models of entry behaviour we have
implicitly accepted that conduct and performance may feed back to
structure, since those models incorporate, albeit simply, fringe
response to established industry performance. Thus Phillips, among 
37others, considers that we should take account of the possibility that 
the equation we have been discussing is merely one among a simultaneous 
system of relationships. Obviously this opens up a very wide avenue 
which we cannot do justice to here.
Phillips' point is relevant in the present context of our 
discussion of lags as, if performance only reacts to structural 
changes with some delay, then despite the potential simultaneity of 
the system, we need take no account of this in practice. On the other 
hand, if the lag is short enough for us to estimate the relationship as 
a contemporaneous one, we might consider that our problems are greater.
One response to the Phillips' type of argument might be to say that, 
although we estimate the equation as contemporaneous, it is in fact not 
so and as such need not be treated as part of a system. A more convincing 
response would of course be to estimate our equation by a simultaneous 
equation method. The requirements for doing sc* however, would be that we 
know at least the variables present in the system which are not incorp­
orated in our structure-performance equation. Unfortunately, theoretical 
discussion of possible simultaneous systems along the lines outlined 
above is at such a rudimentary (or even ad hoc) level that the
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information required cannot really be gleaned from them. In the 
absence of reliable assumptions about the variables to use as instru­
ments, simultaneous estimates are impossible. Again, to develop a 
simultaneous model of our own is rather beyond the scope of the 
present work. Thus we must simply resign ourselves to the fact that 
our empirical work in the contemporaneous case may be clouded by 
problems of simultaneity, with consequent biases which are hard to 
determine.
In chapter 6 in our empirical work we attempt to take some account 
of the additional factors considered relevant in the sections of this
38
chapter.
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FOOTNOTES
I. See Chapter 4 on some comparisons between the Cournot and joint profit 
maximisation bilateral power models.
2'. This equation receives some further discussion in Appendix X.
3. A general movement affecting all industries to the same extent would
be taken up in the constant term, as pointed out in the previous chapter.
4. This study is also mentioned in the final section of this chapter.
5. It is not clear whether or not Holterman includes a constant term, 
she does not report it.
6. The Khalilzadeh-Shirazi study and Caves' et al. work are particularly 
close for the sample is identical and only one variable is not shared.
We discussed the construction of MEPS 10 and similar statistics briefly 
in chapter 3.
7. We discuss the position of barrier variables again later in the chapter.
8. We do not consider, , except marginally, the place of either imports or
exports in this thesis. Our reason for excluding consideration of 
exports is that we feel the government provides incentives sufficient 
to offset the risks (trade fairs, low cost insurance etc,). Concerning 
imports, the most obvious place is as a deflator of the market power 
variable. But this requires much more sophisticated data than is 
available. Dutton points out that the effect of imports on margins may 
not be unambiguous in the cross-section except in long-run equilibria. 
She also in some equations includes additional dummy variables con­
cerning government regulation and monopolies coranission and restrictive 
practice court findings. We cannot do justice to this work here; see 
her paper for details.
/
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9. Dutton similarly finds that when she splits up her composite market 
power variable, significance is lost.
10. As we have said, we consider, particularly in the light of our decision 
to take a ratio form of the relationship, that "barrier" variables need 
not be included. Also, as we have indicated, we are not satisfied with 
the arguments adduced for the "growth" terms. In later sections of
this chapter we do however examine the possible place of other variables.
11. For brevity we denoted this as II/R when discussing the UK studies in the 
previous section.
12. This passage is deleted in the published article (1974).
13. We discuss this assumption in appendix I.
14. Our manipulations here are, we notice, vaguely similar to those in 
Ornstein's (1975) recent paper. However we believe his fundamental 
assumption, that return on capital is a function of the concentration 
ratio, to have a rather doubtful pedigree.
15. We are here considering capital analogous to labour in that it is 
measured as a flow of services K (units/time) and receives a wage in 
(£/unit). m is not the rate of interest (see e.g. Friedman 1970 p.244). 
In fact under certain definitional conditions we may dispense with m,
as we mention later.
16. This is not quite fair to those who favour profit on equity, since they 
normally are able to subtract depreciation. But that is not the full 
(longer run) cost of capital since it is only a payment to maintain the 
service capability and does not include a return to the suppliers of 
that service. We neglect this distinction for simplicity. There is 
an additional point here, being a difference between US and UK studies. 
We are assuming the model to be short-run and so include fixed costs in
/
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our definition of profit, distinct from variable capital costs. This 
is more applicable to the UK studies than those for the US where 
experimenters normally are able to consider the longer run by averag­
ing most variables over a number of years. In their applications then, 
although fixed costs are not actually added to profits as measured, 
they are implicitly assumed to be small and, again for simplicity, we 
neglect the refinement.
17 It is of course easier and more usual to define K such that m = 1 (K 
being in £/unit of time rather than physical units of capital services 
/unit of time). This is perfectly possible both definitionally and 
dimensionally in the above scheme but has not been done in order to 
spell out the relationship, and the pitfalls, in more detail. Bain, 
(1959 p. 369) for example, immediately uses iE as the cost.
18 That is, subject to several qualifications concerning factors such as 
risk, non-monetary supplements to returns, and so on.
19 Many people have made the point that monopoly profits may be capitalise 
for example Stigler (1963).
20 For a full definition of the terms, see the original article, pp. 217-8
21 See for example, Jacquemin and T’nisse (1972).
22 Where weights depend upon such factors as the discount rate and proba­
bility of entry.
continued on p.133
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23. Subscript z has been omitted for simplicity. The generalisation can 
obviously be made since all we are doing is rewriting the left hand 
side in terms of (potentially) measurable quantities.
24. There are obviously other reasons if the argument is not acceptable 
as is clear from the limit pricing models of chapter 3.
25. These might also act as proxies for, or determinants of, the elasticity 
of demand.
26. In 1938, Kalec ki commented briefly on Harrod's argument with the 
assistance of some calculations, and expressed disapproval of it on 
balance.
27. On which point, see appendix I.
28. Obviously we could consider preferences for other things than factors 
of production, but it would seem less reasonable that management should 
hold such preferences. For example, Baumol (1959) suggested managerial 
preference for sales, though it is difficult to see why sales should
be taken beyond the profit-maximising level unless management gain 
utility because salaries or employment of staff are thereby increased. 
But in that case it seems more direct to consider they have a preference 
for staff employment, say.
29. An alternative, more complicated problem would be to include the wage 
bill along with profits in thp utility function.
30. See also Cowling 0975) and references cited there for discussion on 
this topic.
31. Thus cyclical factors should influence the adherence to profit maximisa­
tion. Such effects might well be picked up by our proxy for cyclical 
behaviour discussed earlier.
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32. It is barely conceivable that the reaction in g(— —  ...) to a drop
M
in |nI would be such as to overcompensate for the fall in |n| 
itself.
33. That is if, for example, management obtains utility from profit only 
as a security against dismissal, but shareholders do not fully 
appreciate that a fall in numbers implies a greater profit potential.
34. This draws on the preliminary discussions about data in chapter I, and 
the notes on data in Appendix II.
35. The Herfindahl index incorporates such changes ii structure in a 
particularly straightforward manner, see Stigler (1968, Chapter 4).
36. Amongst others, Joskow (1975) bemoans this lack of concern over conduct.
37. For example, Williamson (1965).
38. For example, agreement even as to how many equations the system should 
contain would be unlikely. Phillips (1972), whose estimations we 
touched upon earlier, does attempt a simultaneous equation estimation 
of two alternative two—equation models. Besides the conventional 
structural effects on performance he also incorporates equations 
hoping either to explain the "effectiveness of price fixing" or the 
"propensity to attempt price-fixing agreements". It is not altogether 
clear how he chooses the variables to explain these nor why he focusses 
only on these particular aspects of conduct,although the latter may be 
partly because of some (confidential) data he was able to obtain. The 
results are not particularly interesting, except that in the "structure- 
performance" equation concentration and the advertising/sales variable 
(and their interaction) mostly maintain their significance of the 
ordinary least squares estimations. (The other equation of the system 
contains at most one significant variable.)
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Chapter Six: EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
Introduction:
In this chapter we estimate an approximate version of the 
theoretical model developed earlier. We proceed by discussing data 
pi'blems and introducing experiments as they occur naturally.
To reiterate what we said in chapter 1, the basic data used for 
empirical testing of the model emanates from the U.K. Censuses of 
Production (hereinafter, Census). The bilateral power index that we 
use requires knowledge of interrelationships between industries so the 
level of aggregation is that of the industry input-output tables for 
1963 (with one exception).* The 1968 tables are less aggregative, but 
can be compressed to the 1963 level except that "Hosiery and Lace" and 
"Other Textiles" (1963) have to be amalgamated in order to produce 
comparable tables between the two years. This gives us a maximum of 
58'industries" covering the whole of manufacturing plus "Other Mining 
and "Construction". There seems no reason why these last two should not 
be included. Problems of comparability in the Census industries between 
1963 and 1968 are fairly minor as the 1963 figures were recalculated 
alongside those for 1968 in the 1968 Census, and provide no real basis 
for excluding any observations. Figures for later years than 1968 are 
according to the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification also.
Seven industries have however been excluded from the sample. The 
reason is that either the commodity is not produced mainly by the firms 
in that industry, or that the firms assigned to that industry do not 
produce mainly that commodity. Our definition of mainly here is of 
necessity somewhat arbitrary, but it provides a purely objective criterion 
We decided to exclude those industries whose "specialisation" and/or
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"exclusiveness" ratios were less than 80% in either of the two years.2 
Any higher figure would have reduced the sample appreciably more. The 
industries we reject on these grounds, together with their Minimum List 
Heading (MLH) numbers are: Grain milling (211), agricultural machinery 
(331), engineers small tools (390), industrial engines (334), office 
machinery (338), other mechanical engineering (342,349), insulated 
wires (362). Our basic sample on which the experiments are performed 
is then of 51 industries, though since the dependent variable data are 
not available for the construction industry beyond 1968, we sometimes 
use a sample of 50.
Our main dependent variable, the ratio of profits plus fixed costs 
to revenue, comes fairly directly from census data. The numerator is 
net output minus wages and salaries, net output basically being defined 
as gross output minus materials (adjusted for stock changes), transport 
costs, etc.3 As we said in chapter 5, the cost of capital services is 
not subtracted and in a later section we experiment with a slightly 
different form, hoping to exclude these costs if relevant. Aside from 
this, one problem with the dependent variable is whether enough cost 
elements are excluded. For 1963 and 1968 we are able, making certain 
straightforward though not necessarily correct assumptions regarding 
allocation, to subtract some additional cost elements including for 
example advertising expenditure. However, it turns out that the ratios 
calculated after extracting such cost elements from the numerator are 
so closely correlated with the original ratios that the experimental
results are not worth reporting separately, and we do not discuss this 
measure further.^ A second problem is that, unlike the theoretical 
model, firms in practice may increase or decrease stocks of the finished
difficult to see what simple adjustment to the data would cater for
product over a year, so gross output need not equal sales. It is
/
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this problem, but the difference between sales and gross output is of 
the order of one per cent, so hopefully the effects are not serious.
The independent variables require rather more discussion and are 
awarded separate sections.
II The Herfindahl Measure!
In this section, we first describe the measure calculated and then 
go on to our reasons for rejecting simple alternatives.
The Herfindahl index, as we have developed it, should theoretically 
be calculated for each industry according to the formula:
Unfortunately neither volume outputs nor even sales data are available 
to perform this calculation. We have to use figures on employment size 
distributions to derive an approximation of the formula:
Even if employment data exactly corresponding to this were used, there 
might be consequences for the estimation of the model, since it is well 
known that the distribution of firms by employment size has a smaller 
range than the distribution by size of sales, larger firms being more
emjioynient shares are not available in the census of production; we have 
to use the distribution of firm size by employment tables. This 
distribution combines enterprises into groups of three or more by size 
categories. The size categories, although following a general pattern, 
differ across industries and census years in order to avoid disclosure
H = i = 1, 2, ... n firms
«L ’ , which we might call the employment herfindahl.
capital intensive in general.^ In addition, data on individual firms
problems.
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The most straightforward way to calculate the Herfindahl index is 
to allocate employment within each size class equally between the 
enterprises in that class, then to apply the formula given above.
That is basically what has been done here. As a consequence, a value 
for our index greater than 0.33 would be impossible, as even if one 
firm employed 99% of the industry total, it would have to be grouped 
with at least two other firms in the tables. In effect then, such a 
calculation provides a minimum value for the Herfindahl, since any size 
variation within classes would increase the size of the statistic.
Unlike the case of the four-firm concentration ratio (on which 
see later), no maximum value for the Herfindahl can reliably be calcul­
ated. A calculation along these lines would involve allocating employment 
in each size class among hypothetical firms in such a way as to maximise 
the within-class variance, but the computational problems would be 
severe. For this reason we only employed the minimum value.
Of course, we must remember that the index we calculate is to be 
used in ratio form, one year upon another, so that the problem of the 
level of the Herfindahl is not as important to us as the ratio of the 
two levels as calculated. This may alleviate some of the difficulties 
referred to above. On the other hand, it becomes important to ensure 
that the ratio of 1968 over 1963 values bears some significance across 
industries. In particular, changes in the number of size groups for an 
industry between years can effect quite spurious changes in the ratio.
For this reason, the size groupings we used were as nearly as possible 
identical between years for each industry. This involved a fair amount 
of consolidation in classification.
Three final points on calculations Total industry employment was 
taken as the total including firms with less than 25 employees for each 
industry. The level of aggregation of the data is MLH or lower: In
/
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calculating indices for our "industries" where more than one size 
distribution table is involved, we used all of this information 
together, rather than taking arithmetic averages of the values 
obtained from each table separately. We should like to thank Malcolm 
Sawyer for supplying his calculated Herfindahl figures for 1963.6
Given the divergences between the actual measures calculated and 
the theoretical Herfindahls, it is probably as well to consider alter­
natives. Concerning the problem of employment as against output 
indices, we note that the only reasonable alternative available is the 
figures for five-firm concentration ratios calculated in the Census on 
a sales basis. While these might have a fairly high rank correlation 
with Herfindahl figures, there are major problems. Because they are at 
sub-MLH level, a considerable degree of aggregation would be needed, and 
it is not easy to see how this could reasonably be accomplished. Simple 
weighted averaging would not necessarily produce a meaningful statistic. 
In any case, there are gaps in these measures in that the sub-MLH 
categories for which they are supplied do not together normally cover 
the whole of the MLH industries of which they are part. In addition, 
some figures have to be omitted from the census on disclosure grounds.
For these reasons, and also because the concentration ratio is less 
theoretically relevant, given our model, we rejected a measure based on 
this data. We also rejected the method of calculating concentration
ratios from the employment size distribution tables, where both maximum
, 7and minimum values are obtainable and the average taken.
Another plausible alternative would be to assume that firm sizes 
follow some useful statistical distribution. The prime candidate , on 
theoretical and empirical grounds, is probably the lognormal distribution. 
Assuming for the moment that this distribution does fairly describe the 
data then knowledge of only the mean and median size of firm for each
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industry is sufficient to give a unique value to the Herfindahl.® The 
median has of course to be interpolated so that again the Herfindahl 
obtained is not sacrosanct, yet it would probably be superior to our 
calculated value. We therefore turn briefly to evidence on lognoi ■„ i lity.
For the UK, Hart and Prais (1956) chose a sample of "those companies 
engaged in mining, manufacturing or distribution which are quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange" (p. 154) for various years between 1885 and 1950. 
Their measure of size was market valuation, and the test of satisfactory 
fit to the observed distribution was based on the third and fourth 
moments of the distribution which have an expected value of zero. The 
fit is found to be "satisfactory" but unfortunately appears to get 
progressively worse through time. The main problem as far as we are 
concerned is that the results are for the whole of industry. It would 
appear to be statistically dubious to assume that our industries could 
be random drawing from that population, and there would be severe diffi­
culties with small number industries. For this reason it is also 
interesting to refer to Silberman's (1967) comprehensive tests of the 
thesis on US data. His work is on 90 four—digit industries, and he 
obtained mean and variance of (logarithmic) size data from the census 
authorities directly. To determine the goodness of fit, he compared 
expected and actual 4,8, 20 and 50 firm concentration ratios over various 
size measures and census years. There was no significant difference 
between these four actual and expected measures in at most 42 out of his 
90 industries. He concludes that "though the lognormal hypothesis cannot 
be rejected for specific industries, it is inappropriate to consider the 
function as a generalised statistical summary measure of the industry 
size distributions in manufacturing" (p. 809). Again unfortunately, he 
was "unable to discover a consistent relationship between the occurrence 
°f lognormality and specified attributed of the industries which
well described." (p.831).
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Finally, we chose one industry (Bacon Curing, Fish and Meat Products) 
at random from the (UK) Census for 1963 and calculated its Herfindahl based 
on the lognormality assumption. The value was lower than the (minimum) 
value obtained by the method outlined earlier. Such results, if common, 
would pose a problem if we decided to use the lognormality assumption, as 
they obviously lead to misleading values. Thus, despite its limitations, 
we use the Herfindahl calculated in the straight-forward manner we 
described. A modest experiment attempting to judge some effects of the 
problems with our measure is noted below; it does not lead to particularly 
interesting results though.
Ill The Bilateral Power Index
Recall that the formula for calculating the bilateral power index
is:
i— a. .
(notation adapted from equation (32) chapter 4) for each industry i.
A number of problems arise in approximating this formula.
One difficulty is that firms sell to industries outside the remit 
of our sample, for example to the sectors: Agriculture, electricity, 
distributive trades and final buyers. For none of these do we have 
Herfindahl figures (H^  in the formula) from the Census, so that 
approximations have to be calculated by more or less ad hoc means. We 
here briefly describe their sources:
Agriculture: According to the EEC Yearbook of Agricultural 
Statistics (1967), there are 393,000 holdings of one hectare or more in 
the UK. We assumed in both years that this industry was so diverse that
it warranted a Herfindahl of zero.
Forestry and fishing: We assumed that the main concentration of
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sellerswas the nationalised sector of ftie forestry industry, which we took 
as a single seller. The proportion of total forestry owned by the 
Oomnission in 1962/64 and 1967/8 was applied (figures from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, AAS), and this figure further weighted by 
forestry as against forestry and fishing total output.
Coal mining, gas, electricity, communication: For all these, 
Herfindahls of 0.9 were assumed in both these years, thereby taking it 
that approximately 95% of all output in these industries is produced by 
the nationalised industry concerned (assumed to act as a single seller).
Water: Census figures as in our main sample, are available for this 
industry.
Road and rail transport: Each of the various nationalised and local 
government bodies in this area was entered as nearly as possible as a 
separate enterprise, size being measured by receipts (AAS figures). The 
remainder was considered as too diverse to affect the Herfindahl value, but 
total revenue was used in the denominator.
Other transport: This is of course mainly sea and air transport.
We consider only BOAC and BEA as separate firms, with the remainder 
assumed diverse. Again we used recapts for the two airlines, compared 
with total industry revenue (source: annual reports).
Distributive trades: Rough values were calculated here from the Census 
of Distribution for 1961 and 1966, and these were used as 1963 and 1968 
figures respectively.
Miscellaneous services: This is an extremely diverse catch-all 
category and we assumed the value of zero for the Herfindahl.
Consumers and export purchasers: Also assumed to have Herfindahls 
of zero in both years.
Public administration and defence, health and education: We 
considered that the important purchasers were the defence industry, the
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National Health Service and the Local Authorities; we took it that the 
first two were single purchasers. The Herfindahls were calculated on 
the basis of these bodies' expenditure compared to the total for the 
years 1963 and 1968 (source: input-output table, e.g. table p 1968).
A second problem with the input-output tabulation is that while
current purchasers are allocated fully, capital formation is aggregated
to a single column. In the absence of any simple alternative, we
decided to apportion this figure (normally small) among buyers in the
proportions in which they purchased current output. The input-output
tables are then used to calculate the a., values.
ij
Undoubtedly the main difficulty with applying our formula for the 
bilateral power index directly to the data is that we are required to know 
the elasticity of demand of each purchaser for each industry's product.
We cannot deny that this is a substantial problem to which there is no 
satisfactory solution. As we saw in chapter 1, relevant empirically 
determined elasticities for our sample are not available. Without the 
benefit of specific knowledge we have to make some assumptions about the 
elasticities in order to perform the experiment at all. Our favoured 
solution is to give demand elasticities the same numeric value across 
all purchasers, industries and both time periods. This solution, it 
must be admitted, is rather against the spirit of the thesis, but we see 
no real alternative. We of course expect that different numbers would 
yield different results, so we experiment with three values.
Before discussing the outcome, there are two side issues which 
should be mentioned. Firstly, given that we are assuming values for 
the elasticity in the bilateral power index, it is fair to ask whether 
the further assumption that elasticities are constant across all industr' 
at a given value might be made. The consequence of this would be to render 
the model amenable to regression as a "level" rather than a ratio
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equation. There are two points here. The first is that, as will be clear 
from our earlier work of chapters 2 and 3, a ratio form allows much more 
flexibility in the interpretation of the theoretical background to the 
model as more factors are held constant. The second is that the assump­
tion of equal elasticities in the bilateral power measure does not 
restrict the model as strongly in ratio form as in level form. Assuming 
identical elasticity values imposes an erroneous weighting on the various 
purchasing industries. All other things equal, if the concentration in 
a purchasing industry rises, the effect on the calculated ratio will be 
in the desired direction, albeit not of the right magnitude. In level 
form, an erroneous weighting might mean that one industry has a higher 
bilateral power index as calculated, yet a lower true value for this 
index. For these reasons we reject the possibility of performing 
experiments on a "levels" equation as being less general than the "ratio" 
form.
Secondly, in experimenting at the present stage of development with 
the various bilateral power indices provided by assuming alternative 
numbers for elasticities, we accept that there is an omitted variables 
problem. A superior procedure would be to include all potentially rele­
vant variables. We feel unwilling to adopt this approach at this stage, 
because there are already a number of variants involving lag structures 
and so on that we have in mind, and to use every permutation at every 
stage would make the experimental series exceedingly long. If, as it 
turns out, none of the bilateral power indices we try is at all highly 
correlated with other independent variables, then the biases introduced 
by following our preferred procedure should not be severe.
Turning now to the tests, note first that assumed elasticities 
across all industries much less than unity are unacceptable as they cause 
difficulties with the formula in connection with nationalised industry
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purchasers. We therefore arbitrarily chose three values of 1.0, 1.5 and 
2.0 for all elasticities of demand. The results of estimating the model
n+F
log A(-^-) = lo8 A + alo8 AH + &1°8 AHbuy + V
on the data thereby generated are listed in table 1. We also provide in 
table 1A a correlation matrix showing collinearity between the three 
measures generated under the alternative assumptions.
What these results seem to indicate is at least moderate support 
for the inclusion of the HBUY measure. It is encouraging to note that 
it (almost) attains significance at the 5% level under all three assump­
tions about the elasticity of demand. It is also extremely encouraging, 
in view of the rather arbitrary assumptions about elasticity of demand 
made, to see that the three alternative bilateral power measures used 
are very highly correlated with each other in our sample. Finally, it 
is fairly clear from this experiment that we should utilise the values 
for the bilateral power index obtained by setting elasticity of demand 
equal to unity for further work, since both the significance of that 
variable, and the overall explanatory power, are better in the first 
regression. We save further comments on the estimation until we have 
tested our more complete model.
^  The Basic Estimations
We move now to a discussion of the results obtained in estimating 
an equation of the form:
log A C^jp) “ A + olog AH + Slog AHBUy + f(AU) + V 
(similar to equations(16) and(17) chapter 5, except for the addition of 
a disturbance term).
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The additional variable, the percentage unemployed, is defined as 
Unemployment/(Unemployment + Employment) in that industry. Figures for 
this variable were obtained from the MS; they can be consolidated to 
fit our sample of industries with very little difficulty indeed.11
As we said in the previous chapter, we decided to perform the test 
using both a contemporaneous and lagged form, that is with the dependent 
variable being based on the ratio of the years 1968 and 1963, and also the 
ratio of the years 1972 and 1968. We take the former first. Since figures 
on the price-cost margin are not available for the construction industry 
beyond 1968, we decided to estimate this equation with and without the 
inclusion of that industry to facilitate comparisons with results for the 
lagged relationship. We also experiment by using the unemployment proxy 
as a normal ratio and as a logarithm of that ratio, both with contemp­
oraneous employment and assuming unemployment to lag behind other cyclical 
changes. This gives us a series of eight equations which are listed in 
table 2.
We notice a number of intensting features arising from these esti­
mations. In all equations, both the Herfindahl and the bilateral power 
measures attain significance at least at the 5% level, confirming our 
earlier partial estimation. The constant never attains significance at 
that level, neither does any measure of the unemployment variable. While 
both of our structural variables are very significant neither has a 
particularly high coefficient and both are significantly less than unity 
at the 5Z level, sugg^ting a smaller adjustment than indicated by the 
Pure Cournot model (see Chapter 2) which we considered in some sense a 
minimum. Therefore, either full adjustment to the structural change has 
n°t had time to take place, or other consideraions prevent such adjustment, 
or costs rise when structure becomes more concentrated, or finally our 
data or estimation procedure is such that it biases the coefficients
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TABLE 6.2 Dependent variable: log 
1968/Ü^ 1963}
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downward. (In general, as we said in the previous chapter, between 
1963 and 1968 most industries become more concentrated1 *). The insig­
nificance of the constant is perhaps unsurprising given that the 
(unweighted) mean value of the ratio of 1968/1963 unemployment is barely 
over one (1.071) in our sample, indicating quite possibly that there are 
similar levels of general economic activity in the two years. It remains 
possible that, using alternative data to proxy differential cyclical 
changes, we might have obtained a significant coefficient for that 
cyclical change variable. One slightly surprising feature of the 
results is that including "construction" as an observation increases 
significance while adding an extra degree of freedom. Thus, except when 
making comparisons between this set of results and others where construc­
tion figures are unavailable, we choose equation one as our favoured 
equation. The equation as a whole is significant at better than 1% on 
an 'F' test.
As we said in chapter 5, one possibility which presents itself is 
that it takes some time for performance to react to structural changes.
For this reason we estimated a similar set to the above equations using 
the 1972/1968 value of the dependent variable. The results are in table 
3. These regressions present a totally different picture to the estimations 
already discussed, for neither the Herfindahl nor the bilateral power 
measure are in any case significant, and they are usually of wrong sign. 
Also in contrast the unemployment variable shows significance in many of 
its guises. There are a number of possible explanations for this turn­
around. For example, structural variables may act quickly on performance, 
perhaps not imnediately but maybe with a fairly short lag, though this did 
not appear to be the case in Cowling and Waterson (1976). We are unable 
to try any shorter lag here though, due to lack of performance figures 
between 1963 and 1968.13 Again, the effect of iicomes policies may have

been to curtail performance changes. Or again, the comparative slump 
position existing in 1972 as measured by the ratio of 1972/1968 unemploy­
ments (unweighted) mean value of 2.096 might have prevented movement 
towards higher profits.
Our favoured equation, based on goodness of fit, is no. 5. As
with the estimations of table 2, contemporaneous unemployment ratios
appear to add most to the explanation. Looking in slightly more detail
at this equation, we find that the constant is significantly positive,
while the unemployment variable is significantly negative. This suggests
that performance (as understood here) would have risen greatly but for
the rise in unemployment indicating a depression causing a fall in
margins, via elasticity of demand changes or otherwise. It is perhaps
unwise to speculate on the reason for the significantly positive constant
14value, it could proxy a structural change after 1968, or a number of 
other effects. Similarly, as we said in chapter 5, there is certainly 
more than one explanation of the negative sign on unemployment. We 
continue our discussion of experiments on the assumption that performance 
reacts quickly to structural changes so that equation 1, table 2 is our 
main focus for further work.
We noted in chapter 5 that there is a possibility of durable and 
non-durable goods being affected differently by cyclical changes; we 
attempt to test this. One problem which immediately crops up here is 
that of finding an appropriate definition of a durable good. We decided, 
faut de mieux, to select statistical criteria for the definition. Using 
the input-output tables we calculated the proportion of each industry s 
output which was sold to purchasers for gross domestic capital formation 
in 1963 and 1968. If this proportion exceeded a certain value over the 
two years then the good was considered as "durable". We took three 
proportions: IZ, 5X, 10Z and also a fourth criterion: if some output
- 202 -
was sold for this purpose in both years.16 Using this information, we 
performed a complete covariance analysis for homogeneity of the whole 
sample. This was done using the specifications of equation I table 2 
and of equation 1 table 1, the latter being included in case the effect 
of durability was masked by the presence of the unemployment variable.
This procedure, rather than that of using "durability" as a continuous 
variable, was followed because we did not expect our measure of dura­
bility to be very accurate. The covariance analysis basically involves 
a regression on all the data, a regression on all data with a dummy 
variable for durability, and separate regressions on "durable" and 
"nondurable" observations. The residual sums of squares are then 
compared with the F statistic in the manner described in Johnston (1972a) 
pp. 192-207, for example. In every case, whatever the definition of 
durability and whether or not unemployment was included as a variable, 
we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity of the 
complete sample at the 5% level; both intercept and slope are insignif­
icantly different between subsamples. (For example, testing for homo­
geneity of the complete relationship and using equation 1, table 2, the 
theoretical F value, F (4,43) at 5% is 2.61, while the calculated statistic 
takes on values 0.9390, 1.073, 0.7481 and 0.5855, depending upon the 
definition of durability). It is of course possible that alternative 
definitions of durability might indicate the need for separate treatment 
or an additional coefficient.*^
We also discussed in the previous chapter the potential problem with 
our work in that capital costs representing the deterioration of equipment 
due to use in production are not subtracted from the numerator of our 
performance measure. We argued that under certain assumptions this might 
be reasonable, but the assumption should be tested and we suggested sub t r a c t in g  various proportions of (some proxy for) capital costs defined in
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... '8this manner. This procedure is statistically superior, given our 
model, to the alternative of using capital costs as an independent 
variable. Whatever the method used though, we run into the problem of 
available data. We decided to take the census values for capital 
expenditure in the year in question as a proxy for capital costs as 
discussed above; this is only reasonable on the assumption that firms 
are spending regularly, purely on replacement of equipment worn out in
production. As such the figures used could over- (or even under-)
. . 19estimate the true figures.
Our method is to subtract a proportion of capital expenditure from 
the numerator of the profit-revenue ratio. We chose to subtract tenths 
at a time,giving ten regressions of which a selection are listed in table 
4. These should be compared with our "favoured equation" (equation 1 
table 2). The results are interesting but also slightly surprising. First, 
as we increase the proportion of capital expenditure subtracted, the 
overall goodness of fit falls. But at the same time, the Herfindahl 
increases its significance up to the stage at which 0.3 of capital expend­
iture is subtracted and its coefficient continues to increase in size 
throughout the whole series. Meanwhile, the bilateral power variable 
falls off in significance and drops below the 5% level after 0.3. The 
unemployment variable always remains insignificant at 5% and its t value 
falls off. Thus if we are concerned only with overall fit, we should 
choose our favoured equation of table 2, while if our main purpose is 
the Herfindahl's significance, equation 3 table 4 (or some value sub­
tracted between 0.3 and 0.4) would be the most interesting. Given our 
overall approach, we incline towards the former. However we do notice 
that, in contrast to the results of Ornstein (1975, p. Ill)» subtraction 
of capital expenditure as a cost does not remove significance from the 
monopoly power variable. Of course, since the capital variable used is
204
m43
00 ■«O O' Cn •G* CO ro cprtM*0p
MX ^  *0 H/-N rt) oo PH CL oH* H rt rtrt C H*P* — O o o O O O o H O(D • • • • • • • • rt) p^ O VO O' Cn -P* CO toc C0 Op* C Hio crH* rt Oft) H P* N_^ P *d O H*H* rt rtP rt) PCL CL h-H*OPrtn>(A /•—N /-N /*s oo  o o  o o  o o  o —  O —  o —  O —  o oP p—  o ro o ■''J o vO O —  o ro o 4> O Cn — COo to — VO CO 'O O' -O '-J o  oo O' 00 —  vO •P* O rto CO VO CO «»O 00 "J CO Cn Cn to co oo —  -P* 00 o P
n w  cn w  ov W  00 CO n-' ro w  O' w  O' w  ^ PHi rtH>H« rtoH* w
rt) rtP P /*“N /—s X~S /“Nrt rtH» to O ro o CO o CO O CO O co o CO O CO O 00cn CO O' 4^ 00 ■£> ro co CO to vo ro co ro CO to to ro >H* rt O' ON O 4> o O  OO co *o 4> cn —  4> Cn co 3200 H* O' — CO to VO '«J oo VO — O  O' O  to •p- oP O >—r vO v-' — N—/ VO Cn vo n-' COH* CO * * 5«- * * * * *HiH» H*O PpPrt P *T 1 /—v /—N /**NH*VJ »i(DP
o o o  o — o —  O — O ro o to O
o o co — ro co Cn CO 00 CO O  4> to 4>* ■P- 4> 32cl rt 4^  — O' 4> ro 'O Cn O O' roH« P* 4> VO 00 00 — ro oo 4> VO VO CO 4> 4> oo — SHi o w  CO CO VO N—/ MHi CO * * *n> a>H COn>Prt C2Hi «•“s /•-s /~v
O5 o  o o  o — o —  o — o — o — o — o O'ON O "4 o o  o —  o —  o ro o CO O CO oN 00 VO CO '-J O  **J oo *o •— -ort> VO 4> to 4>* O  co ro 4>w W  %*| W  Cn o 00
CO
Prt
Cn
O o o o o O o oO
a*
CnK>Ov
*o
O'
rou>>oCO
rocnCnCO
ro
oVO
ro00COcn
rovorovo
rovoVOo
33to
rtrtfl>»1 cnCO p
Cn Cn Cn Cn Cn cn cn cn H* B N *0P H*P
n+F 
1968
TABLE 6.4 
Dependent variable: log {(-£-) y^lwith subtractions of part of capital expenditure from "n+F1
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not theoretically correct, we can say little about whether we have 
generated evidence in favour of the Spencian position20 (see chapter 5). 
Because the fit on all variables falls off sharply as large proportions 
of capital expenditure are subtracted though, we would be inclined to 
conclude that his simple model contains some element of truth.
We performed a similar experiment to that described above on our 
favoured equation of table 3 (1972/1968 values for the dependent variable). 
The overall fit falls throughout, the coefficient on AH moves from 
insignificantly negative to insignificantly positive. We do not consider 
it worthwhile to detail the results obtained.
Further Statistical Considerations
Other structure-performance studies for the UK have encountered 
quite high correlations between independent variables, but multicolinearity 
does not appear to be a problem in our sample. For example, in our 
favoured equation of table 2, the correlation between the three independent 
variables is very low; between the Herfindahl and bilateral power variables 
the correlation coefficient is 0.0172 and between these and the unemploy­
ment variable, - 0.1637 and 0.0789 respectively.
Another statistical problem which Comanor and Wilson (1967) noted 
in their study of the US was that of heteroskedasticity. They tested 
for this by splitting the sample into four and calculating the variance 
of residuals in each quartile. Based on this tabulation they derived an 
appropriate weighting scheme. We decided to use the more formal parametric 
test of Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) in considering the problem of hetero­
skedasticity in connection with our work.21 We felt that the most likely reason for possible difficulties in this area would be reaction to large changes in industry structure. That is if the Herfindahl say rose sharply
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between 1963 and 1968 in a certain set of industries, we might well 
expect the variance of the performance changes resulting to be larger 
than the variance of performance changes in a set of industries where 
structure changed little. Once the particular variable which might 
effect heteroskedastic disturbances has been chosen, the sample is then 
ordered according to the size of that variable and split into equal 
segments with a number of observations around the middle omitted. The 
authors give some guidance on the size of the omitted segment formulated 
from a "Monte Carlo" study, but no hard and fast rules can be adopted.
Based on their work, we chose to rank our observations by the magnitude 
of the Herfindahl variable and set the size of the omitted middle portion 
at 11, 13 and 15 observations (samples of sizes 20, 19 and 18 respectively). 
In each case the two subsamples were estimated independently and a ratio 
of the sum of squared residuals formed. This sum is compared with the F 
statistic with appropriate degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis being 
that the sample is homoskedastic. If the squared residuals are signifi­
cantly larger in one sub-sample than the other, we reject the null 
hypothesis. The ratios of the sum of squared residuals in the subsample 
of larger Herfindahl changes divided by that value for the subsample of 
smaller Herfindahl changes, together with the appropriate theoretical F 
statistic at the 5Z level are listed below :
Sample s iz e s  Calculated ratio F statistic 5% Degrees of freedom 
20 1.83 2.33 16> 16
19 2.40 2.40 '5. >5
18 2.28 2.48 l4> 14
Based on these results, we have scant evidence that the sample as 
a whole is not homoskedastic, the calculated ratio being smaller than (or exactly equal to!) the theoretical value and so inside the acceptance
/
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region. For, whilst we are not assured that the test will give us an 
unambiguously clearly defined central omissions region for maximum 
power, it can be argued that the power will increase and then diminish 
as the central gap is widened (see e.g. Goldfeld and Quandt p. 541 n. 8). 
If at a (supposed) maximum we are only on the borderline of rejecting 
the null hypothesis, then it seems fair to proceed on the assumption 
that heteroskedasticity is not a problem in our work. Having said this, 
it is possible that alternative tests, perhaps based on other size 
orderings, would give different results, but the number of potential 
alternatives is too large for full exploration.
As we have mentioned in various places previously, all of our 
independent variables are potentially measured with quite large errors.
If there is a persistent tendency towards over-estimation of the 
Herfindahl ratio (say), then this might be one explanation for the low 
coefficient obtained. But as is well known, measurement errors even 
of zero expectation give rise to biased and inconsistent estimation of
the model parameters. The bias, moreover, is towards the coefficients 
being too small as estimated. Thus in some degree the low coefficient 
on the Herfindahl ratio might be explained by the measurement error 
problem. If we proceed here on the assumption that there is no persistent 
over or under estimation, then consistency may be achieved by the use of 
appropriate instrumental variables.^ As usual though, candidates do not 
immediately spring to mind as ideal. Perhaps one of the best is Durbin s 
suggestion of using the rank of the particular variable in the series as 
an instrument both highly correlated with the actual variable size and 
hopefully not related to the error in the limit (see Johnston 1972a pp. 
285-6). He performed such an instrumental variable estimation on equation 
I of table 2 (the "favoured equation") using the rank of the variable as 
an instrument for each series. The following equation was obtained:
/
- 208 -
VI
log A (-¡[-i ■ 0.1079 + 0.1737 log AH + 0.4092 log AHBUY
(1.604) (2.426) (2.019)
- 0.0692 AU, R2 = 0.2937 .
(-1.215)
(t statistics in parentheses, sample size 51, all variables 1968/1963 
values).
Comparing this equation with our favoured equation, we see that 
the overall fit is poorer, the coefficients and their t values smaller 1
There are several explanations for the fall in the size of the coeffi- 
. 23cients: He must remember that we do not achieve unbiased results even
if the instruments are good, the instruments may only poorly reflect the 
ranking of the "true"values, and measurement errors involved may not in 
fact have the desired properties. It is difficult to apportion "blame" 
for the unexpected result obtained, we must simply accept that what 
appears to be the best available instrument to deal with the problem 
encountered has not had the effect we hoped for.
Conclusion
We are thus drawn back to our favoured equation of table 2 as 
representing best what we consider to be a good partial explanation of 
the underlying relationships between changes in industrial structural 
variables and changes in performance. It is repeated below:
log A(£H) - 0.1058 + 0.2198 log AH + 0.4566 log AH0UY - 0.0752 AU
(1.672) (3.175) (2.580) (-1.412)
R2 - 0.3021
(t statistics in parentheses, 51 observation, all ratios 1968/1963).
Taking this equation at face value, we see that a rise in industry 
concentration has a firm, but fairly weak, positive effect on the price
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cost margin, as does an increase in the bilateral power index. This
is at variance with the conclusions of some of the other UK studies
cited earlier, although similar to the main conclusion of Cowling and 
24Waterson (1976). There is obviously a myriad of other influences
on the change in the price-cost margin between these two years, as is
25only to be expected when trying to explain such a volatile variable; 
it is to be hoped that our omission of many possible effects does not 
seriously bias the results as estimated.
We resist the temptation to include any discussion of policy 
implications arising from our work; we would feel much more confidence
in doing so if and when similar results are generated using data from
26other time periods for the UK.
I-  2 1 0
There is obviously an aggregation problem here, as many
Ca^e^ories ar& xdir1 •i.j/’ oroad. T.;e do not pretend to oe a.
provide a complete answer to on io ci.—x x iCu.x i<y •
The definitions of these ratios are: the "output of 'principal 
products 1 of each industry group as a percentage of industry 
group total output" and the "output produced as 'principal 
products' as a percentage of total output of the commodity 
group" (input-output table S, 1968), respectively.
A i d  u C i L nit ion of net output, a±ong wi or. deiinioions ox 
the other components of the dependent variable, are listed 
in the introduction to each census.
The correlation "between these two measures is 0 %') (]’'}• ¿ne 
additional costs subtracted are those listed in Table 12 
of the individual industry reports, where given, se aeciaeu 
to report results only for the case where the additional cos 
are not subtracted to facilitate comparisons between m e
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contemporaneous and lagged, equations.
5« See Smyth et. al, 0975)» who discuss the problems of surrogate 
measures and the conditions under which they will give a correct 
representation of the true measures.
6. Because Sawyer’s purpose and sample size were different only 
some of his figures have been used here, but they eased the 
burden of calculation.
7. These are what Sawyer (1971) tabulates in his article. We would 
expect the distance between maxima and minima to be further apart 
in general for our sample than his, as ours is the more 
aggregative. In Cowling and Waterson (1976), concentration 
ratio figures are used alongside Herfindahls, with "inferior" 
results.
S. I am grateful to Steve Davis for pointing this out to me.
9. i is the selling industry, j the purchasers; a ^  =
sales to industry j divided by total sales of the ith industry.
10. Deaton’s (1975 b) work, heavily based on final consumption, would 
allow us at most a sample of five industries and seven purcahsers.
11. The only slight problem is that in later years in two cases the 
employment figures were too aggregative. We apportioned 
employment in these cases as it was apportioned in the previous 
year. Employment figures (as opposed to unemployment; change 
little from year to year and such apportionment is likely to 
cause very little error.
/
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12. The unweighted mean of the logarithmic ratio is O.0642, whereas 
if concentration had not increased we would expect a value of 
zero.
13. For example we cannot relate a 1970/1965 performance measure to 
1968/1963 structural changes because the census taken in 1965 
does not contain anywhere near enough information. (See Appendix IX)
14. We are unable to obtain figures for the Herfindahl, for example, 
after 1968.
15. They may also be affected differently by structural changes because 
of the opportunities open to sellers, see Cowling and Waterson 
(1976).
16. Higher proportions than those mentioned would have left few 
observations in the "durable" category. These statistics 
presumably do not include consumers • capital expenditures. It 
might then be objected that we are picking up a partial measure 
of producer (as against consumer) goods. However, casual 
inspection of the figures indicates that most categories of 
goods commonly thought of as durables are picked up as such in 
our measures (eg. domestic electrical appliances).
17. In Cowling and Waterson (1976)» using a subjective definition 
of durability, markedly different results for the two subsaraples 
involved were obtained.
18. These capital costs should be distinguished sharply from costs 
fixed in the short-run. We refer here to faotors such as wear 
and tear on machinery caused by using it in production.
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19. As we have seen in adding the "capital-output ratio" as an 
independent variable, Shepherd (1972) used a similar measure 
to ours.
20. This will depend upon the relative sizes of the capital variable 
actually subtracted and the theoretical values for that variable.
21. They took only the case where the disturbances were heteroskedastic 
in a particular manner. In fact thought as Glesjer (19^9) makes 
clear, the test is more general than might be implied by their 
description. ,Tohnston( 1972a) p 221 suggests the Goldfeld and 
Quandt test as the most useful for exploratory purposes.
22. This is of course a v e r y  rough experiment. There is no 
particular reason why the assumption should be true, nor a 
reason why the error should exhibit constant (asymptotic) 
variance and be uncorrelated with the general error term.
23. It is not particularly surprising that the overall fit is 
poorer.
24. One of the main equations from Cowling and Waterson is:
0.0220 + 0.2501 log AH (jgjg) 
(0.728) (2.572)
1963. 
1958' /
R2 = 0.067, 94 observations ( M H  level), t statistics in 
parentheses, (notice the lag structure)
The addition of "trade union" and "durable" variables did 
not add materially to the fit but, as mentioned earlier, 
splitting the sample into "durable" and "nondurable" goods
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categories gave quite a good fit for the former, very poor 
for the latter. Apart from the "trade union" variable, 
bilateral power was not considered in that paper.
25. As we said in chapter 1, though we are able to explain 
a smaller proportion of the variance in our dependent 
variable than, say, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974) is in his, 
we most likely have far more to be explained.
26. the results of Cowling and Waterson (1976) cannot be said 
either to be from a completely different time period, nor 
to be entirely in agreement with those presented here.
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Appendix I : Two Assumntions discussed
The Assumption of Constant Elasticity of Demand
The theoretical work of the preceding chapters has relied to 
some extent upon the assumption that demand for every industry's 
product is constantly elastic. This is true particularly of the work 
in developing the bilateral power model, but the limit pricing model 
also involved the same assumption. Having said this, it remains the 
case that both models could have been developed to similar levels from 
alternative suppositions about demand curves, though the conclusions 
would obviously have differed in some respects. We do not of course 
require for our results that every demand curve is exactly constantly 
elastic; as long as the double-log form fits observed patterns reason­
ably faithfully, even if other formulations will do as well, then our 
conclusions remain more or less intact. Given this position we should 
consider, albeit briefly, the evidence from demand studies bearing upon 
the viability of the constant elasticity of demand form.*
First though, it should be pointed out that if we do not assume 
(in the sense described above) constant elasticity of demand then a 
further problem is created for empirical work. Using equation (1) of 
chapter 5 (equation 33, chapter 4), assume that there is a change in 
the concentration of that industry. We have:
H Z ( 1 + U 2 ) „
Tin ' BUY z '
3Hz
z
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As we explained, our particular formulation (equation (2) of chapter 
5 is the simplest case) is designed to allow for the first two types 
of effect present in the equation above. However, it cannot fully 
allow for the third effect, which effect is zero in the constant 
elasticity of demand case. The point here may be illustrated with 
reference to a linear demand curve. If the number of firms drops,
Hz will rise, price should rise, and total output falls; there is a 
movement up the demand curve. But then demand becomes more elastic so 
that 3|nJ/3Hz is positive and the rise in the margin is less than would 
be expected from a constant elasticity curve. Problems are caused here 
because, even in the pure Cournot case (uz = 0), we cannot say with any 
certainty what the magnitude of the change in margin will be and, a 
partly connected point, the level of marginal cost will have an effect 
on the change in margin expected.
One point which might worry some is that if we assume that demand
is constantly elastic then we must assume all demand curves to have
elasticity greater than unity in order to cater for monopolists. This
is an overstatement though. All that is really required is that demand
is approximately constantly elastic in the normal region of observa
tion". If there are at present fifty firms in the industry then the
demand curve can be very inelastic as long as we do not expect dramatic
. 2changes in the structure of that industry.
It is well known that, despite being consistent in differential 
form3 the double-log or constant-elasticity of demand function is 
inconsistent in many respects with the postulates of consumer theory, 
especially when we consider extrapolation from given data. Despite 
this there seems to be no basis for rejecting it out of hand for two 
main reasons: it is not necessarily true that the postulates hold in 
practice, and within the region of observation it may provide as good 
an explanation of reality as alternatives satisfying the postulates.
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In fact when we turn to the evidence on the veracity of the 
properties of a complete demand system, following from the assumptions 
that consumers maximise utility while spending all their budget, we 
find that, despite Barten's (1967) early encouraging results with a 
four commodity system, later work at a less aggregative level has 
tended not to bear the properties out too well. For example Deaton 
(1974) in his nine commodity study of the U.K. finds that intercepts 
are necessary (though not implied by the pure theory) and that homo­
geneity of degree zero cannot be accepted for all commodities, though 
"symmetry" is accepted and "negativity" almost so (given homogeneity).
He is at rather a loss to explain the rejection of such a straight­
forward effect as homogeneity.
Interestingly, Deaton also tests for "additivity", a property not 
required from utility theory but often imposed by those who estimate 
demand equations. This is rejected at a very high level of confidence. 
Such a finding is important because probably the most widely used 
alternative to the "pragmatic" constant elasticity format is the Linear 
Equation System which imposes additive preferences at the level of the 
utility function.
In a more recent paper Deaton (1975a) makes a direct comparison 
between the constant elasticity and linear expenditure models using a 
more general non-additive framework as a benchmark. Concerning the 
price elasticities he finds that the constant elasticity format provides 
a much closer approximation to the simple non-additive model than does
the linear expenditure system. Thus:
"The effects of choice of functional form on measurement depend 
upon the amount of information in the data, but in any case are small 
relative to the effects of assumptions, such as additivity, which destroy 
much of the available evidence." (p.272)
/
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As far as the constant elasticity form is concerned he feels that this 
"model remains a useful means of summarising the evidence over the sample 
period" (p.262).
Such a conclusion is most reassuring from the point of view of 
the assumption of constant elasticity of demand in our model. We 
further note that Stone (1954) who uses this form throughout his 
extensive work on demand estimation considers that "these simple 
relationships may be said on the whole to fit the observations reasonably 
well" (p.278). Also Deaton (1975b) in his study of thirty seven commod­
ities, while mainly favouring the linear expenditure system for his 
estimates of demand relationships,"* uses the constant elasticity form 
for many commodities. His estimates of the log—linear model from a 
time series of seventeen observations (including a trend term on 
elasticities) show excellent fits in general. Twenty nine of his thirty 
seven commodity groups yield an better than 0.9 (12 of these greater 
than 0.99). Given this general good fit and lack of any demonstrably 
superior simple alternatives we feel it not unreasonable to 
assume that constant elasticity of demand is a useful generalisation.
The Assumption of Constant Marginal Cost in the Short-Run:
This assumption, and its implication that we may write the firm's 
marginal cost as equal to average variable cost, has been utilised in 
several places in the preceding work. More specifically, the later 
oligopoly models of chapter 2 suppose it; and the work of chapter 4 on 
the Cournot-type model of bilateral power both uses the assumption of
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constant marginal cost and is strengthened by it as we have noted there in 
our comments on Hicks (1935). Furthermore, when we move on to talk of 
a price—cost margin as a ratio of profits plus fixed costs to revenue 
then in every case that assumption is made. In fact it is probably true 
to say that without it, there could be very little rigorous work on 
relating industry structure to a performance measure. This arises 
because the normal basis for any such model is a maximising entrepreneur 
or manager so that marginal quantities naturally appear in the first 
order conditions, yet data availability is such that these cannot 
normally be identified. Given this situation, it is easiest if one 
moves to assuming the marginal quantity equal to an average quantity 
which is what we have done here. It then becomes of some importance to 
at least briefly assess the evidence for the assumption that short-run 
marginal cost is constant.
There are basically five areas where we can glean evidence on the 
shape of cost curves, some more useful for our purpose than others. Two 
of these, the Survivor Technique and Rate of Return studies, are rather 
wider in scope than the alternatives because factors additional to costs 
are included in the assessment. The survivor technique, as used by 
Stigler (1958) for example, involves looking for patterns in the 
distributions of (firm or plant) sizes over time. If say it is observed 
that the largest size category contains an increasing proportion of the 
observations as time proceeds, then we might conclude that there is 
evidence of scale economies. On the other hand (and this is of course 
its advantage for some purposes) it might be evidence of luck, advant­
ages of vertical integrtfion, outside acquisitions and so on. Of its 
nature, this technique is likely to be affected by the definition of 
the industry whose observations we are perusing. Also, unless the 
hypothesis regarding distributional changes is rather sophisticated, we
JU
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are unable to say anything about the cost disadvantages of firms not at 
the "optimum" size. The other side of this coin is that we are not 
necessarily able to conclude that the absence of any discernable pattern 
in the size distributional changes means that there is an absence of 
significant scale economies. For the present purpose evidence in this 
area is ambivalent and will not be considered further save to say thatv 
in the view of Shepherd (1967)^ taking his own and earlier estimates into 
account, "there has been no widespread shift at all towards larger plants" 
and "there remains the inability of the survivor technique to provide 
normative estimates of scale economies above the plant level." (both 
p. 122).
The second of the broad approaches is the rate of return type of 
study like that of Hall and Weiss (1967). Here the exercise is to relate 
profitability to firm size. As will be obvious from our earlier work 
there are a large number of factors, besides scale economies, which should 
be reckoned as additional determinants of profitability. For this 
reason, the results of Samuels and Smyth (1968), probably the most useful 
of U.K. studii in this area, should in the present context be treated 
with a good deal of caution. They found, briefly, that Profit rates and 
size are inversely related" (p.139); if the relationship were entirely due 
to scale economies then this would indicate continually decreasing returns. 
Such a result conflicts directly with the work of Hall and Weiss for the 
U.S., but of course there are many other explanations of the divergence 
which we do not intend to pursue here. The evidence does not bear directly 
enough on the question of scale economies.
By contrast, a third approach to measuring scale economies, the 
"Engineering" study, probably has too narrow a compass for present 
purposes. The idea of such studies is to question those in the industry 
and ask what would be the cost (or cost advantages) of producing certain 
output levels based on available technical information. Thus: Their
- 221
accuracy is particularly suspect when dealing with some of the non­
technical forces determining the effects of scale, for example when 
estimating the relationship between size and quality of management..." 
(Pratten 1971 p.20). In fact Pratten provides probably the best 
example of this type of approach in the U.K. After studying a large 
number of industries he considered that "there are large technical 
economies of scale for such ranges of products in many industries"
g
(p.268), and later he concludes that there are also economies on die 
marketing and managerial sides (see e.g. p. 302), though he has much 
less information in this area.
The focus of engineering studies then, is very much on the technical 
side and so at plant level. There are advantages in this, for demand 
consideraions, relative prices and so on are held in abeyance. But as 
far as we are concerned, Pratten's work concentrates too much on what 
ought to be rather than what is. As such, the scale curves he derives 
are essentially planning curves rather than short run schedules holding 
many factors fixed. Quite a large amount of the decline in average total 
cost can probably be ascribed to the cost of the physical plant being 
spread, and may in no way be inconsistent with constant short-run 
marginal costs. We should also remember that the technical economies 
of scale he observes, while requiring plants operating up to a significant 
proportion of total industry output, are in most cases for quite narrowly 
defined "industries" or economies of producing a "narrow range of products 
(p. 268). Our industries, being MLH level or broader, are much more 
aggregative. Thus we feel that his evidence does not contradict the 
assumption we wish to make about short-run marginal costs for the firm.
The fourth area in which we can obtain evidence on scale economies 
is from "Statistical Cost" studies, best exemplified by Johnston's (I960) 
oft-quoted work. This approach involves the use of empirical data on
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costs, usually from published sources. Besides estimating cost 
functions for six industries himself, Johnston also provides a fairly 
comprehensive review of previous studies in the same area. He finds 
that "Two major impressions ... stand out clearly. The first is that 
the various short-run studies more often than not indicate constant 
marginal cost and declining average cost as the pattern that best 
seems to describe the data that have been analysed. The second is the 
preponderance of the L-shaped pattern of long-run average cost that 
emerges so frequently from the various long-run analyses" (p.168).
The conclusion on long-run functions is of course compatible with 
Pratten's results. However, our main concern is with short-run cost 
functions which are generally derived from time-series data.
Now there have been many criticisms of the methods and consequences 
of statistical estimation of cost curves and in a further chapter Johnston 
comments on the main ones. He considers six relating to the short-run 
function, the main thrust of these being that statistical estimation 
renders the rejection of a curvilinear form for the total cost function 
more likely than in "truth" should be the case. To a greater or lesser 
extent he is able to qualify or reject all these, so that he considers 
that"MC may rise at extremely high output rates; but over substantial 
ranges of output, in cases where divisibility or segmentation of capital 
equipment is possible, it is probably constant." (p.192). In fairness 
though, it should perhaps be pointed out that, after his survey of the 
empirical results and arguments, Walters (1963) reports that the 
evidence in favour of constant marginal cost (in the short run) is not
overwhelming" (p.51). This does not mean that the assumption is not a
9reasonable approximation, of course.
Finally, we should note that a further possible source of inform­
ation on scale economies is the large number of econometric studies
/
223 -
which involve estimating production functions. Obviously to move 
towards cost functions from these we would have to make a number of 
(perhaps questionable) assumptions about factor prices and so on, not 
all compatible with the oligopolistic basis of the models developed 
here. Thus we consider that the connection is not strong enough to 
albw us to say anything very reliable about short-run cost functions 
from estimations of production functions.
Given the available relevant evidence, we consider that our
assumption of constant short-run marginal cost is a fairly useful
approximation over wide ranges of output. It remains true that if
output varies greatly the average cost curve may turn upward at its
extremes, but we can do little about this in empirical work apart from
noting that our proxy for elasticity of demand changes (on which see
10Chapter 5) may pick up such effects to some extent.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Estimation has generally proceeded using the form:
log + nyi log(y) + log
or assuming homogeneity of degree zero in income and all prices:
log qj “ + nvi log &  *  Enii log (Pi/P)J  n i Jp j
n goods in the system and q^ the quantity of the ith good purchased,
p is a general price index. Often many or all of the prices other
than the ith are omitted in estimation (as in Deaton (1975a) where
only p^ is included). In this notation, the elasticity we are concerned
with is n* .n
2 Any possibility of "Riffen" goods is naturally very serious for our, 
or almost any, structure-performance study. We assume they do not 
exist.
3 That is where the demand for the ith good is of the form
d log qj^  = nyi dlogy + In^d log p^
(where certain relationships hold between the elasticities within this 
equation and between it and the others in the system).
4 The egg- „ation property of the system was imposed by the data.
Symmetry and negativity are properties derived from utility theory, 
the latter being the generalised substitution effect and the former 
the equivalence of compensated cross-partials. Aggregation and 
symmetry are not properties of the constant elasticity model (see 
e.g. Stone 1954 p.278).
5 This was presumably written prior to his last-mentioned (1975a) paper.
/
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6 See also Shepherd (1967) for further critique of the method.
7 Pratten (1971) pp 348-9 has some discussion on this point. Hall 
and Weiss do include some of these factors.
8 The idea of the "range of products" is defined on the same page in 
Pratten.
9 We ought to mention a further point on these conclusions. Some of 
the empirical studies referred to by Johnston and Walters were 
performed at the plant level while others are at the level of the 
firm; we are really concerned with the latter. But management can 
presumably duplicate plants so that constant marginal cost is 
retained for the firm unless there are substantial economies or 
diseconomies in running ceveral plants under one umbrella. If we 
look at the U.K. statistics however, we find that the number of 
establishments per enterprise in manufacturing is only 1.33 in 1968 
(Census of Production figures), which indicates that this possibility 
should not worry us much empirically.
10 Of course if we believe Spence (1974), whose model was discussed in 
chapter 3, then we would expect excess capacity to be maintained, 
making it rather unlikely that the average cost curve would turn 
upward at high output levels.
] /
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APPENDIX II
The Data
Some Introductory Comments
The predominant source of data for studies such as ours is 
the series of Censuses of production for the UK. Detailed censuses 
have recently been taken at roughly five-yearly intervals, the last 
produced at time of writing being for 1 9 6 8. These series cover all 
of manufacturing plus part or the whole of mining, construction and 
the public utilities. The census material is tabulated in most 
cases at Minimum last Heading (MIH) Level, or in a more detailed form 
than that. This derives from the Standard Industrial Classification 
system for ordering industries, mainly by productive activity. The 
definitions change slightly from time to time, but in the 1 ) 6 6 census 
the 1963 figures have been reclassified to the same basis and no 
major revisions have taken place since then. These yield enough 
data to derive approximations to the main structure and performance 
measures normally used.
In addition, small censuses are taken nearly every year, the 
latest published data being an (as yet) incomplete series for 1973. 
Between 19 6 4 and 1967 the small census was a very minor affair, 
containing only two main tables and these at a more aggregate level 
than the MIH categories. Those tables were concerned with stocks 
and work in progress and fixed capital expenditure only. However 
from 1970 onwards, much more detail is included. One of the main 
differences between the small and large censuses is that the former
or
are based not at all on the "enterprise" (which is a census 
approximation to a firm), tut rather on the "establishment" 
plant. As such they are not useful for information on many 
industrial structural features. Post 1970 though, they are 
sufficient to obtain industry aggregates such as our performance 
measure. Hie upshot of this arrangement is that annual series of 
the data we require are not available long enough even for averaging 
purposes; we have to take "snapshot" views of the industrial world.
As we said in chapter 1, since we decide to use a "ratio" 
formulation for our model we need two years from which we can 
glean more—or—less compatible data on the structural features used. 
Our bilateral power measure (on which see chapter 4 ) requires 
knowledge of interindustry relationships so we choose 1963 and 1968 
as our base years, being years for which UK input—output tables 
have been produced, lhese luckily have as their basis an aggregated 
MIH classification system which becomes our sample level. If we 
decide to have structure affect performance with a lag, this is 
possible using performance figures from later small censuses.
Sources
We list below for convenient reference main details on the 
sources of the data used in empirical estimations. In each case 
figures are for the UK. Much of the data comes fairly directly 
from published Government tables so that it seems wasteful to 
provide all the figures used in estimation in addition. However 
we end the appendix by tabulating data on structural features
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which did involve some substantial burden in collection. Pull 
references for all statistical sources are given below rather 
than in the main bibliography.
The profit - revenue ratio or price - cost margin:
This is defined as total net output minus total wages and 
salaries all divided by total sales and work done (including sales 
of merchanted goods). Source: 1968 Census, Part 1 5 6, Table 1 (for 
1963 and 1968 figures); 1973 Census, Table 1 (for 1972 figures).
Capital expenditure:
This is subtracted from the numerator of the above ratio in 
some estimations, see chapter 6 for details. It is defined as Total 
(net) capital expenditure. Source: 1968 Census, Part 156, Table 2 
(for 1963 and 1968 figures); 1973 Census, Table 2 (for 1972 figures).
The Herfindahl index:
The construction of this variable is described in full in 
chapter 6, the figures are tabulated below. The basic source is:
1968 Census, Part 158, Table 42A which gives the distribution of 
enterprises by employment for each industry.
The Bilateral Power index:
This is constructed partly from the Herfindahl index, partly- 
using the Input-Output tables and partly from some miscellaneous 
sources as noted and described in chapter 6. The Input—Output source 
is: Table D: Industry by Industry flow matrix 1968, ditto 1963.
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Hie Unemployment variable:
This is defined as unemployed divided by unemployed plus 
employed. Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, various years; 
Tables : Estimated number of employees in employment and numbers 
unemployed.
Hie split between durable and non-durable goods is based on the 
figures in the column "Gross Domestic Capital Formation: Fixed" 
in table D of the Input-Output tables.
The choice of which industries to exclude based on "specialisation" 
and "exclusiveness" ratios was made using the table "Analysis of 
output of principal products", Table S in the 1968 Input—Output 
tables, table L in those for 1963.
Full references:
Census of Production:
Department of Trade and Industry, Business Statistics Office:
"Report on the Census of Production 19 6 8." tendon, HMSO, 1972.
Department of Industry, Business Statics Office (Business Monitor 
PA 1000) : "Report on the Census of Production,1973 Provisional 
Results." London, HMSO, 1974«
Input-Ouput Tables:
Central Statistical Office: "Input-Output Tables for the UK 1963 
(Studies in Official Statistics No. 16)." Icndon, HMSO, 1970.
Central Statistical Office: "Input-Output Tables for the UK 1968 
(Studies in Official Statistics No. 2 2 ) . "  Icndon, HMSO, 1973.
■
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Annual Abstract of Statistics:
Central Statistical Office: "Annual Abstract of Statistics (various 
years)." London, HMSO.
Census of Distribution:
Board of Trade: "Report on the Census of Distribution and Other 
Services, 1961." London, HMSO, 1963. (Table 7)
Board of Trade: "Ditto, 1 9 6 6." London, HMSO, 1970. (Table 6).
Airline Annual reports:
Ministry of Aviation: "British European Airways Corporation. Annual 
Report and Accounts 1963 - 4." HC 348.
Ministry of Aviation: "British Overseas Airways Corporation.Ditto" 
HC 349.
Board of Trade: "British European Airways Corporation. Annual 
Report and Accounts for the year ended March 31, 1969" HCP 379«
Board of Trade: "British Overseas Airways Corporation.Ditto"
HCP 378.
European Economic Communities: "Yearbook of Agricultural
Statistics." Brussels, Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, 1967.
Table Al — Selected Data Used
MLH (1968) Nos. Name
Herfindahl Index
Bilateral 
Power Index*
1963 1968 1963 1968
102-4, 109 Other mining 0.00963 0.01120 1.10308 1.55155
211 Grain milling 0.05969 0.07366 1.02005 1.023042
212-3, 219 Other cereals 0.04700 0.05796 1.00117 1.00104
216 Sugar 0.07692 0.09867 1.01265 1.01844
217 Cocoa,chocolate 0.05215 0.06001 1.003 57 1.00373
214-5, 218,229 Other food 0.01161 0.00869 1.01141 1.01444
221,275 Soap,oil3 & fats 0.03369 0.03093 1.02542 1.03034
231,232,239 Drink 0.02553 0.03250 1.00053 1.00126
240 Tobacco 0.09817 0.09903 1.00000 1.00024
262-3 Mineral oil 
refining 0.10944 0.09103 1.73779 1.95168
274 Paint 0.02966 0.03077 1.12002 1.05607
261 Coke ovens 0.04937 0.10736 1.18393 1.49443
272-3 Pharmaceutical 
& toilet 0.02320 0.02203 1.05256
1.04623
276 Synthetic resins 0.06849 0.05910 1.03516 1.03718
271,277-9 Other chem, 
& allied 0.01427 0.01160
1.10953 1.11467
311-3 Iron 4 steel 0.01432 0.02868 1.43795 1.30818
321 Aluminium 0.05754 0.04324 1.03840 1.04687
322-3 Other nonferrous 0.03343 0.04350 1.06134 1.05264
331 Ag. machinery 0.03547 0.04119 1.03747 1.025252
332 Machine tools 0.01882 0.02532 1.11601 1.106432
390 Engineers small 
tools 0.00831
0.00925 1.63847 2.02065
2
334
335 
336-7
Indust.engines 
Textile machinery 
Contractors plant
0.09110
0.04301
0.01134
0.17706
0.03777
0.01270
1.16048 
1.03197 
1.08783
1.11001 
1.03078 
1.26699
2
338 Office machinery 0.08989 0.07389 1.13172
1.14406 
L— —  *
232 -
MLH (1968) Nos. Name
Herfindahl Index Bilateral 
Power Index
1963 1968 1963 1968
333,339 Other non­
electrical 0.00475 0.00451 . 1.43484 1.17970
341 Industrial plant 0.01342 0.01110 1.26220 1.30682
342,349 Other mech.eng. 0.01267 0.01823 1.30134 1.304272
351-4 Instruments 0.00984 0.01311 1.09468 1.11478
361 Electrical
machinery 0.04689 0.07652 1.83706 1.79560
362 Insulated wires 0.05826 0.07282 2.76038 3.472362
363-7 Radio & 
telecomm. 0.02054 0.02063 1.39367 1.27749
368-9 Other electrical 0.02124 0.02588 1.25991 1.30587
395 Cans & boxes 0.07893 0.09252 1.02345 1.03727
391-4,396,399 Other metal gds. 0.00186 0.00215 1.12013 1.25468
370 Shipbuilding 0.03744 0.05159 1.10818 1.07592
380-1 Motor vehicles 0.05694 0.08605 1.04910 1.03373
383 Aircraft 0.10901 0.12178 1.14135 1.09044
382,384-5 Other vehicles 0.03024 0.04182 1.19331 1.05514
411 Man made fibres 0.14286 0.20000 1.01157 1.01084
412-3 Spinning & 
weaving 0.00853
0.01752 1.05252 1.02362
414 Wool 0.00864 0.01097 1.00561 1.00328
415-9,421-2,429 Other textiles 0.00411 0.00679 i.14283 1.00884
423 Textile
finishing 0.01991
0.03355 1.00576 1.02394
431-3 Leather 0.00287 0.00349 1.00620
1.00558
441-6,449 Clothing 0.00241 0.00280 1.09225
1.08299
i 450
1________________
Footwear 0.01193 0.01551 1.01217 1.01049
MLH (1968) Nos. Name
Herfindahl Index Bilateral
1963 1968
Power Index
1963 1968
464 Cement 0.18920 0.25084 1.02527 1.12098
461,469 Other building 
mats. 0.00595 0.00815 1.29118 1.13298 !
462-3 Pottery & glass 0.01926 0.02729 1.14684 1.02161 !
472-3 Furniture etc. 0.00349 0.00509 1.03326 1.02211
471,474-5,479 Wood 0.00139 0.00197 1.38501 1.20321
481 Paper & board 0.04227 0.04510 1.10366 1.02448
482-3,484 Paper products 0.00959 0.00962 1.09185 1.11680
485-6,489 Printing & 
publishing 0.00771 0.00869 1.14261 1.11006
491 Rubber 0.04480 0.05384 1.22591 1. 16560
492-6,499 Other 0.00409 0.00467 1.31252 1.03997
- !
500 Construction 0.00059 0.00105 1.31517 1.525403 .
Notes: 1. This is the bilateral power index most commonly used in
estimation, where the elasticity of demand takes on the value 
unity everywhere (see chapter 6 for details).
2. These figures are provided purely for information, the obser 
vations were not used because of insufficient homogeneity in 
the data (see chapter 6 for details).
3. This industry was sometimes excluded from estimation because 
of lack of information for years later than 1968 (see chapter
6 for details).
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